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ABSTRACT

HAZARD RECOGNITION AND REGULATION:
AN ASBESTOS CHRONOLOGY
by
Diane A. Colson

One hundred years after it was first mined, several
uses of asbestos were banned in the United States.

The

latency period that typifies asbestos-related diseases was
but one factor in the delayed recognition of asbestos as a
health hazard.

Many other factors delayed the initiation of

practical measures to alleviate the hazards.
Controversies surrounding exposure to asbestos continue.
Epidemiological studies have answered many questions, but
many others are, and may remain, unanswered.

Some of the

controversies surrounding exposure to asbestos are embedded
in the development of the United States of America as a
country.

An understanding of the historical basis for these

controversies helps to explain the present relationships
between business, labor, and government, and how these groups
view issues of health and safety.
part of that history.

Asbestos is an integral

It is used as the focus of this

thesis, to examine the interplay of factors and forces which
influenced the development of federal regulation of health
and safety in the United States.
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PREFACE

Although it develops in, and is mined from rock formations,
asbestos breaks into fibers that have the characteristics of
silk or cotton, but will not burn.

Not all fibrous minerals

are asbestos minerals. The term asbestos refers, variously,
to the group, or to a type in the group, or more specifi
cally to the fibers, of six commercial minerals.
Asbestos is a worldwide commodity that was first mined
in the 1870s.

Commercial production of asbestos insulating

materials was recorded by 1874.

Worldwide production and

use of asbestos increased from fifty tons in 1877, to four
million tons per year in 1967.

From 1900 to 1980, some

thirty-six million metric tons were used worldwide.[1]
Asbestos has been used in more than thirty-six hundred
different commercial, consumer, and industrial products.[2]
The unique properties of asbestos fibers, which make
them so useful commercially, also cause specific diseases.
The risk of developing an asbestos-related disease depends
on exposure to airborne asbestos fibers.[3]

An apparent

connection between exposure to asbestos dust and resulting
sickness was noted as early as the first century A. D.
The scarring, or fibrosis, of the lungs caused from
inhaling asbestos fibers, was identified at the turn of the
nineteenth century, and given the name asbestosis in 1927.
Even though there was some awareness that inhalation of
asbestos dust was hazardous, exposure does not cause any
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short term effects, and there are no warning properties.
The ill effects are long term.

Twenty years may elapse

between exposure and the manifestation of an asbestosrelated disease.
In 1963, the only major asbestos-producing mine opera
ting in the United States was GAF's Lowell mine in Vermont.
During that year, four other mining operations began in
California.[4]

In 1978, there were six mine and mill

operations, run by as many companies.

Three of those were

located in California, and one each was in Arizona, Vermont,
and North Carolina.

Total employment for the six firms was

four hundred.[5]
In his 1978 book, Death On The J o b , Berman estimated
that ninety thousand people worked directly with asbestos,
and that another five million worked with asbestos-contain
ing products every day, commenting that "profits and jobs
linked to asbestos have made it politically difficult to cut
back its u s e ."[6]
In 1964, a seminal study on asbestos exposure was
presented at the New York Academy of Sciences International
Conference on Asbestos Disease.

The study, by Selikoff et

al., found high rates of asbestosis, lung cancer, and
mesothelioma, among the cohort when compared with the
general population.

It was not the first study to show

these results, but it was the first to use data gathered
independent of the asbestos industry.

The study was deemed,

by asbestos manufacturers, to be the first definitive study
on the ill health effects from exposure to asbestos.
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The discussions at, and published proceedings of, the
1964 conference initiated a discourse that helped to create a
favorable atmosphere for enactment of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970.
Under its power to regulate commerce, Congress passed
the Occupational Safety and Health Act in 1970.

Asbestos was

the first substance to undergo the formal rulemaking
procedure established by the OSHAct.

It thus became the

subject of the first federal, enforceable, comprehensive
standard for "protecting the health and safety of workers,"
by regulating workplace conditions.
In 1990, the Collegium Ramazzini sponsored a conference
on The Third Wave of Asbestos Disease which categorized three
phases of asbestos exposure. The first included small
populations involved in mining the raw material, and manu
facturing asbestos-containing products. The second phase
involved shipyard and insulation workers who installed those
products.

The third phase is exposure to asbestos-contain

ing materials (ACM) that were put in place between 1930 and
1980.

More than thirty million tons of asbestos was used in

the United States from 1900 to 1980.[7]
Researchers at Mt. Sinai's Occupational Health Clinic
in New York City estimate that twenty-seven million people
worked with asbestos between 1940 and 1980.

Of that popula

tion, more than one million are expected to develop an
asbestos-related disease by the year 2000.

Their research

also estimated that, within the next thirty years, exposure
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to asbestos in the workplace will cause ten thousand cancer
deaths above the normal cancer rate.[8]
OSHA considers occupational exposures which cause more
than one death per one thousand workers over a working life
time to be significant. Its 1994 Final Rule for Occupational
Exposure to Asbestos estimates that the population at risk
from exposure during new construction, renovation, abate
ment, maintenance work and custodial activities ranges from
1,758,006 to 5,751,586.[9]
The other sphere of asbestos exposure is regulated by
EPA under AHERA, which applies to primary and secondary
school buildings.

Benarde, in Our Precarious Habitat:

Fifteen Years Later, estimates the average level of exposure
in schools ranges from 0.001 to 0.004 fibers per cubic
centimeter.

He notes a study by Hughes and Weil of Tulane

University which predicts the lifetime risk for school
children exposed for five years, starting from age ten,
at from 0.02 to 0.37 deaths per million children per
year.[10]

An article by Mossman, in the January 19, 1990

issue of Science, advocates the "amphibole theory."

[11]

This supports the view that other types of asbestos are
more dangerous than chrysotile, which comprised more than
ninety-five percent of all asbestos used in buildings in the
United States.

A review of the article in Time notes that

Mossman estimates the risk to the general public to be no
more one percent of the level deemed safe for workers, even
in buildings where asbestos is damaged and flaking.
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The

Time review states that "the risk of dying from smoking,
drowning, airplane crashes or even playing high school
football is 100 to 1,000 times as great as the risk of
dying from asbestos exposure in buildings."[12]
All or none of these estimates may or may not be
confirmed, but no "safe" level of exposure to asbestos has
been determined.

Public health policy advocates reducing

exposures to the lowest level possible.

OSHA's 1994 rule

reduced the permissible exposure limit to 0.1 fibers per
cubic centimeter (0.1 f/cc), while acknowledging the risk
of developing an asbestos-related disease that still exists
at that level.
The thread of asbestos woven through the development
of the United States of America was slow to unwind, and
hard to break.

Events which got the spool rolling are

presented herein, as are some of the medical studies which
helped distinguish and establish the hazards of exposure to
airborne asbestos fibers.

The final chapter presents a

sampling of the many factors which continue to prompt
controversy concerning asbestos-related diseases.

The many

aspects and controversies concerning sampling and analytical
procedures for estimating exposure levels are only discussed
in the context of the impact of technology in establishing
limit levels of exposure.
It is hoped that the general reader will gain a better
appreciation of how and why the fairly recent clamor about
asbestos developed.

Presenting events in chronological
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order is not always possible due to the long span of time
over which the history unfolds.

Recounting the one hundred

year boom-to-bust sojourn of asbestos in the United States
speaks to the power of labor, of industry, and of consumer
ism.

Each is a driving force of the country's economy, but

in the final analysis, no one should have to sacrifice their
life to boost profits or, without warning, jeopardize their
health to make or use the products that are produced.
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CHAPTER 1

THE MAGIC MINERAL

1.1

Historical Names and Sightings

Asbestos is the common name used in North American and
Northern European languages to identify a group of fibrous
minerals.

The use of the Greek word 'sabestos' was recorded

before the first century AD, to describe the asbestos wicks
which kept their temples lamps and candles burning, but were
not themselves consumed by the flames. The word meant inex
tinguishable or unguenchable, derived from the Greek verb
sbennumi, meaning to quench, die down, or extinguish.[13]
This contradicts an essential characteristic of the mineral,
which is that it does not burn. Its mode of formation was
unknown, but the remarkable physical and chemical properties
of asbestos were obvious, and did not go unnoticed in the
annals of ancient history.
Pliny the Elder, the Roman naturalist, thought that
it grew in the deserts of India, and reported that asbestos
cloth 'came out of the flames whiter and cleaner than it
could possibly have been rendered by the aid of water'.
The incombustible cloth shown to Marco Polo in Siberia was
called salamander, said to be made from the skin of the
salamander which lived in fire.[14] It is said that Charlemange had a tablecloth made of asbestos to impress his
warrior guests.

He would throw it into the fire after

dinner and withdraw it later, clean and intact.[15]

1

In England, the mineral was originally known as amiantus or amianthus, derived from the Greek amiantos, meaning
the material which is undefilable.

It was known as amiante

in French, and amianto in Italian, and Spanish.
it was known as stone flax (Steinflachs).

In Germany

French Canadian

miners referred to it as cotton-stone (pierre-a-coton).[16]

1.2

Properties of Asbestos

The chemical, and morphologic composition of asbestos
differs according to where it is mined, and results in
corresponding changes in physical properties such as range
of the fiber diameter, degree of flexibility, tensile
strength, and surface properties.

In addition to elemental

substitutions, the asbestos varieties are influenced to some
extent by the presence of impurities.

Impurities may be a

part of the crystal structure, or they may be introduced by
associated minerals.
In general, chrysotile deviates less in composition,
and is less variable than the amphibole types.[17]

The

properties may vary considerably with the different types
of, and to a lesser extent, between specimens of, the same
mineral.

Various properties of the commercial varieties

of asbestos are included in Appendix D.

1.2.1 Unique Properties
Properties vary among asbestos types, but commercial value
depends largely on the two common physical characteristics
of noncombustibility, and unique fibrous structure.

1.2.1.1

Water Content, Dehydration, and Mineral Type

Chrysotile contains approximately fourteen percent water.
The water content of the amphibole varieties is only one
or two percent, and they will withstand somewhat higher
temperatures than chrysotile.
X-ray studies in the 1920s confirmed earlier work by
W.T. Schaller, in concluding that all amphiboles contain
water of crystallization.

Myril C. Shaw's work, published

in 1950, indicated that chrysotile contains both (OH), the
hydroxyl radical or water of constitution, and H 2O, the
water of crystallization.
Unlike vegetable and animal fibers, asbestos will not
burn, but it will decompose and lose its essential physical
properties at moderately high temperatures.

Dehydration is

accompanied by a pronounced change in physical properties.
For example, olivine, also called chrysotile or peridot, is
an anhydrous magnesium-iron silicate that does not exhibit
the "asbestiform habit."

Chrysotile, the fibrous form of

serpentine, is a hydrous magnesium silicate.

The adsorbed

water of chrysotile is driven off at about 300 degrees cen
tigrade.

Between 550 and 600 degrees centigrade, all water

of crystallization is driven off, and the mineral gradually
alters to olivine.[18]

1.2.1.2

Fibrous Structure

The outstanding physical

characteristic of asbestos is its unique fibrous structure.
When asbestos minerals are crushed, they have the property

of splitting lengthwise into bundles of fibers of varying
strength and flexibility, exhibiting the "asbestiform
habit".[19]

Unlike hard crystal fragments typical of most

minerals, asbestos minerals yield fibers that can be spun.
The fiberization is a cleavage process, defined as a
tendency in some minerals to split in a certain direction
along planes related to the molecular structure of the
mineral, and parallel to possible crystal faces. Cleavage
is described in five steps from poor (bornite) to fair, good,
perfect, and eminent (mica).[20]

The asbestos varieties

exhibit good to perfect cleavage, crystallizing in bundles
that look like organic fibers.
smaller fibers, or fibrils.

Each fiber is composed of

A strand of human hair is more

than twelve hundred times larger than a typical asbestos
fiber.

Asbestos fibers can stay airborne for weeks.

The

aerodynamic behavior is a function mainly of diameter, but
also of size, shape, and density.[21]

1.2.2 Morphology of Asbestos Fibers
Perhaps egual in importance to the fibrous nature is the
difference in morphology or fiber structure. The most
striking difference between chrysotile and amphibole
fibers is in their shape.

1.2.2.1 Chrysotile

No other mineral is as fibrous as

chrysotile, and its fibers are the most flexible of any
asbestos fibers. In its natural state, chrysotile is

slippery and soapy to the touch. The fibrous surface is
so hard that it will dull a sharp knife, yet it can be
scraped with the fingernails into a soft, fluffy, fine,
fibrous mass, ranging from a lustrous white to shades of
gray.

The fine fibers have a delicate texture, and a

perfectly smooth surface.[22]

Chrysotile fibers can be

separated into fibrils, with diameters in the range of 200
to 400 angstroms (one angstrom equals one ten-billionth of
a meter).

A chrysotile fiber can readily yield one thousand

fibrils of the same length.

Fibers mined from serpentine

rock deposits in Quebec and Vermont varied from one-half
to three inches in length.[23]

The fibers in a piece of

chrysotile as big as the tip of a finger would stretch
around the world if placed end to end.[24]
The typical tubular structure of chrysotile is formed
by the tendency to roll up onto itself as the fiber cleaves,
giving the appearance of long, curved, hollow cylinders.
Some fibers which are solid show an unusual growth pattern.
Filling the cylinder with foreign material may also result
in a solid appearance, and a change in density.

The density

of Arizona and African chrysotile is compatible with tubular
structure, but Canadian chrysotile with a high density has
at least fifty percent filled tubes.[25]

1.2.2.2 Amphiboles

originally, the term asbestos was

applied to fibrous minerals closely related to amphiboles.
Amphibole fibers are usually straight, and exhibit good

cleavage.

The cleavage planes of amphibole minerals are

at about 55 degrees and 125 degrees, forming wedge-shaped
fragments.

The crystals are often long or needle-like, and

when short, they are six-sided.[26] The amphibole fibers are
acicular, with minimal diameters of 600 to 2500 angstroms.
After fiberizing processes, the amphiboles produce a great
flocculent volume, composed mainly of air held in minute
cells by the framework of fibers.[27]

1.2.3 Specific Properties by Type
Heat resistance and ease or difficulty of fiberization were
important properties for the commercialization of asbestos.
Other important properties include flexibility, durability,
high tensile strength, high strength-to-weight ratio, chem
ical, corrosion and moisture resistance, and resistance to
searing temperatures. The varying chemical compositions and
physical properties of the asbestos varieties made them more
or less suitable to certain commercial applications.

1.2.3.1 Properties of Chrysotile

Chrysotile, also called

white asbestos, is the only variety with a positive electric
charge. It is very elastic, and the most flexible of the
asbestos varieties. It also has the highest resistance to
heat, becoming brittle around 650 degrees centigrade, and
fusing at well over 1,000 degrees centigrade. Chrysotile has
virtually no resistance to acids, and is readily decomposed
by sea water and moist air. The fibers are long, and strong,
easily separable, and have a silky luster.

1.2.3.2 Properties of the Amphiboles

Amphiboles are

straighter and harsher than chrysotile, but will withstand
somewhat higher temperatures.

Amosite and crocidolite were

the most widely used amphiboles.
Amosite, or brown asbestos, is a ferrous silicate in
which a proportion of the iron is replaced by magnesium.
It has good tensile strength, heat resistance and flexi
bility.

It is less resistant to acids than crocidolite,

but fuses at a higher temperature. Its fibers are fairly
strong, and unusually long, but coarse.
Crocidolite, or blue asbestos is a complex silicate of
iron and sodium.

It is the strongest of all natural fibers,

with a basic tensile strength 1-1/2 times that of steel
piano-wire.[28] It is noted for resistance to acids, alkalis
neutral salts, and organic solvents, but will discolor and
loose strength at temperatures above 360 degrees centigrade,
as a result of oxidation.
Tremolite is a calcium-magnesium silicate.

It is

characterized by the lack of iron, and resistance to acids.
The fibers are long and silky, but brittle, and low in
tensile strength.
Anthophyllite is a silicate of magnesium and iron,
usually with small amounts of aluminum. Its fibers are
usually brittle, and lack tensile strength. Both tremolite
and anthophyllite are superior to chrysotile in resistance
to chemical reaction.

Actin is similar to tremolite, except that iron
replaces some of the magnesium.

It has good resistance

to acids, and the lowest tensile strength of the asbestos
varieties.

Its fibers are weak and brittle.[29]

1.3

Historical Early Uses

Sometimes called the "Funeral Dress of Kings," asbestos
cloth was used in ancient Egypt as a burial shroud to keep
the ashes of the royally deceased separate and protected
from those fueling the funeral pyre.[30]

Clay pots from

Finland in this same era, cira 2500 BC, contained asbestos
as a binder to enhance the material strength.[31]
The first recorded use of the material for acoustic
purposes was in 28 BC, when Anaxilaus, a Greek doctor,
described how a tree could be felled noiselessly if it was
surrounded by asbestos linen.

Pliny the Elder recorded

that it would not burn in the first century BC, and also
noted its apparent debilitating effect on slaves weaving
asbestos cloth.
Until the end of the 17th century, asbestos was more
an object of superstition and curiosity than a commercial
commodity.[32]

As late as the 1880s, its properties were

so singular, and its occurrence in nature so unusual, that
it almost defied classification.[33]

1.4

Mining

Asbestos is mined like other minerals, in huge open-pit
or underground workings.

"Crude" asbestos was separated

from dirt and rock, and sorted into groups for milling.
"Milled" asbestos consists of all grades produced by
mechanical treatment such as crushing, screening and air
separation.

The end product is graded by fiber length.[34]

All uses of asbestos are as processed fiber.
fibers were used in the textile industry.

Long

The shorter

fibers were used in a variety of products, according to
their individual properties. Because the various asbestos
minerals differ in their chemical composition, crystalline
structure, fiber dimensions, and chemical properties, they
share certain properties to varying degrees, but each has
distinctive properties.
The asbestos miner had virtually no control over the
percentage of the various grades produced, and the prop
erties of a particular asbestos type were often associated
with the mine or location from which it was extracted.
Commercial mining of asbestos began in the 1870s, in
a remote region of the Italian Alps.

The Italian chrysotile

asbestos fibers were straight, smooth, and slippery. Cotton
fibers were mixed in to enable spinning.

The large chrso-

tile deposits in Canada were first mined in 1876.

Although

not as long as the Italian variety, the Canadian fiber had a
slight hook on it that enabled easy spinning.

Within a few

10
years there were four mines operating in the vicinity of
Thetford, Quebec.[35]

1.5

Deposits

Development of the extensive chrysotile deposits in eastern
Quebec in the 1880s was followed by further exploitation of
already known and extensive deposits.

Major deposits of

chrysotile occur in the southern Ural Mountains of Russia,
eastern and southeastern Quebec, and the Italian Alps. The
Italian Alps deposits are in Susa, Lanzo, and Val Malenco.
Limited deposits were located in Italy and Cyprus. Signifi
cant deposits in the United States were mined in Arizona,
California and Vermont.[36]
South Africa is the major source for both amosite and
crocidolite.

Deposits of the famous Cape blue variety of

crocidolite near Prieska were first mined in 1891.[37]
Limited deposits of crocidolite were also mined in Australia,
Brazil and Canada.

Amosite was first discovered in the

Transvaal, South Africa, in 1907, where commercial mining
began in 1908.[38]

1.6

Summary

In antiquity, asbestos was known for its resistance to fire.
The wide spread modern use of asbestos is intimately
connected with industrialization, and the use of asbestos for
the conservation of heat, to make the steam-powered machinery

which propelled that era more efficient.

The variety of

favorable and adaptable properties probably accounts for
the diverse applications and multiple uses of asbestos.
Crude asbestos fibers could be separated by standard
industrial procedures into useful sizes, and were easily
incorporated into the manufacturing operations of already
established industries such as commercial mining, and
textiles.

The relatively limited use of asbestos was greatly

expanded during the Industrial Revolution.

A vast industry

evolved, using asbestos as the raw material of choice, to
manufacture a great variety of valuable products.[39]
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Figure 2.1 Flow diagram for asbestos textile
manufacture.
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CHAPTER 2

DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF COMMERCE

2.1

Textiles

The Industrial Revolution began in England around 1760,
and later spread to other countries, including the American
colonies.

The most important developments in England's

Industrial Revolution came in the field of textiles.[40]

2.1.1

Textile Operations

Asbestos fibers pass through the same steps as cotton, an
operation which was well established by the time the first
Italian asbestos was used as a raw material in England's
textile industry.

The principal textile operations are

carding, spinning, and weaving.
After leaving the mines, crude asbestos was shipped to
England for further processing.
the longer fibers by hand.

At first, workers picked out

Eventually, the raw material was

separated by mechanical processes.

The asbestos fiber was

then grouped and graded according to length.

Those of

suitable length were used to make yarn, rope, and assorted
fabrics.[41]

The operation starts with breakers and crushers

to separate and clean the fiber, while guiding it over slats,
screens, and rollers.

The fibers are formed into a large,

round, soft roll called a picker "lap."
ready for carding.[42]

12

In this form it is
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Carding is the specific operation for opening up the
fibers, further eliminating dirt and foreign substances.
It also straightens the fibers somewhat and removes some of
the very short fibers.

The fibers leave the carding machine

with no twist, in a long, soft, round rope called a "card
sliver.11
The slivers are drawn out, to straighten the fibers
and lay them as parallel as possible and at the same time
to reduce the strand in diameter.

Roving continues the

drawing-out process and gives a twist to the sliver.

Leaving

the roving machine, the strand is called a "roving" and is
ready for spinning into yarn. Drawing and roving are the
necessary final operations prior to spinning.[43]
Spinning completes the drawing operation.

The strand

is drawn out to the final si2e required? it is then given the
desired amount of twist, and is wound on bobbins, spools, or
other suitable packages.

In this form it is called "yarn,"

and can be woven, knitted, twisted, or plaited into fabrics.
A small percentage of cotton was usually blended with the
straight, smooth Italian fibers
to facilitate the spinning operation.

This addition was not

necessary for the Canadian fiber, which already had a slight
hook.

The characteristic hook and more accessible location,

made Canadian fiber more desirable than the Italian fiber as
a raw material.
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2.1.2

Textile Industry, England

The number of textile mills grew as various inventions
speeded production.

Spinning and weaving were slow, hand

crafted arts practiced with little change for about seven
thousand years until 1733, when John Kay invented the "flying
shuttle."

This device allowed a single weaver to sit at the

center of the loom and pull a handle that sent the shuttle
twice the distance previously covered by hand.

It enabled

weavers to weave fabric faster than spinners could make
thread.
That same year, John Wyatt and his partner Lewis Paul
introduced the use of mechanical rollers to form a tough,
compressed thread that could be stretched out in spinning to
any desired fineness.

In 1769 Richard Arkwright, a barber

who became Britain's first great industrialist-capitalist,
gave England "the power of cotton."

Arkwright made and

patented the first spinning machine powered by waterwheel.
Called a "water frame", it had a series of rollers that
could spin a much stronger cotton thread faster, and made
it possible for cloth to be woven entirely of cotton.
Arkwright was also the first to develop the factory system
by taking textile workers out of their homes.[44]
In 1770, James Hargreaves invented the "spinning jenny,"
which could operate a number of spindles simultaneously.[45]
It produced more thread in a day than six or eight human
spinners and their handwheels.

In 1779, Samuel Crompton
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combined the water frame's rollers and the jenny's movable
carriage into a "mule," able to produce stronger thread at
higher speed.[46]

Mule spinning is an intermittent process,

but drawing out and twisting operations are performed at the
same time.[47]

Crompton's mule became the standard for the

textile industry.

One worker with a Crompton mule could spin

as much thread in a day as three hundred workers could spin
in 1760 with handwheels.[48]
The conversion to steam powered machinery started in
1785, when Edmund Cartwright, a clergyman, built a power
loom.

It used horse power at first, and then steam.[49]

By

1785 steam power was applied to drive machines for spinning
and weaving.

Spinning mules driven by water or steam were

soon producing literally millions of miles of yarn and
thread.

The textile mills made Britain the world's richest

industrial power, boosting exports from insignificance in
1780, to nearly eight million pounds sterling two decades
later.

By 1824, the textile industry, regarded as "the

sacred staple and foundation" of British wealth, was well
on the way to complete conversion to steam [50] as the main
power source for the various machines used in the textile
industry.

2.1.3

Textile Industry, United States

Factories using jennies were established in 1787, in Phil
adelphia, in Beverly, Massachusetts, and elsewhere in the
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country, but none proved successful, partly because of the
inferior quality of the product.

To protect its cotton

trade, England forbade export of textile machinery, or its
design.

The textile industry was smuggled to the United

States by Samuel Slater, an apprentice working in Belper,
England for one of Richard Arkwright's partners.
Slater left England in 1789 to pursue his fortune in
America.

Early in 1790, he sought out Moses Brown, who ran

a spinning mill in Providence, Rhode Island.

They set up a

business agreement, and Slater set to work building textile
machinery from memory.

Four days before Christmas, 1790,

the machines started to spin, powered by the arm of an
elderly Negro man named Samuel Brunius Jenks.

Later, water

power was supplied from the falls of the Blackstone River.
Within four years of leaving England, Slater built the first
successful cotton-spinning mill in the United States, on a
site in Pawtucket, Rhode Island.
By 1804, a Pittsburgh factory was selling textile
machinery, and by 1807, there were fifteen or twenty mills,
with about 8,000 spindles in operation.

By 1810 there were

some ninety mills operating perhaps 80,000 spindles.

Ten

years later the number of spindles in use had climbed to
191,000.
In 1812, upon his return from two years in England
studying the industry, Francis Cabot Lowell designed, from
memory, a textile operation at a plant in Waltham, Massachu

setts.

This may have been the first time anywhere that both

the spinning and weaving processes came together under one
roof.[51]

2.2

Transportation

It is said that the United States of America could not have
been without the steam engine.

The steam engine consumed

and wasted considerable fuel, but it also fueled the devel
opment of America and the transportation network needed to
support it.

The American Revolution officially ended with

the signing of the Peace Treaty of Paris, on September 3,
1783.

What emerged from the Revolutionary War were some four

million people living in thirteen states,

joined in a loose

federation, strung out along the Atlantic seaboard.

Wagons

and roads were an expensive way to carry merchandise,
especially bulk freight.

The network of waterways available

made the steamboat a natural alternative to overland
transport.[52]

2.2.1

Steamboats

The first commercially successful steamboat run in America
was developed by Robert Fulton of Pennsylvania.[53]

In 1806,

Fulton returned from twenty years in Europe with a Boulton &
Watt engine that he had managed to take out of England.

In

August, 1907, he launched the flat-bottomed, 100-ton North
River Steamboat on the Hudson River.

Within two months, it

was carrying sixty to ninety passengers on each trip between
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New York and Albany, covering the 150 miles in thirty-six
hours or less. In time, Fulton renamed his flagship the
Cleremont.[54]
The prosperity of the shipping industry flourished
throughout America from 1792 to 1807.

Output from the

shipyards rose from 200,000 tons in 1789 to 1,400,000 in
1810. By this time, American ship's were hauling ninety
per cent or more of both the nation's exports and imports,
the value of which had more than tripled since the 1760s.
Improved engines and the use of screw propellers pro
duced more powerful boats, cutting travel times substan
tially.

An upriver trip from New Orleans to Louisville,

which once required twenty-five days, was reduced to less
than five days.

By 1820, sixty steamboats were operating on

the western rivers.

Exports had climbed to $70 million, and

imports to $74 million. Steamboats were largely responsible
for the growth of Mississippi Valley commerce, estimated at
more than $650 million by 1852. Navigation of the waterways
was a natural development, especially on the eastern rivers
where passenger traffic was more important, but the railroad
was recognized as a key factor in developing the transporta
tion network and the push to go west.

The railroads got a

much later start than steamboats, partly because of the
large capital expense required and partly due to the lag
in technology.[55]
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2.2.2

Railroads

Like the steamboat, the railroad, got its start in England.
The early steam engines were bulky, extremely hot, and could
not be used where fire was a hazard.
huge amounts of fuel.

They also consumed

The possibility of using steam loco

motives instead of horses to haul coal from the mine pits
of England inspired experiments using faster, more compact
engines.

This produced a variety of coaches and configura

tions intended for rail transport, some of which had trouble
staying on the rails.
In 1829, the Rainhill contest was held to determine
which locomotive to use on the thirty-five mile track built
for the new Liverpool & Manchester Railway.

Stephenson's

Rocket won by hauling a thirteen-ton train an average of
fifteen miles per hour.

With this event, problems of

technology were considered solved.
The first successful railroad in America, the Baltimore

& Ohio, was chartered in 1827.

The B & 0 had a 300-mile (480

km) right of way from Baltimore, Maryland, across the
Allegheny wilderness to Wheeling, Ohio.

The first thirteen

mile (21 km) stretch of B & O track was designed for horsedrawn cars traveling between Baltimore and Ellicott's Mills,
Maryland.

By 1833, 137 miles (220 km) of track to Harper's

Ferry, Virginia had been completed.

It was the longest

stretch of railroad track in the world.[56]
The Mohawk & Hudson, chartered in 1826, was the earl
iest forbear of the New York Central.

The Mohawk & Hudson

railroad opened in 1830, as did the Charleston & Hamburg,
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followed by the New York and Erie in New York, the Western
in Massachusetts, and many more small lines.[57]

By 1830,

some 230 steamers were churning America's rivers and the
American railroad industry was developing full steam ahead.
Within ten years, the fame of American locomotives had spread
abroad and their manufacturers began filling orders from
Russia, Germany, Austria, Cuba, even England itself.[58]
One bottleneck to railroad expansion was overcome in
1839, when the Burden railroad spike machine was developed.
It formed spikes in one operation, and produced them at a
rate of fifty per minute, much more than fifty blacksmiths
and their helpers could forge.
By 1840 more than 400 companies were operating almost
3,000 miles of track, and heavy duty steam-driven machinery
was invented or adapted as needed to continue the push west.
Between 1820 and 1850 the population of the United States
grew from 7.9 million to 19.6 million, with the population
living west of the Alleghenies rising from 27 to 45 per cent
in that period.[59]
Between 1850 and 1860 rail mileage tripled to thirty
thousand (40,000 km). Most of the new construction occurred
in the Midwest, connecting cities of the east with those on
the Great Lakes and along the Mississippi, and the Ohio
Rivers.[60]

In 1868, George Westinghouse invented the air

brake, making the use of more powerful locomotives possible.
The first transcontinental railroad was established on May
10, 1869, when the Golden Spike driven at Promontory Point,
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Utah, joined the Union Pacific and Central Pacific rail
roads.

A cross-country trip that had taken 118 days twenty

years ago was now completed in a little over six days.
Between 1868 and 1873, thirty-three thousand miles of
rails were laid, and many lines were double-tracked, with
steel rails beginning to replace iron.[61]

In addition to

greater passenger comfort and speed, railroads cut inland
freight rates still further and brought a mobility that
was vital to the nation's commerce.[62]

2.2.3

Automobiles

The search for an internal combustion engine was advanced
in 1860 when French inventor Etienne Lenoir built a small,
single-cylinder, internal-combustion gas engine, but its
running costs were excessive compared with steam engines.
Ford built his first successful automobile in Dearborn,
Michigan, in 1896.

It had a two-cylinder, four horsepower

(3 kW) gasoline engine, and could travel sixty miles (100 km)
on its three gallon maximum capacity tank.

Three years

later, Ford quit his engineering job with the Detroit Edison
Company to concentrate on building the car he envisioned.
In 1908, he introduced the Model T, a sturdy, practically
indestructible car that cost $850.
The long sought concept of cost effectiveness through
assembly-line production was finally achieved at Ford's
Highland Park, Michigan plant.

In 1913, assembly of the

Model T 's five thousand parts were consolidated into
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defined, successive, linear operations.

The car drove

out onto John R. Street on operation number forty-five.
As production climbed from 78,440 cars in 1911-1912
to 785,432 in 1916-1917, the Model T's price plummeted from
$690 to $360. Before Ford discontinued them in 1927, some
fifteen million Model Ts had rolled off the assembly line.
Ford's Model T made automobile ownership possible for the
average working person, and demonstrated the efficiency of
assembly line production.

Since then, both the number and

variety of products and assembly lines have multiplied
beyond reckoning.[63]
The overwhelming success of the automobile brought a
new asbestos friction product into the market.

In 1907,

a woven asbestos fabric and wire composition product was
introduced.

It replaced the use of leather in brake shoes

and clutch facings.[64]

The best braking materials convert

kinetic energy into heat very rapidly, and then dissipate
the heat as quickly as possible.[65]

This ability, along

with other properties, including durability, traction,
resistance to thermal and chemical breakdown, and
incombustibility, made asbestos ideal for brakes.[66]

2.3

New Products and Uses Developed for Asbestos

The Industrial Revolution that had started in 1760 in England
reached America about fifty years later, and was embraced
with a vengeance in those industries which had been imported
to the American colonies.

Growth of the nation's industries
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and transportation network was made possible by adopting,
adapting, and improving steam technology.

2.3.1 The Power of Steam
The steam engine was the preeminent source of power in the
nineteenth century.

Because it was virtually impossible

to machine cylinders and pistons to fit together exactly,
various kinds of seals or packings had to be used.

Most

common in the mid-nineteenth century were leather packings
or hemp soaked in grease. These and other organic materials
deteriorated rapidly under the extreme conditions in the
interior of steam engines.[67]
A major improvement in precision parts machining in
1776 led to the development of mass production.[68]

By

the 1850s, the standardized part was a symbol of American
industrial practice.

By the 1860s, asbestos was being spun,

woven, or fashioned into a type of millboard or corrugated
cardboard for use as a packing and sealing material. Asbes
tos was uniquely suited to this use "owing to its power of
resisting moisture, friction, high temperatures, and even
flame itself."[69]
Advances in steam engineering led to higher steam
pressures and temperatures.
was still a major problem.

Wasted fuel due to heat loss
Eighty to ninety percent of the

heat loss could be prevented by providing insulated cover
ings. [70]

Asbestos was a component in a large number of the

new products developed for insulating hot engines, boilers,
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and piping.

One of these new products was called eighty-

five percent (85%) magnesia.

2.3.2 Eighty-five Percent Magnesia Insulation
In 1885 Hiram M. Hanmore, a pipe coverer, began to mix
magnesia with other pipe-covering materials and patented his
idea.

The addition of asbestos fiber acted as a binder to

give strength and cohesion to the magnesia sludge, which
could then be cast or molded into standard shapes and dried.
The optimum mix was eighty-five percent magnesia and fifteen
percent finely divided, long fiber chrysotile asbestos, the
only type available when eighty-five percent magnesia was
developed.
The use of eighty-five magnesia insulation spread
rapidly, especially in the United States.

By 1888 the U.S.

Navy used coverings of eighty-five magnesia almost exclu
sively in its capital ships "because by maximum conservation
of heat these coverings enabled ships to steam farther on a
given coal capacity."

In the 1880s and early 1890s, such

products could be sold on the basis of their efficiency as
well as their cost effectiveness.[71]
As the variety of materials enhanced by the thermal,
condensation, and noise insulating properties of asbestos
became more popular, they were used for a variety of pur
poses in shipbuilding.

A characteristic difference among

the types of asbestos was also utilized by the Navy to reduce
the tonnage of naval vessels.

2.3.3

Use of Asbestos in Naval Vessels

During World War I, the allied powers agreed to a proposal
by Charles Evans Hughes, Secretary of State under President
Harding.[72] The 1921 Washington Treaty of Limitations in
Tonnage called for a drastic reduction in the gross weight
of naval vessels.

The use of amosite reduced the density of

eighty-five magnesia insulation from 16-26 to 14-18 pounds
per cubic foot.

Long fiber amosite was also less costly

than the Canadian chrysotile.

By switching to eighty-five

magnesia insulation made with amosite, heavier weapons
could be utilized without increasing the total weight of
the vessels.
Amosite felt was developed in 1934.

It was lighter,

more resistant to higher temperatures (up to 900 degrees
Farenheight), and more flexible than any previous insulating
material.

Loosely compacted amosite felt did not pack under

vibration.

The fabric retained its insulating qualities

after it got wet and dried out again.

Amosite felt was used

as a protective covering for eighty-five magnesia insulation
and other forms of insulation, and for turbines, valves, and
fittings on virtually all U.S. combat vessels built just
before World War II.[73]
Other weight saving materials which incorporated amosite
into naval vessels included a lightweight, fireproof
wallboard, called Marinite, used for partitions, and amosite
insulated mattresses.
pounds per cubic foot.

The amosite mattresses weighed 9-1/2
Those made of chrysotile weighed up

to fifty percent more, and would not conform with Navy
specifications.

Asbestos was also used in other personal

items, such as safety clothing, curtains and blankets on
board the ships.[74]
Asbestos was utilized extensively by the Navy during
building, conversion, and repair to insulate and fire-proof
hulls, boilers, engines, electrical lines, and piping.

The

work was often carried out in confined spaces under cramped
conditions without any ventilation or other respiratory
protection.

CHAPTER 3

THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY

3.1 Development
Speculation in asbestos contributed to one of the severest
depressions the country had ever experienced during the
Panic of 1893.

In one six-month period, eight thousand

businesses failed.

One company that managed to survive

was the H.W. Johns Manufacturing Company of New York.[75]
The company's name would be as indelibly linked to asbestos
as the Industrial Revolution's was to the power of steam.

3.1.1 The H. W. Johns Manufacturing Company
Henry Ward Johns had moved to Brooklyn in 1858 at the age
of twenty-one, and began a small business handling roofing
materials.

Upon learning about the properties of asbestos,

Johns experimented with various ways to incorporate it
into his products.

He patented roofing material made with

asbestos in 1868 and also developed a prefabricated pipe
covering.

This new insulation product was lined with

asbestos paper and precut to standard sizes. It could be
wrapped or wired around pipes.

The company's sales

increased immediately.
Asbestos fibers added strength to the insulation and
roofing materials. Shorter, inferior fibers were suited for
these products and much less expensive than importing the
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long fiber Italian asbestos.

The raw material needed by

Johns' products could be provided from local sources, such
as the minor deposit of asbestiform material discovered on
Staten Island in 1874. By 1880, the H.W. Johns Manufacturing
Company had a second factory in Brooklyn manufacturing paints
made with asbestos, marketed as a fireproofing product.[76]

3.1.2

The Birth of an Industry

In 1880 several European mining and manufacturing companies
combined to form the United Asbestos Company, Inc., and
subsequently monopolized the Italian chrysotile deposits.[77]
The demand for noncombustible fabrics produced by the cotton
industry in England and France provided incentive for
commercial development of the mines.

Incorporating asbestos

gave the fabrics increased durability and better sealing
properties.[78 ]
The chrysotile deposits discovered in Canada in 1876
opened a new supply source, and the slight hook on the
Canadian fibers saved steps in processing for textile
applications.

An asbestos industry that had been virtually

non-existent in the United States was about to evolve.

Johns

and his American competitors soon became the major consumers
of Canadian asbestos.

By 1889 the United Asbestos Company

had acknowledged the superiority of the Canadian fiber and
obtained mines in Quebec.[79]

The cost of asbestos had risen steadily during the
1880s.
per ton.

In 1889, first-quality fiber ranged from $80 to $120
By 1891, first-guality asbestos sold for $250 per

ton or more.

The typical cost of production and preparation

for market of a ton of asbestos was about $25.

As demand for

asbestos increased, additional efforts were made to use the
cruder fibers and to extract even more fibers from what had
previously been considered waste material.

Removal of

impurities became important when it was discovered that they,
and not the asbestos fibers in the packing material used in
steam engines, caused scoring of the piston rods.

The

introduction of more capital eguipment and machinery to
accomplish the needed operations decreased production costs
to about $15 dollars a ton.

Mining was a profitable

operation for companies which could finance the needed
acquisitions, and asbestos mining was recommended as an
ideal investment.

3.1.3 The Johns-Manville Corporation
In 1891 the H. W. Johns Manufacturing Company of New York
retained its name and joined with several other firms and
competitors to become the largest asbestos manufacturer and
dealer in the world.

Now the company had factories in New

York, Chicago, and Philadelphia, which more than quadrupled
Johns's former production capacity.

By the early 1890s the

new company had obtained its own mine in Canada, as did other
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asbestos manufacturing companies in both the United States
and Europe.[80]

The first asbestos textile mill in the

United States opened in 1896.[81]
In 1898, Johns died in Yonkers of scarring of the
lungs.[82] His death certificate listed the cause as "dust
phthisis pneumonitis," which was probably a medical euphemism
for asbestosis.[83] His son took over the company.

One

vendor of Johns' products was a company started in 1886 by
Charles B. Manville and his three sons.

The Manville

Coverings Company of Milwaukee also manufactured pipe and
boiler coverings, but none contained asbestos.

Manville sold

Johns' asbestos insulation products in the midwest for high
temperature applications. By the end of the century, the
Johns Company was deeply in debt.

The paint company was sold

first, and a buy-out of the entire company to the Manville
Covering Company of Milwaukee was arranged in 1901.[84]
Thomas F. Manville, a son of the Manville Company's
founder, became president of the new Johns-Manville Company.
Rather than focus on research and development as Johns had,
Manville further diversified the company's product line by
adding hundreds of non-asbestos products.[85] He built a big
hotel in the small town of Manville, which had developed
around the complex of asbestos factories started there in
1912.[86] He also established an extensive network of sales
offices throughout the country staffed by salaried agents.
By the fall of 1925, when T. F. Manville suddenly dropped
dead in his hotel room, the company had sales of almost forty
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million dollars a year and a catalogue of two thousand
different products.[87]

3.2 Products and Competition
Growing recognition of the adaptability and utility
of asbestos for modern industrial use stimulated the rapid
exploitation of the Canadian deposits, and an expansion of
asbestos manufacturing.[88]

3.2.1 Fiber Sizes Used in Products
The longer fibers (greater than 6 mm) were spun and woven
into rope, tape or cloth.[89] Fabrics made of asbestos were
soft, flexible, and very strong.

They were widely used

commercially where fire protection was essential. Common uses
were curtains in theatres, or protective clothing in certain
industries, including aprons, helmets, arm protectors,
gloves, leggings, shoes, coats, and overalls.[90]

As early

as 1853, the uniform worn by the Parisian Fire Brigade
consisted of a full hooded body jacket of asbestos-containing
material (ACM).

Fifty years later, fire fighters uniforms

made of ACM encapsulated the whole body.[91]
Intermediate (2 to 6 mm) and the smallest size fibers
(less than 2 mm) were more abundant than the longer fibers.
They were used in products such as packing for steam
engines; building materials such as roofing, shingles, and
caulking; millboard; paper products; paint; brake linings;
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clutch facings; electrical insulation; floor tiles; and
filters.[92]

3.2.2 Friction Products
American companies competing with Johns-Manville included
Keasbey and Mattison of Ambler, Pennsylvania, and Philip
Carey Company of Cincinnati.

Each had their own mines, and

manufactured roofing and insulation products.

The Asbestos

Corporation, a combination of Canadian mining companies, was
also active in this market.

Other companies concentrated on

newer specialty asbestos products, one of which was the
manufacture of "friction products."

These were primarily

brake shoes and clutch facings, in demand due to the
continuing rise in automobile sales.[93]
At the end of World War I, there were 5.5 million motor
cars in America - one for every nineteen Americans.[94]

In

1920 there were 8.25 million registered automobiles. The high
numbers of people killed and injured each year in automobile
accidents from driving without experience prompted a rapid
conversion in the mid-1920s from two-wheel to four-wheel
brakes as a safety measure.[95]

By 1927 the number of

automobiles had more than doubled the 1920 figure.

By the

end of the 1920s, there were more than 23 million cars on the
roads - about one for every five Americans.[96] All of those
vehicles had brakes and clutches that required asbestos
friction products.[97]
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Companies competing with Johns-Manville in the friction
products market included the Raybestos Company, formed in
1916 in Connecticut; the General Asbestos and Rubber Company
of South Carolina, started in 1895; and the Manhattan Rubber
Manufacturing Company, which began in New Jersey in 1893.
Raybestos bought out the General Asbestos and Rubber Company
in 1925.

Four years later, it consolidated with the

Manhattan Rubber Company to become Raybestos-Manhattan
Company, the country's largest manufacturer of friction
products.[98]
Johns-Manville continued to dominate the building
products and insulation sector, listing over fifty sales
offices in the company's 1927 annual report.

After T. F.

Manville died, his younger brother had become president.
Hiram Edward Manville consolidated, then promptly sold most
of his holdings, retained a large block of Manville stock,
and went into semi-retirement as chairman of the executive
committee.[99] By 1927, Johns-Manville was no longer a
family-owned business.[100] That was the same year in which
Cooke coined the term asbestosis to describe an industrial
lung disease caused by inhaling asbestos dust.

3.3

Summary

The asbestos industry was poised to take off, and their
main concern was the ability to sustain a very profitable
business.

Industry, medical, and government interests and

interactions, in combination with a number of other factors,

served to delay the consideration of practical measures to
prevent exposures to asbestos.
As the industry grew, its executives collaborated to
preclude damaging information about asbestos, while influ
encing legislation favorable to their business interests.
Industry manipulated the dissemination of medical data as a
condition of sponsorship, and controlled the workplace as a
function of ownership.

Industry's influence on the medical

community compromised the research that was being conducted
and what was known about the hazards.

CHAPTER 4

MEDICAL AWARENESS in ENGLAND

4.1 Introduction
The ability to control hazards depends on the knowledge
and assessment of the cause, as derived from some measure
of exposure.

The most accurate measures of occupational

exposures are obtained from workers and workplace condi
tions. [102]

During the first quarter of the nineteenth

century, there were few regulatory restrictions and almost
nothing was done to control dust levels in asbestos
factories.

Little medical information was gathered on

asbestosis and few dust samples were taken.[103]
The long latency period of asbestos-related disease,
ignorance about the cause, confusion with other pulmonary
disease-causing agents, and evaluation of exposure were
factors in establishing the hazards of working with asbestos.
Awareness of the dangers posed by inhalation of asbestos
fibers existed long before medical evidence established the
nature of the hazard.[104]

Some of the studies and reports

from England which established the nature of the hazard are
presented briefly in this section.
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4.2 Early Reports of Disease
4.2.1 British Home Office Report, 1898
Until the 1870s, there had been minimal importation of
asbestos into England.

The Industrial Revolution and the

inventions it spawned occurred there first, as did the
first documented case of asbestos-related disease.[105]
It was reported approximately thirty years after chrysotile
was first mined, but serious health effects were noted before
the turn of the century.
The earliest British government document to cite
the hazards of asbestos fiber was The Annual Report of Her
Majesty's Women Inspectors, in 1898.[106]

The report

mentioned asbestos textile work specifically, and identified
common symptoms exhibited from the effects of the dust on
the respiratory system.[107] Eight years later, the Lady
Inspector of Factories reported that, of all the "dusty
trades" for which complaints were received, none surpassed
the injuriousness of asbestos processes."[108]

4.2.2 Report of Mortality, 1906
The results of the first study of mortality among asbestos
workers appeared in 1906, in the Bulletin de 1'Inspection du
Travail et de l'Hyqiene Industrielle.[109] The article was an
account by an inspector in the Department of Labor at Caen
named Auribault.

He was reporting on conditions at an

asbestos-weaving mill that had been established in 1890.
Fifty workers died in the first five years of the mill's
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operation, including all but one of seventeen workers
recruited by the factory's director, from the staff of a
cotton mill he had previously owned.

4.2.3 Murray, 1900
The first fatal case of pulmonary asbestosis was observed in
1900 by Dr. H. Montague Murray, Senior Physician at Charing
Cross Hospital in London.

It involved a thirty-three year

old man who had worked for fourteen years in an asbestos
textile factory.

He claimed to be the last survivor of ten

men who had been working in the carding room of the factory
when he started in 1886.
severe pulmonary fibrosis.

The patient had been suffering from
At autopsy, Murray found spicules

of asbestos in the lung tissue.[110]

Although not the first

such case reported in detail, Murray's was the first with a
post-mortem description of the victim's lungs as extremely
tough and fibrous, especially in the lower parts.[Ill]

As

the first documented case of a death resulting specifically
from asbestos, it established a presumptive connection
between occupation and disease.[112]
In testimony before a British Departmental Committee on
Compensation for Industrial Diseases in 1906, Murray said,
"that considerable trouble is now taken to prevent the
inhalation of dust, and so the disease is not so likely to
occur as heretofore."[113] His correlation between asbestos
dust and disease prevailed for the next two decades.
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Attention focused on reduction of the high dust levels
and dusty conditions commonly found in industry.

4.2.4 Cooke, 1927
In 1927, the year in which Johns-Manville ceased to be
a family-owned business, Dr. W. E. Cooke, an English
physician, coined the term asbestosis.

Cooke used the term

to describe[114] the unusual fibrosis of the lungs he had
observed and previously reported, regarding the case of a
thirty-three year old female patient.

At the age of

thirteen, she had started working in an English asbestostextile factory that had no system to remove dust. By 1917,
after thirteen years of exposure, she was coughing and in
bad health.[115]
The case had been detailed in Cooke's article "Fibrosis
of the Lungs Due to the Inhalation of Asbestos D u s t ,"
published in the July 26, 1924, edition of the British
Medical Journal.r1161

The autopsy showed extensive pulmonary

fibrosis and dense strands of abnormal fibrous tissue
connecting the lungs and the pleural membranes surrounding
them.[117]

It was the first clear case of death due to

asbestos exposure, and only the second death from asbestosis
that had been so identified.[118]
Cooke's discovery sparked intensive study in England
over the next seven years.

The most important work was

conducted by Dr. E.R.A. Merewether, Medical Inspector of
Factories for the British Home Office.[119]
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4.3 Medical Studies in England
4.3.1 Merewether, 1930 - Asbestosis and Silicosis
In 1928 the British Medical Journal published Seiler's
South African case of "pure" asbestosis in an asbestos
textile worker.
reported.

This was only the third such case

It prompted the Factories Department of the

Home Office to initiate a study of asbestos textile workers
in England's factories.[120]
Between 1928 and 1929, a comprehensive study was
conducted by Merewether and Price.

Their investigation

was confined to workers exposed to pure asbestos fibers.[121]
After excluding other possible causes, they concluded that
over one-quarter of the workers had contracted the disease
because of their occupation.[122]
Merewether and Price determined that, over a period of
years, inhalation of asbestos resulted in serious fibrosis in
those air-cells of the lungs where the asbestos came to rest.
The normal reserve capacity of the lungs masked the effect
for some years.

They found that the disease could be fatal,

with no detectable difference evident, when considering the
different types of asbestos fibers used in British industry.
They also discovered that the disease was dose-related.
Workers exposed to higher concentrations of dust had a
greater probability of becoming ill.
Of the 160 factories employing 2,200 workers in manu
facturing asbestos products in England in 1930, Merewether
and Price found 18 factories involved in weaving textiles
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from fibers.

MuCulloch outlines how the subjects were

selected and gives a description of conditions in the most
dusty plants, where mattresses were made using asbestos as
a filler and covering material.

Brouder also gives an

account of the study selection and results.[12 3]
Merewether and Price's study was entitled "Report on
the Effects of Asbestos Dust on the Lungs and Dust Suppres
sion in the Asbestos Industry: Part 1 - Occurrence of
Pulmonary Fibrosis and Other Pulmonary Afflictions in
Asbestos Workers; Part 2 - Processes Giving Rise to Dust
and Methods for its Suppression".

Published in 1930, it

was the first major study of the effects of asbestos on
occupational health published in Britain.

The authors'

reasoning - that reducing the dust levels found in industry
would reduce the dose, and therefore lengthen the time before
the appearance of disease - emphasized elimination of the
hazard by controlling dust levels in industry.[124]
Based on the results of the study, the Home Office
issued a notice to all manufacturers about the pathological
and clinical distinctions between silicosis and asbestosis.
Each disease was described in detail.

Dust suppression,

such as wet versus dry methods of processing, and other
engineering controls were recommended.

Periodic medical

examinations for all employees was also encouraged.[125] By
1930, the hazard had grown to such proportions that measures
were adopted to suppress dust in asbestos factories.[126]
Parliament passed legislation in 1931 that instituted
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periodic medical examinations for workers engaged in
particularly dusty processes in the asbestos-textile
industry, made asbestosis a compensable disease, and
reguired improved methods of ventilation and dust
suppression in asbestos-textile factories.[127]

4.3.2 Merewether, 1947

- Lung Cancer

As dust levels decreased, more workers lived long enough
to develop lung cancer.

In this regard, another study

conducted by Merewether is topical, because it provided the
first evidence of a causal link between asbestos and lung
cancer.

An association between lung cancer and asbestosis

was first suggested by clinicians in the 1930s.[128] Some
articles appeared in the British medical journals, but lung
cancer was not a frequent diagnosis at the time and no firm
conclusions were drawn.[129]
In 1934, Wood and Gloyne described lung cancer in
asbestos workers.[130] The following year, the first
published reports began to suggest that asbestos workers
with asbestosis also appeared be at unusual risk of devel
oping cancer of the lung.

Two of those reports were by

Gloyne, and one was by Lynch and Smith from Charleston,
South Carolina.[131]
In 1936, Gloyne reported a case of oat cell carcinoma
in an asbestos factory worker, and Middleton reported three
lung cancers among fifty-four cases of asbestosis.

Another
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American case by Egbert and Geiger, from New Haven, Connec
ticut, brought to six the total number of published reports
by 1936.
Three more cases were reported in 1938.

These came

from Germany,[132] whose physicians by that time were calling
lung cancer an occupational disease of asbestos workers.

The

following year, asbestosis became a compensable disease in
Germany.[13 3]

An editorial in the British Medical Journal

reviewed the general question of the relationship between
lung cancer and dust diseases, and urgently called for
further study.
Six more articles appeared between 1938 and 1942 that
mentioned a suspected relationship between asbestos exposure
and cancer of the lung.

Seven pages were devoted to asbes

tosis in Wilhelm Hueper/s 1942 textbook, Occupational Tumors
and Allied Diseases, in which he reviewed the evidence and
concluded that "there is an incidence of lung cancer in
asbestosis of the lung which is definitely excessive."[134]
In 1947, Merewether investigated the link between lung
cancer and asbestosis.

He considered 235 autopsy reports in

the period from 1924 until 1946, in which the acknowledged
cause of death was asbestosis, and found 31 with cancer of
the lung or pleura.

In addition to the causal link, Mere

wether found a much higher incidence of cancer when compared
with silicosis sufferers.
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Merewether's report was published in 1949.

It was

substantiated by other studies which culminated in Richard
Doll's work.[135] Doll studied post-mortems dating back to
1935, and provided epidemiological evidence of a causal link
between cancer and asbestos exposure.

Doll concluded that

cancer of the lung was a specific hazard for asbestos
workers.[136]

4.4

State of Medical Awareness

That exposure to asbestos may lead to diffuse pulmonary
fibrosis has been known since early in this century.[137]
Because of ignorance about the cause of the disease, and
because it manifests itself slowly and insidiously over a
period of ten to twenty years or more, asbestosis was
probably, more often than not, misdiagnosed as pulmonary
tuberculosis, fibrosing pneumonia, or silicosis.[138]
In referring to the uncertain nature of the hazard, the
1898 Annual Report of Her Majesty's Women Inspectors stated
that, "the general symptoms produced by dust on the various
respiratory organs are to the lay mind so similar to those
produced by other causes that it is not always easy to trace
the connection."[139] This difficulty in diagnosis was
evident in earlier works of Murray, Cooke, Merewether and
others.
Cooke's 1924 case, and others previously reported, was
complicated by co-existing tuberculosis or pneumonia, making
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an exact specification of the effects of asbestos dust less
certain.[140] Over the next five years, a number of articles
on the subject of pulmonary disorders would indicate that
asbestos-related disease of the lungs was quite distinct
from that in patients with tuberculosis.[141]
Industrial lung diseases such as silicosis and
asbestosis were well defined in the medical literature by
1930.

A specific chronic disease of the lungs attributed to

breathing asbestos was well described in dozens of different
medical articles, involving hundreds of cases.

In addtion

to confirming the link between lung cancer and asbestosis,
Merwether's 1949 report showed a much higher incidence among
those suffering from asbestosis than for those with
silicosis.[142]

An awareness of the individuality of

diseases caused by asbestos dust was reflected by the
title of the Third International Conference of Experts
on Pneumoconiosis held in Sydney, Australia in February
and March, 1950.

Previous conference titles had only

used the term "silicosis."[143]

The 1950 conference

title acknowledged the broader spectrum and individuality
of dust diseases.

CHAPTER 5

DEVELOPMENT OF AWARENESS in the UNITED STATES

5.1 Introduction
The English studies documented the very real hazards of
occupational exposure to asbestos dust, and differentiated
asbestosis from other forms of pneumoconiosis.

As early

as 1907, more than 280 American entries were listed in a
preliminary bibliography on occupational diseases and
industrial hygiene.[144]

Despite this information,

asbestosis would be confused and overshadowed in the
United States by the contemporary pulmonary diseases of
tuberculosis and silicosis.[145]

5.2 Early Reports of Disease
5.2.1 Pancoast, 1917
The first published case of asbestos-related disease in the
United States was reported by Dr. Henry K. Pancoast.[146]
Like Murray of England, Pancoast was a pioneer in the use
of X-rays for medical diagnosis, and was considered to be
the foremost roentgenological authority in the United
States.[147]
In 1915, Pancoast and his colleagues at the University
of Pennsylvania began an investigation of chest X-rays in
the diagnosis of workers exposed to dust in various occupa
tions.

These included potters, metal grinders, cement

workers, coal miners, marine firemen, and asbestos workers.
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Pancoast concluded that the "effects are the same in
general but may vary in degree."
in 1917.

The report was published

Its reception in the medical community focused on

the economic impact of the undue prevalence of tuberculosis
in industrial workers.

The following year, Pancoast et al.

reported findings of lung scarring and fine fibrosis in Xrays of fifteen asbestos factory workers.[148]

5.2.2 Hoffman, 1918
In 1918, the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics
published a special study titled "Mortality from Respiratory
Diseases in Dusty Trades (Inorganic Dusts)."[149 ]

The study

was conducted by statistician Frederick L. Hoffman, chief
actuary for the Prudential Insurance Company of America,
Newark, New Jersey.[150]

The report/s conclusion noted

"that in the practice of American and Canadian life insurance
companies, asbestos workers are generally declined on account
of the assumed health injurious conditions of the industry."
Hoffman concluded that the industry involved "considerable
dust hazard,"

and cited the fact that American asbestos

workers were experiencing unusually early deaths.[151]
Hoffman called urgently for "more qualified and extensive
investigation of the health aspects of asbestos manufacture."
Hoffman's findings and his urgent call for further
investigation were repeated in future years by others
researching asbestos-related disease.

Their calls went
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unanswered for various reasons.

Among these were the

laissez-faire relationship between government and industry,
events of national scope that displaced attention, and lack
of any adequate response to the research results sponsored
by industry.

There was also the ongoing problem of

recognition of asbestos as a disease causing agent.

5.3 "The New Public Health"
The earliest American reports of asbestos related disease
were published amidst changing ideas about, and approaches
to, disease identification, causation and control.

The

belief that disease resulted from miasmas emitted by
decaying organic matter held sway in the United States until
the 1890s.[152]

This was superseded by the germ theory of

disease, which focused on the individual as the key factor
in disease causation.

H. W. Hill, of the Minnesota State

Board of Health, expounded the belief that disease producing
germs resided chiefly in relatively few people.

In a widely

read and influential book for the general public, called The
New Public Health, Hill announced the New Order: "The old
public health was concerned with environment; the new is
concerned with the individual.

The old sought the sources

of infectious disease in the surroundings of man; the new
finds them in man himself."[153]
Unlike the Inspector of Factories in England, there
was no centralized data collection, assessment, or federal
regulation of workplace hazards in the United States.
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Responsibility for public health rested with territorial,
state, or local governmental units which were spread out
across the frontier society.[154]

Most of the state and

local agencies were thinly staffed, minimally funded and
often politically controlled.

These agencies had little

if any regulatory power and lacked laboratory and other
technical resources so vital to the surveillance of hazards
in industry.[155]

Even federal government agencies, such

as the Public Health Service, required the cooperation of
industry to gain access to their factories.[156]
Until the 1920s, the asbestos industry was so small
that no individual physician would have come across a
sufficient number of cases of asbestosis, or lung cancer
among asbestos workers, to be alerted to the connection.
The American Medical Association (AMA), in representing
the interests of individual physicians, and in promoting
free market competition, ostracized contract practice, as
economically and professionally detrimental to the medical
profession.

From 1901 to 1920, during the period in which

mergers created giant corporations in industry, the AMA
waged a negative campaign against contract doctors while
reorganizing to become one of the most effective and
powerful lobbying organizations in the United States.[157]
Public health reformers did not perceive the environ
ment of the worker as their main concern even though indus
trial settings provided the "great human laboratory"
envisioned by pioneer industrial physician Henry Mock.[158]
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5.4

Government Initiatives

Physicians had always been employed to treat injured
workers, but when the rate of industrial accidents became
a national scandal early in the twentieth century, state
and federal agencies were forced to respond to conditions
in industry.

Disasters, especially epidemics, created the

political pressures necessary for initiating action.[159]
It was during this period that the new field of industrial
hygiene emerged.

5.4.1

Regulating Working Conditions

The first federal law to regulate working conditions was
the Hours of Service Act passed in 1907.

A coal mine

explosion in West Virginia that same year led to creation
of the Bureau of Mines in 1910, and in 1913 the Department
of Labor was formed to "foster, promote and develop" the
lot of wage workers.

One of the first reports on asbestosis

in the United States appeared in a 1918 Department of Labor
publication.[160]
Between 1911 and 1920 most states passed worker compen
sation laws requiring employer's to carry liability insurance
to ensure payment of legitimate claims. Worker's compensation
tion was intended to be an incentive to reduce accidents and
injuries by improving working conditions.

Due to industry's

influence on the lawmakers, the legislation proved to be a
boon for employers.

They were allowed to compensate for loss

of life or limb at bargain prices during a time when injury
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and death rates had soared in coal mines, steel mills and
textile factories.[161]

In the 1930s, the public outcry,

over another disaster in West Virginia, prompted a change
in some of these laws.[162]

5.4.2

U. S. Public Health Service

In 1914, the United States Public Health Service formed a
Division of Occupational Health.

It was headed by Dr. Joseph

Schereschewsky, first president of the American Association
of Industrial Physicians and Surgeons (AAIPS).

Mock was one

of the 125 physicians and surgeons, in industry or government
service, who met in Detroit to form the AAIPS in 1916.

Like

members of similar groups, such as the Conference Board of
Physicians in Industry, members of the AAIPS identified more
strongly with the large corporations for which they worked,
than did the average contract physician.[163]
Schereschewsky also headed the Public Health Service's
Division of Industrial Hygiene until 1918.

On staff with

this Division were Anthony Lanza and William McConnell, who
both participated in industry sponsored asbestos research
in later years.

Under Dr. Lewis Thompson, the Division of

Industrial Hygiene carried out a number of extensive dust
studies using equipment developed jointly by Dr. Leonard
Greenburg and George W. Smith, of the Public Health Service
and the Bureau of Mines, respectively.

Soon after taking

over in 1923, Thompson, hired a young sanitary engineer
named Jack Bloomfield.

Bloomfield pioneered the use of the
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Greenburg-Smith impinger over a ten year period. It became
the standard instrument for dust measurement in the United
States.[164]

5.5 Harvard's Program in Industrial Hygiene
One of the first comprehensive programs in industrial
hygiene was developed by Philip Drinker, a professor at
Harvard University.

The new program began as a joint

venture between the Sanitary Engineering Department of
the Engineering School, and the Department of Ventilation
and Illumination at the new School of Public Health.
When the School of Public Health was formally founded
in 1918, retired Jackson Professor Frederick Shattuck raised
$125,000 from manufacturing firms in New England to support
the new program.

The program was managed by Philip's older

brother, Cecil Drinker, who succeeded Shattuck as Jackson
Professor in 1916, and eventually became the second dean of
the School of Public Health.
The objective of the program was to train company
doctors, and teach students how to investigate industrial
health problems.

Industrial hygiene was regarded princi

pally as a medical problem.

A certificate of public health

was issued after completion of a five month course.

As the

program expanded, it became apparent that industry was more
interested in engineering problems, some of which were beyond
the scope of the industrial physician's ability to solve.

In 1922, the School of Public health entered a new
phase, paying more attention to the measurement and control
of hazards.

Physicians in the program were soon outnumbered

by engineers and scientists, who were taught to design less
dangerous workplaces.

In this capacity, the university's

facilities were made available for research and training.
The Schools of Public Health and Engineering launched
Harvard's new program in industrial sanitation in 1927.
The title is significant.

Until 1925, sanitary engineering

was the only discipline that addressed the impact of the
environment on public health.

This impact was exemplified

by the great improvement in public health following reforms
such as water purification and waste disposal earlier in
the century.
Eventually, the program became the Industrial Hygiene
Department of the School of Public Health.[165]

The first

engineering oriented graduates from Harvard's industrial
sanitation program would again connect public health with
the environment, this time in industrial settings.

They

graduated just in time to address the growing silicosis
epidemic.

5.6 Silicosis
The medical literature of the 1930s pointed to dust disease
as the prevalent threat in occupational settings, and an
avalanche of litigation by workers suffering from silicosis
got the most attention.

Silicosis is a disease associated

53
with those who drill, crush, or pulverize rocks, such as
granite and sandstone, where silica is released into the air
as respirable dust.

Breathing becomes difficult as the lung

tissue becomes scarred, and shortness of breath is a common
result.

Those who are thus affected are more susceptible to

tuberculosis, a complicating factor in diagnosis.
Measures to prevent the disease were suggested as early
as 1700, by Bernardino Ramazzini, a professor of medicine at
the University of Padua.

The first pathological description

of silicosis was given in 1762 by Ijsbrand van Diemerbroeck,
a professor of medicine at the University of Utrecht.

In the

United States in 1887, silicosis was found at autopsy in the
lungs of a stove-foundry worker in Poughkeepsie, New York.
Though well established in the medical literature, and
despite protective practices standardized by the Bureau of
Mines, more than one million workers in the United States had
been exposed to harmful amounts of silica dust by 1930.

At

least one in four of them could have been expected to develop
silicosis.

In 1933, damage suits totaling more than $100

million were pending, and a year later the figure had risen
to $300 million.[166]

One source of the swelling number of

lawsuits was the Hawks Nest tunnel disaster, near the town
of Gauley Bridge in Fayette County, West Virginia.

5.6.1 Gauley Bridge - Hawk's Nest Tunnel Disaster
Excavation on the tunnel began in late March, 1930, with a
crew of about two thousand laborers.

Three-fourths of them
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were Black, many had migrated to the area, and all of them
were paid depression era wages.

The contractor, Rinehart

and Dennis of Charlottesville, Virginia, permitted dry
drilling of the 3-3/4 mile tunnel through Gauley Mountain,
which was, in parts, 99.44% pure silica.
completed in December, 1931.[167]

Construction was

It was reported that

almost five hundred workers died, and fifteen hundred were
disabled from severe silicosis within a few years.[168]
At the time, worker's compensation only covered those
occupational injuries which occurred at a definite time
and place.

Silicosis was a compensable disease in only six

states, and West Virginia was not one of them.[169]

Eighty

claims had been filed with the West Virginia State Compensa
tion Commission.

The contractor's appeal to have the claims

settled through the Commission was denied by the state
supreme court in February of 1933.

The only other redress

for injured tunnel workers was through common-law negligence
suits, which were eventually filed by more than 500 of the
2,500 tunnel workers.[170]
The first lawsuit came to trial in the Fayette County
District Court on March 16, 1933.
ended in a hung jury.

It lasted six weeks, and

In an out-of-court settlement, the

contractor paid $130,000 to 157 plaintiffs.

Half of that

amount was in exchange for the plaintiff's seventeen
attorneys' agreement not to prosecute.[171]

By the time

the trial concluded, more than 330 suits were pending,
and the courts were clogged.

More than two hundred
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additional new lawsuits were thrown out by the courts,
citing the trial agreement to forgo further prosecution.
In March, 1935, the West Virginia legislature enacted
new provisions to cover silicosis, including a one year
statute of limitation for filing claims, and a two year
employment requirement.

No action was ever taken on the

original eighty claims filed with the Commission, and the
new time restraints jeopardized the viability of the pending
lawsuits.[172]

As a result, Rinehart and Dennis was able

to settle the remaining cases for some $70,000, with the
stipulation that all evidence and data be relinquished.[173]
The story of Gauley Bridge might have remained a local
tragedy.

By chance, early in 1934, a playwright named Albert

Maltz learned about it, and passed the story on.

Late in

1935, the People's Press, a weekly labor tabloid, broke the
story under a banner headline that read, "476 DEAD, 1500
DOOMED, IN W. VA. TUNNEL CATASTROPHE."[174]
The resulting publicity prompted hearings before a
subcommittee of the House Committee on Labor in January,
1936, but Congress made no further effort to investigate
the charges.

However, the public outcry resulting from

the hearings did promote a change in legislation, with
more attention paid to occupational disease.[175]

5.6.2 Industry Response
In business circles, silicosis was known as the "Depression
disease."

One remedy for industry to deal with the rising

number of claims had been recommended in 1932, by Andrew
Farrell, a Chicago insurance-company lawyer.

In an article

in Industrial Medicine, concerning the onslaught of silicosis
claims, Farrell recommended that silicosis and other pulmo
nary dust diseases be taken out of the courts and covered
by worker's compensation acts wherever possible, using the
statute to limit the amount that could be recovered.
Worker's compensation statutes for pulmonary dust diseases
were enacted in some twenty states over the next decade, and
business interests were once again placed before the health
and welfare of the afflicted workers.[176]
Research and training opportunities were other responses
to the mounting silicosis claims.

The Air Hygiene Foundation

was created in 1935, at industry's request and with backing
from the Mellon Institute.

It was established specifically

to address technical issues concerning silicosis that
industry felt were beyond its own capability.

Among its

twenty members were representatives from the Aluminum Company
of America, Dupont, Owens-Illinois Glass, the Public Health
Service, and the Bureau of Mines.
Medical Committee.

Anthony Lanza chaired the

The Preventive Engineering Committee was

chaired by Philip Drinker.
In 1941, the name of the organization was changed to the
Industrial Hygiene Foundation.

At that time, John D. Harper,

Vice-President of the Aluminum Company of America, wrote that
"It is encouraging to me that in an era when the extensive
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grasp of government is reaching out to regulate and control
more and more phases of economic life, there is a voluntary
and nongovernmental research organization to turn to on
problems of environmental engineering."[177]

5.7

The State of Industrial Medicine

The employer's consideration for workers' health was not
so much with installing costly preventive or protective
measures.

Their concern was that escalating disability

payments would negatively effect production and profits.
Their insurer's were frightened about the prospect of
having to make massive compensation payments.
The primary social role assigned to contract doctors
was to keep workers' compensation costs down, and their
primary tool was the physical examination.

For industrial

use, the examination was reduced to a ten minute assessment
of a worker's fitness for work.

Knowledge regarding a

worker's medical condition was, by law, the exclusive
property of the employer, not of the employee.[178]
The ambiguity between an industry that is economically
healthy and one with healthy workers was a blurred distinc
tion that lay at the heart of early industrial medicine.
A 1930 editorial in the Journal of the American Medical
Association set the boundaries: "Industrial medicine...must
deal with the worker as a producing unit not as a social
unit."

The editorial warned that to do otherwise would
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result in loss of status as specialists and a reversion to
their former reputation as "poorly educated, low salaried
'hacks7."[179]
The restrictions placed on physicians in the workplace
is exemplified in Brouder's account of the Drs. Wise.

David

Wise began as a contract physician for Johns-Manville's
Pittsburgh, California plant in 1926.

His son, Kent, took

over in 1962, and was specifically instructed to ignore
medical evidence of disease among the workers.

Both doctors

were named in a lawsuit, filed by former workers against the
company in the 1970s, at which time Johns-Manville refused
to defend either one.[180]

Even though distinguished as a

specialty and separated from the discredited tradition of
contract practice, industrial medicine in 1930 was still
not a part of mainstream organized medicine.[181]
As described in The Health and Safety of Workers, the
alignments and divisions that resulted from the reorganiza
tion of medicine in the United States had unintended side
effects on the discipline of public health and the nascent
specialty of industrial medicine.

For the latter, Ozonoff

notes that "the result would be a shift in focus from the
individual employee to the interests of the employing
firm."[182]

Access to, and conditions in the workplace,

and knowledge of the hazards of asbestos exposure were
still controlled by industry.
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5.8 The State of Industrial Hygiene
Against this backdrop, industrial hygiene was emerging as a
specialty in its own right.

In 1930, only five states and

one city (New York City) had official industrial hygiene
programs.

In an effort to increase those numbers, the Public

Health Service initiated a series of short training seminars
in industrial hygiene, with funding provided from the 1936
Social Security Act.

The seminars were held in conjunction

with the territorial and state health agencies.

A group that

formed to help coordinate actives for the fledgling state
industrial hygiene units became the American Conference of
Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH).
The American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA)
was the major support organization for those employed full
time by private companies, many of which held large
government contracts.[183]

Viewing themselves as worker

rather than company oriented, "the ACGIH split from the AIHA
in 1938 expressly to keep out corporate influence."[184]
Ironically, the ACGIH would later recommend an inadequate
threshold level for exposure to asbestos dust that was
adopted as the standard by industry.

5.9 Concern Over Mounting Litigation
The Gauley Bridge tunnel tragedy was a symbolic turning
point.

It focused all attention on silicosis, even though

tuberculosis was still the prevalent concern.

Concern with

asbestos-related disease was overshadowed, but it was not
unnoticed.

The first disability claim for asbestosis was

filed in 1927, by a foreman in the weaving department of an
asbestos-textile mill in Massachusetts.

The claim was upheld

by the Massachusetts Industrial Accident Board.

In 1930, the

first case of asbestosis found at autopsy in this country was
reported in a journal called Minnesota Medicine.

The subject

of the case was a worker who had been employed at an asbestos
mine in South America.[185]

In 1932, there was a report of

an asbestos-related disability of a hospital maintenance
worker in Wisconsin.[186]
Construction of the Gauley Bridge tunnel began as the
depression was starting.

By the time the incident was

finally publicized in late 1935, the depression was in full
swing.

By then, the public's attention was focused on jobs,

not on job health.[187]

5.9.1 Insurance Companies
During this period, industry and their insurers assessed the
possibility of a similar situation regarding their products'
manufacture and liability.

The position they took gave

asbestos-related diseases more time to incubate.

The

insurers position appeared in the Philadelphia Record in
August 1935, in an article of response, by John L. Spivak,
about the insurance companies' awareness of the asbestos
hazard.

Spivak wrote of an intercompany occupational rating

conference that had been held in May, 1928, at the home
office of the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company
in Boston, Massachusetts.

At the conference, officials

of the Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company of Philadelphia
delivered a paper advising their colleagues, that:
until we have the benefit of our experience with
this class of workers, we should continue to look
upon those who may be exposed to large quantities
of dust...as risks to be selected with great care
and only at an extra premium that will provide for
an estimated extra mortality of fifty percent,
disability not to be granted."[188]
The following year, the nation's largest life-insurance
carrier, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, began a survey
of health conditions in asbestos-textile mills.

The report

was completed in 1931, but was not published until 1935. By
that time, the perception of the hazard had changed.[189]

5.9.2 Industry
The concern with litigation was also recorded in JohnsManville's Board of Directors meeting minutes dated April
23, 1933.

Negligence suits filed by former employees who

had developed asbestosis while working at the Manville, New
Jersey plant were pending in federal court.

The company's

attorneys had been approached by the attorney for the plain
tiffs "with an offer to settle all the cases upon a much

lower basis than had ever been previously discussed."

The

recommended settlement offer was "approximately $30,000
provided written assurance were obtained from the attorney
for the various plaintiffs that he would not directly or
indirectly participate in the bringing of new actions against
the Corporation."

The minutes of this meeting came to light

during court proceedings which took place more than fortyfive years later.[190]
Various points of view emerged as disability and
compensation claims became big items on the business agenda,
and issues of occupational health crept into public debate.

CHAPTER 6

A DECADE OF MEDICAL STUDIES

6.1 Introduction
The precise data required to permit appropriate medical
and engineering controls was only available from impartial
scientists in industry or in the public sector.[191] Research
studies were sponsored by the industry, and conducted by the
Public Health Service.

The dichotomy of views about the

nature and extent of the asbestos hazard was reflected in
the research results.
Industry executives decided to fund medical research
that would discredit reports of asbestos hazards, and
"keep...a check on workers' health while telling them as
little as possible."[192]

To this end, the asbestos industry

funded a substantial amount of research, some in conjunction
with the insurance companies.

In 1928, industry began a

long-term relationship with the Saranac Laboratories.
The body of work sponsored by the public sector was
conducted by the US Public Health Service in conjunction
with various state units.

Much of the work involved devising

detection methods, equipment, and techniques with which to
make dust measurements during field.

One of the first of

these studies became the basis for the ACGIH's recommendation
for an allowable level of exposure to asbestos in industry.
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6.2 Lanza, 1929
Silicosis and Asbestosis was a popular medical text
written by Dr. Anthony Lanza.

In a chapter on the health

and economic aspects of pulmonary dust disease, Lanza wrote
that "Silicosis and asbestosis burst upon the amazed
consciousness of American industry during the period 19291930," citing "Among the first claims for damages were those
for asbestosis, a hitherto unheard of disease in the United
States."
At the time Merewether began his study of workers in
England's asbestos textile mills, Lanza began similar work
on a smaller scale in the United States.

"In 1929, the

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company was approached by firms
representing the asbestos industry in the United States with
the reguest that a hygienic study be made of that industry,
to ascertain "... whether asbestos dust was an occupational
hazard in their establishment and if so, what was the nature
of this hazard and what should be done to prevent or control
it."[193]

So began the introduction to the first epidemio

logical study of asbestos workers in the United States.
The study was conducted by Lanza and two of his
colleagues for their employer, the Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company.

Lanza was assistant medical director

for Metropolitan Life.

Working with him were William J.

McConnell, formerly of the Public Health Service's Industrial
Hygiene Division, and William Fehnel, a Harvard trained
industrial hygienist.

After attending Harvard, Fehnel

65
returned to the New Jersey Zinc Company.

Previously, he

had worked there as a chemist, and was assigned to assist
the Drinkers in measurements of dust levels during their
investigation in the early 1920s, of manganese poisoning at
the plant.

Fehnel returned to the company to monitor the

program, and may be the first person hired by industry
specifically to perform industrial hygiene work.

He left

New Jersey Zinc shortly thereafter to work at Metropolitan
Life.[194]
From October 1929 through January 1931, Dr. Lanza and
his colleagues examined and took X-rays of workers [195]
in five asbestos plants and mines in the United States and
Canada.[196]

Results showed an unusual prevalence of

enlarged hearts.

Signs of fibrosis appeared in the X-rays

of forty-three percent of those engaged less than five years
in asbestos factory work, and rose dramatically to eightyseven percent for those with over fifteen years.[197]

Fifty-

three percent of the workers studied were classified as
asbestotics.

Only seventeen percent were asymptomatic.[198]

The written report, entitled "Effects on the Inhalation
of Asbestos Dust Upon the Lungs of Asbestos Workers,11 was
submitted to industry sponsors Johns-Manville and RaybestosManhattan for their review just as a New Jersey legislative
commission was trying to decide if silicosis should be made
a compensable disease under worker's compensation.

With the

increased attention on dust borne diseases, the sponsors were
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concerned that the report, if published as written, might
prompt inclusion of asbestosis in the legislation.[199]
The sponsors complicity in editing the report was
revealed in correspondence contained in files belonging to
Sumner Simpson, president of Raybestos-Manhattan.

The files

were recovered in 1977 during deposition for a product
liability suit filed in May 1975 on behalf of former workers
at a Raybestos-Manhattan plant in Passaic, New Jersey.

They

had been saved by his son, William, who was then CEO of the
company. The recovered files included correspondence between
Simpson and Vandiver Brown, head of Johns-Manville's legal
department.

Sumner Simpson had died in 1953, and the

plaintiff's attorneys were told that Vandiver Brown was also
dead.

In fact, he was in Glascow, Scotland, very much alive,

but mentally debilitated.[200]
Upon reviewing the 1931 report, Brown had consulted
with attorney George S. Hobart, of the law firm of Hobart &
Minard, Newark, NJ, who had handled some damage claims for
Johns-Manville.

In stressing the importance of a medical

report which drew a distinction between asbestosis and
silicosis, Hobart's reply to Brown outlined a "state-of-theart" defense argument that the industry would use for the
next forty years:
...one of our principal defenses in actions against
the company on the common law theory of negligence
has been that the scientific and medical knowledge
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have been insufficient until a very recent period
to place upon the owners of plants or factories
the burden or duty of taking special precautions
against the possible onset of the disease in their
employees.[201]
Variations of the "state-of-the-art" defense were used
successfully by the industry, until Borel v s . Fibreboard
Paper Products Corp. et a l .

That suit was filed by Ward

Stevenson, in federal district court in Beaumont, Texas,
on October 29, 1969, against eleven asbestos insulation
manufacturing companies.

In the first case of its kind in

the nation, Stevenson argued successfully that the doctrine
of strict liability applied to asbestos insulating materials.
By failing to provide adequate warnings of foreseeable
dangers associated with their products, the manufacturers
had breached warranties, and could be held strictly liable
in the death of the plaintiff, Clarence Borel.

In Borel vs.

Fibreboard, the courts established that exposure to asbestos
was cumulative.

Each exposure represented a separate,

additional injury.[202]
In November 1933, more than two years after receiving
Lanza's report, Simpson invited discussion on his idea to
standardize methods of dust control in asbestos factories.
A month later, on December 29, 1933, Simpson and three JohnsManville executives (W.R. Seigle, Chairman of the Board; E.M.
Voorhees, Secretary; and Brown) agreed to allow Metropolitan
Life to bring its survey up to date.[203]
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During the 1931, study Lanza had observed that the
severity of symptoms exhibited was less than might be
expected from the X-rays, and concluded that asbestosis
was a clinically milder disease than silicosis.

By late

1934, he was aware that other scientists, including
Merewether, were finding asbestotics dying at a younger age,
and contracting their disease under dust conditions that
appeared to be safe in other industries.

Lanza revised the

1931 report accordingly, and submitted the proofs.
Vandiver Brown reguested a compromise from Lanza.
"All we ask is that all of the favorable aspects of the
survey be included and that none of the unfavorable be
unintentionally pictured in darker tones than th circum
stances justify.11[204 ]

Among the changes proposed was a

reinstatement of the 1931 report's conclusion, complete
with the suggested wording that "Clinically, from this
study, it appears to be of a type milder than silicosis."
Presenting asbestosis as a less dangerous disease than
silicosis obscured the serious health hazards of asbestos as
demonstrated by the study.

Yet, the changes were accepted

as editorial comments by Lanza, sanctioned by Metropolitan
Life, and incorporated in the final report.[205]
The final Metropolitan Life report emphasized the
differences between asbestosis and silicosis.

The finding

that fifty-three percent of the workers were classified as
asbestotics was absent. The study was finally published on
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January 4, 1935 by the Public Health Service.

By then,

Lanza had become a leading figure in the field of occupa
tional medicine.[206]
Lanza's Silicosis and Asbestosis was published in 1938.
In it, he identified dyspnoea, or shortness of breath, as
the most striking symptom of asbestosis.

He explained the

detectable changes in X-rays preceding the reduced lung
function that caused shortness of breath.

He also noted that

misdiagnosis of asbestosis was frequent because other cardiac
ailments were thought to cause enlargement of the heart, a
common symptom of asbestosis sufferers.

In the latter

stages, clubbing of fingers and toes, and anorexia are
outward signs of disease progression.
Prior to the books' publication, Lanza knew of only
seventy-eight cases in England which documented asbestosis
as the cause of death.

These occurred from 1930 to 1936.

In his book, Lanza suggested a link between asbestos exposure
and lung cancer, but drew no firm conclusions due to the lack
of statistical evidence.

Like his peers, Lanza believed that

the chemical composition of asbestos was most likely
responsible for its harmful effects.

Although it was not

accurate, this view was predominant for many years.
Questions about the mechanics of disease causation
remain, but modern research has identified the morphology
of asbestos fibers as the enabling factor, rather than
chemical composition.

The indestructibility and physical

structure of the fibers wreck havoc on the natural defense
systems of body tissue.[207]
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Silicosis and Asbestosis remained in print for twenty years.
Lanza left Metropolitan Life after World War II, and finished
his career as a Professor of Industrial Hygiene at New York
University Medical Center.

Before he died at the age of

eighty in 1964, the university renamed its laboratories at
Sterling Forest the Anthony J. Lanza Research Laboratories
for Environmental Medicine.[208]

6.3

Saranac Laboratories

Many of the industry sponsored studies were conducted at the
Saranac Laboratories in Saranac Lake, NY.

Originally named

the Trudeau Foundation's Saranac Laboratory for the Study of
Tuberculosis, the institute was founded by Edward Livingston
Trudeau, a pioneer of the anti-tuberculosis movement of the
1890s and early twentieth century.

6.3.1 Gardner
In 1927, Dr. Leroy Upson Gardner became director of the
Saranac Labs.

Gardner had been diagnosed with tuberculosis

in 1917, and sent to the Trudeau Sanatorium at Saranac Lake
to recover.

By 1919, he was the pathologist for the sanato

rium's laboratory.

During this period, Gardner learned of

the high tuberculosis mortality rate among granite cutters in
Barre, Vermont compared to marble cutters in nearby Proctor,
who had fewer cases than expected.

As a result of Gardner's

investigations, the laboratory's research turned to the
relationship between tuberculosis and mineral dusts.[209]
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Loss of support from private philanthropies in the 1920s
caused the Laboratory to seek other sources of funding.

An

alliance with industry was formed, and in 1928, Gardner was
retained by Johns-Manville to conduct animal studies.[210]
During these experiments, Gardner was able to produce
asbestosis in the test animals by allowing them to inhale
pure asbestos.

Industry discounted the results claiming that

they would only apply to factory workers exposed to one
hundred percent asbestos fiber.[211] In 1930, Gardner began
conducting experiments with asbestos dust.

By the early

1930s, he was in charge of one of the few groups with
experience and information on dust borne diseases.[212 ]
On November 20, 1936, Gardner received an offer to
finance his animal experiments on asbestosis for a threeyear period, at a cost of five thousand dollars per year.
The offer came from Johns-Manville counsel Vandiver Brown,
representing eight or ten asbestos-products manufacturers.
Communications and finances were handled by Brown and
Sumner Simpson, President of Raybestos-Manhattan.[213]
Brown explained the conditions for support in his letter
to Gardner:
It is our further understanding that the
results obtained will be considered the
property of those who are advancing the
reguired funds, who will determine whether,
to what extent and in what manner they shall
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be made public.

In the event it is deemed

desirable they shall be made public, the
manuscript of your study will be submitted to
us for approval prior to publication.11[214 ]
Three days later, Gardner agreed to the terms and began
his experiments late in 1937. An article by Gardner entitled
the "Etiology of Pneumoconiosis" appeared in the November
1938 issue of the Journal of the American Medical Society.
It was included in the 1938 Saranac annual report along
with other addresses by Saranac staff about their work on
asbestosis.

In May 1939, Brown wrote to Simpson concerning

Gardner's article.

"The information covered by these

references has presumably been derived from the experiments
which Dr. Gardner is conducting for, and with funds provided
by, the group members of the Asbestos Textile Industry."
Simpson agreed that Gardner was "certainly not living up to
his agreement of November 1936."[215]
Even though Gardner had breached the agreement, it must
have extended beyond three years, because by 1943, he had
received almost thirty thousand dollars.

By then, nineteen

cases of lung cancer in asbestos workers had appeared in the
medical literature.

In his studies, Gardner had noted an

excessive incidence of pulmonary cancer among a small group
of white mice inhaling asbestos dust for a period of from
fifteen to twenty-four months.[216]

Rather than approach the

industry for additional funding, he applied to the National
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Advisory Cancer Council to finance a new series of experi
ments on the cancer-causing potential of asbestos.

Gardner

was turned down, and so was not able to conduct the new
series of tests he had planned.
Many of the test animals in Gardner's studies had
developed pulmonary disease from exposure to asbestos
dust.[217]

Shortly before he died suddenly, in October,

1946, Gardner was said to be very distressed because the 1936
agreement would not allow him to publish his findings.[218]

6.3.2 Kaylo - 1943 to 1952
In 1943, Saranac Labs was retained by another asbestos
company to study a new insulation product that used asbestos
as a reinforcing agent.[219]

After receiving samples of the

insulation material, and determining its components, Gardner
wrote to the company on March 12, stating "the fact that you
are starting with a mixture of guartz and asbestos would
clearly suggest that you have all the ingredients for a first
class hazard."[220]
The product was called Kaylo, a name derived from the
"K-factor" rating used in heat transmission.

The lower the

heat loss or K-factor, the better the insulation.

Kaylo was

developed during the 1930s by the Owens-Illinois Glass
Company of Toledo, Ohio.

The product was made from calcium

hydroxide and silica, and had a chrysotile asbestos content
of approximately fifteen percent.

The study began in 1944.
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By May, Gardner had produced asbestosis-like symptoms in test
animals whose lungs had been injected with the product.
was directed to proceed with inhalation experiments.

He

Interim

reports were sent to the company by Saranac Lab until the
study was completed in 1952.[221]

6.3.2.1

Vorwald

Gardner was succeeded by D r . Arthur

Vorwald, who was a pathologist at the Saranac Laboratory
from 1934 to 1942.

A year after Gardner died, Vorwald sent

an interim report which "tentatively concluded that Kaylo
alone fails to produce significant pulmonary damage when
inhaled into the lung."

The following year Vorwald reversed

that conclusion, informing the company that "...Kaylo on
inhalation is capable of producing asbestosis and must be
regarded as potentially-hazardous material" that "might
pose a grave danger to the company's employees."[222]
Despite these warnings, Owens-Illinois prepared to
manufacture Kaylo, and started production in the early 1940s
at factories in Berlin, and in Sayerville, New Jersey.

Pre

employment and

annual X-rays were instituted to monitor

the

505 people who

worked

The final
Concerning the

in these plants.

report of the study, entitled "Investigation
Capacity of Inhaled Kaylo Dust to Injure the

Lung," was marked "Confidential," and sent to Owens-Illinois
on February 7, 1952, along with Vorwald's comments on its
publication.

He promised that neither the company or the
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product would be mentioned by name, and assured review of
the final manuscript by the company prior to its release for
publication.

The study on Kaylo was finally published in

September 1955.

By that time, Kaylo, and other new asbestos-

containing products, had been installed in schools and other
public buildings that had been constructed following World
War II.[223]

6.3.2.2

Schepers

After the study on Kaylo was finally

published, the company requested an evaluation by the new
director of the Saranac Laboratories, Dr. G. W. H. Schepers.
Schepers had been sent to America in 1949 by the South
African government to apprentice under Lanza.

He also spent

three months at the Saranac Laboratories with its director,
Dr. Vorwald.

During this time, Schepers had the opportunity

to meet Vandiver Brown, who asked him to delete statements
that embarrassed Johns-Manville from his reports.

In 1954,

Schepers returned to the United States to succeed Vorwald as
director of Saranac Laboratories.[224]
Like his predecessor, Schepers did not mention the
company or the product by name in his article.

He noted

that lesions and fibrosis on the test animals' lungs, as a
result of inhaling the product, were similar to experimental
asbestosis, and concluded that "this harmful effect was
probably caused by the chrysotile asbestos it
contained."[225]

The company's delight with Schepers's
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conclusion was reflected in an intercompany memo dated
October 5, 1955: Kaylo was "no more harmful than the
universally used heat insulation - asbestos - in fact
less so, since Kaylo contains a very small percentage
of asbestos." [226]

6.3.2.3

The Kaylo Files

Files of the Saranac experiments

were transferred to new owners when Owens-Illinois sold their
Kaylo line to Owens-Corning in 1958.

Upon purchase of the

plant in Berlin, New Jersey, Owens-Corning became the sole
manufacturer of Kaylo. Two years earlier, insulators in
Owens-Corning's employee contract units had begun to file
worker's compensation claims for disability caused by
asbestosis.

A decade would pass before Owens-Corning began

issuing warnings in December, 1966 that Kaylo was dangerous
to inhale.
The Kaylo documents first came to light in 1979 as a
result of litigation.

That spring, the director of the

Saranac Laboratory was subpoenaed in connection with two
asbestos cases in Albany, New York.

This led to Vorwald's

medical papers at the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology,
in Washington, D.C., deeded there by his widow following
his death in 1974.

The remaining documents were produced

by Owens-Corning from the summer of 1979 through the winter
of 1980.

Litigation in that case involved workers at the

Berlin, New Jersey plant.[227]
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The reference to chrysotile as the specific disease
causing agent, and the "very small percentage of asbestos"
contained in a product, would be used by industry to plead
ignorance about the harmful effects of asbestos in their
"state-of-the-art" defense. This defense worked as long as
the industry was able to manipulate the published literature,
or suppress publication altogether.

6.3.3 Seventh Symposium
The total amount of information suppressed by the industry
is unknown, but an indication of the extent is evident in
the case of the Saranac Laboratories.

Documents detailing

the industry's meddling were uncovered during litigation in
the late 1970s and early 1980s.

During that time, it was

discovered that thousands of documents had disappeared.
Among these were some thirteen hundred experimental studies
of asbestos and other hazardous substances that had been
conducted at Saranac over a thirty year period.[228]
In addition to the research it conducted, this pre
eminent institution held a yearly symposium.
organized the Seventh Saranac Symposium.

Vorwald

The week long

conference on pulmonary dust disease was held in September,
1952.

Merewether, Lynch, Lanza, and Philip Drinker were

among more than two hundred attendees, who heard from some
of the leaders in the field of asbestos research.

Johns-

Manville, Owens-Illinois, the U.S. Public Health Service, the
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American Cancer Society, the Industrial Hygiene Foundation
and major insurance companies were also represented.

Unlike

the proceedings of six previous meetings, those of the
Seventh Symposium were never published, supposedly due to
lack of funding.

Despite the groundbreaking data which was

presented, none of the participants publicized any of the
conference's discussions.

It would be another twelve years

before the scope and definitive nature of the Seventh Saranac
Symposium were duplicated.

That event was the 1964 New York

Academy of Sciences Conference on the Biological Effects of
Asbestos, organized by Dr. Irving J. Selikoff.

Its proceed

ings were both published, and well publicized.

In the

interim, the number of exposures to asbestos continued to
increase.

6.4 Dreessen, 1938
The acceptable level of exposure to asbestos dust in industry
was a guideline adopted by the American Conference of
Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) in 1946.

The

guideline set the level of exposure at five million particles
per cubic foot (5 mppcf) of air.

The guideline was based on

a 1938 study sponsored by the Public Health Service.
In 1937, the Public Health Service began a series of
field investigations in conjunction with various state and
territorial boards of health.

One of the first of these

investigations was done at the request of North Carolina's
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State Board of Health and its Industrial Commission, which
administered the state worker's compensation act.[229]
The study team was headed by Dr. Waldemar Dreessen
of the Public Health Service.

The team inspected three

asbestos textile plants, only one of which existed before
1920.

Fourteen occupational groups containing a total of 541

workers were examined after their occupational histories were
obtained. Two hundred of them had previously worked with
other fibers in cotton and wool textile factories.
Asbestos workers were the youngest group of workers
examined.

Ninety-four percent were under fifty years old,

with an average age of approximately thirty-two.

Eighty

percent were employed less than ten years, and more than half
less than five years. Only twenty three had previously worked
in a dusty trade before working in the asbestos textile
factories.[230]
The 126 page report of the study was published in 1938,
as a Public Health Service bulletin.

Its findings were

typical for people working in dusty trades.

Almost one-

quarter of all workers examined showed signs of asbestosis.
Evidence of the disease increased rapidly as dust exposure
increased. This duplicated the conclusion reached by Merewether and Price in their 1930 study in England; i.e.,
workers exposed to higher concentrations of dust had a
greater chance of becoming ill.

A total of 242 dust counts were made using the
Greenburg-Smith impinger, the standard sample collection
instrument for obtaining dust measurements.[231]
impinger was a dust trapping device.

The

The particles which

settled at the bottom of the impinger's collecting cell
could only be viewed at a magnification of one hundred times
(100X).[232]

The impinger did not differentiate between

asbestos and any other airborne fibers. Dust concentration
was measured in millions of particles per cubic foot (mppcf)
of air.
Dreessen's team noted that concentration and duration
were dual factors responsible for causing a higher preva
lence of asbestosis.

The team combined these factors to

describe exposures in "millions-of-particle-years."

This

combined system diluted the importance of the duration
factor.

An exposure of five mppcf for ten years was com

parable to ten mppcf for five years.

Each was equivalent

to fifty million particle-years.[233]
Using this measurement system, half of the workers with
more than one hundred million particle-years had asbestosis.
This figure was extremely low compared to the dust levels
needed to cause a similar degree of silicosis.

Later, it

was discovered that fifteen months prior to the study, 150
workers had been discharged and replaced with others who had
little or no previous exposure to asbestos.

Sixty-nine of

the 150 displaced workers were located and examined.

More
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than sixty percent of them showed evidence of asbestosis,
more than double the rate for those still on the job.
The continuing problem of what to consider as a "safe"
threshold level of exposure was addressed in the study
report:
Ideally, a threshold concentration of dust
should be the highest dust concentration that
would not produce pneumoconiosis in originally
healthy workmen during their entire working life.
The chief difficulty in this study, as in most of
the earlier studies of the Public Health Service,
is that very few workmen are exposed for a long
period of time to low concentrations of asbestos
dust.[234]
Study results showed that three-guarters of the workers
in the 50-99 million particle-year category, equivalent to a
ten to twenty year exposure at five mppcf, had developed
asbestosis. An earlier study in Pennsylvania also indicated
that exposures below five mppcf would lead to asbestosis.[235]
Even though decidedly inadequate for disease prevention, five
mppcf was tentatively proposed by the Dreessen team "as the
threshold level for asbestos-dust exposure... for the guidance
of factory managers and engineers until more complete data
are available."

Below that level symptoms were developing,

but above that level definite cases of asbestosis had already
developed.[236]

The rationale for the proposed level was that new
technology was available and capable of reducing dust
exposures below five mppcf for the majority of the workers.
Reducing levels to five mppcf would have been a major
accomplishment because most levels without dust control
exceeded fifty mppcf. The team also assumed that the
explicitly tentative nature of their recommendation would
prompt further and more extensive investigation on a wider
scale.[237]

6.5

Drinker, 1946

In 1938, Philip Drinker was asked to establish a health and
safety program for the Navy's shipyards.

By 1941, Harvard'

School of Public Health began intensive, four-month courses
to train Naval personnel in occupational medicine and indus
trial hygiene.

By this time, Drinker chaired the Schools'

Industrial Hygiene Department.

He had also maintained a

friendship with a former school mate, Jim Forrestal, who
was then Undersecretary of the Navy.
The friendship came in handy when the U.S. Maritime
Commission and the Navy requested that Drinker conduct a
survey of health conditions at shipyards.

For his staff,

Drinker selected eight Naval officers who had taken the
Harvard course, but could not get the Navy to assign them.
His request was denied until he spoke directly to Forrestal
and Chester Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet
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The study began in 1942 with an inspection of the
shipyard at the Bath Irons Works in Maine.

Two years later,

the team returned because of "concern among the pipe covering
crews that the amosite [asbestos] was causing some respira
tory troubles."

Of the thirty-eight workers X-rayed, twelve

displayed changes significant enough to prompt further
investigations.[238 ]
Four more shipyards on the East Coast were selected.
All of them had high labor turnovers, and dust levels that
greatly exceeded five mppcf.

In the dustiest yard, forty-

eight workers were examined, representing less than ten
percent of the workforce.
or more years of exposure.

Three of the forty-eight had ten
No asbestosis was found.

least dusty yard, all of the workers were examined.
the 168 workers had ten or more years of exposure.
of asbestosis were found among the nine.

In the
Nine of
Two cases

Of the total of

1,074 men examined, three cases of asbestosis were found
among the group of fifty-one workers who had ten or more
years of exposure.
Though well aware of the hazards from his work at
Harvard and previously documented studies, Drinker emphasized
the more positive aspects of the survey.

The results were

published in 1946, in The Journal of Industrial Hygiene and
Toxicology, a periodical edited by Drinker.[239]
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6.6 Summary
Like others before them, Dreessen and his team assumed that
additional research would be conducted.

Exposures, although

high in dosage, were still largely confined to factory
settings. Dusty environments were common in the workplace,
but people working with asbestos were obviously at greater
risk.

Unfortunately, in addition to the subterfuge practiced

by the industry and their insurers, one national crisis after
another served to forestall sustained, impartial, or
comprehensive efforts to answer the questions being raised
about asbestos-related diseases.
Despite sporadic medical reports, asbestos-related
diseases had not yet occurred in any great numbers. The
definitive medical evidence that did exist was overshadowed,
or ignored altogether.

Failure to comprehend the latency

period characteristic of asbestos-related diseases served to
increase the numbers of people who were eventually exposed.
In the public domain, the reality of the hazard lay
dormant.

McCulloch notes that "the lapse in time between

Merewether and Doll's publications was the period during
which the industry expanded most rapidly in Britain and in
North America."[240] The industry, and the number of
asbestos-containing products it produced, continued to grow
without restraint during the twenty year period in which
diseases were developing.

CHAPTER 7

THE WAR YEARS

7.1

Between Two Wars

The asbestos industry began a long-term expansion after
World War I. [241]

From 1925 on, thousands of new uses

were developed, and annual sales swelled from millions
to billions of dollars over the next half century.[242]
Asbestos made the leap from factories and workplaces to
the public domain in the mid-1930s, when widespread use
began in homes, schools, office buildings, and other public
facilities.[243]

A new process for spraying asbestos-

containing material widened the uses of, and exposures
to, asbestos-containing materials.[244]
There were no enforceable regulations regarding worker
safety or workplace conditions, but the first official fed
eral dust standard was published by the government in the
"Basic Safety and Health Requirements for Establishments
Subject to Walsh-Healy Public Contracts Act".

The Walsh-

Healy Act of June 30, 1936, applied only to government
contracts.

It required companies contracting with the

government to insure that no hazardous health conditions
existed in the plants in which their goods were produced.
There was no authority to compel compliance.

The only way

to enforce the Act was to deny or withhold a contract from
the offending company, which proved to be impractical at
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the time.

The country was gearing up for World War II.

Large scale naval construction was already underway, and
total focus was on the war effort.[245]
By 1942, the first asbestos litigation crisis
had disappeared.[246]

Compensation laws in many states

had already been amended to prevent workers with asbestosis
from suing their employers under common law.

Asbestos

manufacturers and their insurers continued to settle dozens
of worker's compensation claims for several thousands dollars
apiece.
The upward trend in asbestos use, which began in the
1930s, expanded after World War II, and continued to the
1980s.

During this fifty year period, asbestos came to be

known as the "miracle" fiber or the "magic" mineral. The
many cases of asbestos-related disease that began to appear
in the 1960s actually got their start during World War II.
It was at that time that hundreds of thousands of people
were employed to carry out the massive build-up for the war
effort, especially in the nation's shipyards.[247]

7.2 World War II
The Navy and Maritime Commission issued minimum safety and
industrial health reguirements based on Drinker's work, and
on surveys conducted by other health and safety consultants
[248] but there were no changes in work practices.[249]
Twenty years passed before further studies of asbestos
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exposure in shipyards were conducted.

"Neither the Navy

nor the Maritime Commission was aware of asbestos-related
illness in shipyard employees until December of 1944," was
the government's response to a lawsuit filed against them
almost fifty years later by Johns-Manville.[250]

7.2.1 Restrictions on Asbestos
The United States was the largest consumer of the world's
raw asbestos supply, but produced less than eight percent
of all grades, and only two percent of strategic grades,
domestically.

In June 1940, government officials met with

asbestos importers and manufacturers to help formulate the
National Defense Commission's strategy to "insure production
and importation of adequate supplies..." of certain grades
and types of asbestos.

These were strategic materials

considered vital to the success of the war effort.[251]
The Office of Production Management issued the first
in a series of restrictive orders on January 20, 1942.
Conservation Order M-79 "was issued to effect conservation
of the asbestos supply and restrict the usage of African
fibers."

Amosite was only available from South Africa and

Southern Rhodesia.

There is no record of its being imported

before 1930.[252] Imports of amosite increased from 500 tons
in 1935, to 4,500 tons in 1945.
August 20, 1945.

Order M-79 was revoked on

By the end of that month, all restrictive

orders on the asbestos industry were lifted.
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7.2.2 Repercussions
In 1983, Manville filed suit against the federal government
for harming the health of shipyard workers by exposing them
to asbestos products during the war.

Manville claimed that

the government took control over every aspect of asbestos
fiber, including expanding mining and manufacturing facil
ities, purchasing, stockpiling, allocation, processing,
exporting, and importing.

The suit also cited the change to

a less dense variety of asbestos which broke up (fiberized)
more easily.[253]

This referred to the particular character

istic which makes some types of asbestos more suitable than
others for certain uses.

The lighter weight of amosite, and

its superior heat and acid resistance, had been utilized to
meet the requirements for lighter naval vessels.
The aerodynamic quality typical of all asbestos fibers
is more pronounced with amosite.

Resistance to wetting makes

its fibers more readily airborne for longer periods of time,
with greater potential for contaminating adjacent spaces.[254]
Becklake notes that differences in the physical properties
of the various types of asbestos fibers may account for
differences in the health effects of exposure.[255]

7.3 Beyond the Shipyards
Those who worked in factories supplying the naval yards
were also at risk.

The Union Asbestos & Rubber Company of

Chicago (UNARCO) established a plant in Paterson, New Jersey
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to supply amosite insulation for the pipes, boilers, and
turbines on navy and cargo vessels.
Between 1941 and 1954, a total of 1664 workers were
employed at the facility. Twenty years later, workers from
this plant were being referred to a medical clinic in
Paterson, founded in 1953 by Dr. Irving J. Selikoff,[256]
a native of Paterson.

By 1990, two-thirds of the workers

had died, 554 of them from cancer.[257]

7.3.1 The Trail to Tyler, Texas
UNARCO closed the Paterson plant in 1954, and established
a similar operation in Tyler, Texas.

In 1962, UNARCO sold

the Tyler operation to Pittsburgh Corning, and got out of
the asbestos business completely.

Twenty years later, UNARCO

went bankrupt due to the mounting asbestos lawsuits filed
against the company.[258]
Pittsburgh Corning was a joint venture between Corning
Glass Works and Pittsburgh Plate Glass (PPG Industries).
Over a period of six and a half years, Owens-Corning
conducted five surveys on health conditions at the Tyler
plant.

On February 3, 1972, two months before a compliance

deadline imposed after an OSHA inspection in October, 1971,
the board of directors chose to shut down the Tyler plant.

7.3.2 Repercussions
Yandle v s . PPG Industries was the class action suit filed
on behalf of former workers at the Tyler plant.

It was the

first case to involve the federal government directly in a
major asbestos health claim.

The suit was filed on January

2, 1974, in first district court in Tyler, by Frederick
Baron.

Baron used the strategy developed by Ward Stevenson

in Borel vs. Fibreboard.

Yandle vs. PPG Industries was

settled in secret in September, 1977, when the defendants
agreed to pay twenty million dollars (Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers International Union - $1 million; PPG and
Pittsburgh Corning - $8.05 million; Cape Industries - $5.2
million; and the US government - $5.75 milion) to 445 former
employees represented in the case.

No money was disbursed

until the following spring because of the government's
reluctance to pay its $5,750,000 share of the settlement.

7.4

A Period of Peak Exposures

Exposures to asbestos in the shipyards reached their peak
during the war years.

"The use of asbestos insulation in

'Liberty Ships' during World War II has proven to be the most
fertile source of asbestos-related cancer."[259] The number
of shipyard workers increased from 177,300 in 1940, to 1.89
million in 1944.[260]

Selikoff estimated that 4,325,000

workers were employed in the nation's shipyards between 1940
and 1945.[261]

Some thirty years later, that period of naval

construction would represent half of the asbestos-related
health claims in litigation.[262]

CHAPTER 8

EXPANDED USE OF ASBESTOS

8.1 Post-World War II Construction Boom
On Tuesday, August 14, 1945, President Truman announced
the unconditional surrender of the Japanese government.
World War II was suddenly over, along with the contracts
that had been anticipated from a lengthier war.

Inflation

and union strikes took over in the post-war period.

When

the dust settled, many Americans had a higher material
standard of living.

Pent up demand from the war years

produced an unprecedented boom in building construction.
From 1940 to 1950, the demand for asbestos increased
by two hundred percent.[263] Half of that increase occurred
in the five years following the end of World War II.

The

use of asbestos insulation for fireproofing accounted for
a major portion of that increase.

8.2

New Products and Uses for Asbestos

The four major uses of asbestos in insulation products were
fireproofing, thermal insulation, acoustical and decorative
uses, and condensation control.

The products, manufactured

for a variety of applications, came in many forms.

The pro

portion of asbestos fibers, other fibers, binders, adhesives,
and agents contained in insulation products varies according
to end use.

Thermal insulation for turbines contains almost
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all amosite or crocidolite asbestos, or a combination of
both.

Materials used for decorative or acoustical purposes

may contain little or no asbestos.

Material used for fire

proofing may contain from five to thirty percent asbestos
fibers.
The focus for marketing asbestos products was switching
from insulation to fireproofing.

New asbestos-containing

products developed during this period included theatre and
welding curtains, high temperature corrugated paper, coldapplied adhesives, joint compound, spackles, air tight paints
and coatings, and cementitious products such as siding
panels, roof tiles, and pipe.

Vinyl asbestos floor tile

and sheeting was introduced in 1950.[264]
Products containing amosite or chrysotile asbestos,
or a combination, were marketed aggressively, and used
extensively in the construction industry.[266]

Following

World War II, all state building codes specified asbestos
insulation as the material of choice for fire retarda
tion. [266]

A method for applying asbestos insulation in a

spray-on form made it the premier fire-proofing material.
"By the late 1950s, the major American producers of asbestoscontaining construction products were positioned to market
their products as school construction took off as a result
of the "baby boom."[267]

8.3 Spray-On Asbestos
8.3.1 The Process
Dry materials are prepared for spray application by either
the wet or the dry method. In the dry method, the dry
material is dumped into a hopper, mixed, and blown into a
hose, which conveys it to the mixing nozzle.

The operator

can control the mix of air, material, and water by adjusting
valves located at the mixing nozzle.

In the wet method, the

dry material is premixed with water in a hopper and is then
pumped through a hose.

By either method, a slurry results

which can be sprayed or troweled onto the surface to be
coated.

After being applied, the material can be shaped.

After it dries, the material is inherently friable.

8.3.2 Development in England
Soon after the British government adopted measures for dust
suppression based on Merewether's 1930 study, a method for
applying insulation by spraying it onto surfaces was devel
oped in England.

Speights and Runyan credit the Turner &

Newall Company with developing 'Limpet7, the first sprayapplied asbestos-containing product, in 1931.[268]
was apparently both a process and a product name.

Limpit
Reitze

credits N.L.Dolbey, Director of Research for the J. W.
Roberts Company, with developing a sprayed inorganic fiber
insula- tion with the Limpet process, which the company
introduced in 1932.[269]

The daily press carried
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illustrations of an experiment to reduce noise in the London
subway system by coating the tunnel walls with asbestos.

The

Lancet warned about the foreseeable consequences of such an
experiment in its February 20, 1932, issue:
In view of the fact that the dust
particle producing the lesion in the
lung has a diameter of only 2u to lOu,
it is obvious that the dust must be
suppressed at its source; the use of
respirators is futile;

...

Experience in asbestos factories would
indicate that, should the experiment of
the London tube railways lead to an exten
sive use of this method for deadening
noise in all the underground railways
of London, then a large increase in
industrial pulmonary asbestosis may be
expected in years to come.[270]

8.3.3

Use in the United States

The spray process was first used in the United States in
1935 to apply decorative finishes to ceilings and walls in
nightclubs, restaurants, and hotels. In 1950, the National
Gypsum Company had its brand of spray insulation approved
as a fireproofing material by Underwriters Laboratories.
Underwriters Laboratories also approved an inorganic fibre
blend developed by the Asbestospray Company in 1951.[271]

8.3.3.1 High Rise Building Construction

Spray-on asbestos

insulation was particularly useful in the construction of
steel framed buildings.

Previously, structural steel was

encased in concrete to prevent buckling and subsequent
failure resulting from the high temperatures during a fire,
but steel roof decks were left exposed.

Spray-on asbestos

insulation provided adequate fire protection, reduced the
weight load on steel building components considerably, and
lowered installation costs.

Where condensation was a

problem, the wicking action of asbestos fibers drew moisture
away from inner insulation materials, preventing extensive
corrosion of the structural steel.[272]
The first large high-rise project to use spray-on
fireproofing was the Chase Manhattan Bank headquarters
building, constructed in New York City, in 1958.

This sixty

story building used 1,500,000 square feet of sprayed fire
proofing product.

By the early 1960s, spray-on fireproofing

cost just twenty-five cents per square foot.
building might use two hundred tons.

A thirty story

An estimated forty

thousand tons was used in 1968 by the construction industry
for fireproofing alone, exclusive of thermal, acoustical, or
condensation control uses.[273]

In 1970, seventy percent of

the world's asbestos supply was reportedly used for products
used by the construction industry.[274]
By 1970, more than half of all large, multi-story
buildings being constructed around the country were being
sprayed with fireproofing products.

In New York City, six
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to eight buildings over thirty stories tall were being
sprayed on any given day.

Five thousand tons was used

for fireproofing in the 110 story twin towers of the World
Trade Center.

Only non-asbestos-containing spray materials

were used above the fortieth floor, due to a change in city
regulations.[275]

8.3.3.2 New York Responds

In April 1970, New York City

became the first governmental agency to address the occupa
tional hazards associated with sprayed asbestos insulation.
The city issued its Sprayed Insulation Regulations, seeking
to control or minimize the hazards by engineering methods and
industry procedures, as an alternative to an outright ban on
the practice.

The city's Department of Air Resources was in

charge of the program.

Less than two years later, citing an

inability to ensure compliance or control of environmental
hazards, the New York City Council banned all spraying of
asbestos as of February 15, 1972.
In 1991, the New York State Supreme Court ruled to
allow tax abatements for liabilities incurred due to ACM in
buildings.

Chase Manhattan received a $24 million refund for

fiscal years 1984-1990, for its headquarters building at One
New York Plaza.[276]

In 1994, adding a new wrinkle to the

health-related damage suits that were piling up, Chase sued
Turner & Newell, claiming losses of $185 million in property
damage caused by the use of their product in the construction
of the bank building.[277]

CHAPTER 9

THE ROAD TO REGULATION

9.1 Introduction
Selikoff's work at the Paterson, New Jersey clinic, which
he opened in 1953, sparked his interest in asbestos-related
diseases.

At the time, he was an epidemiologist at the Mount

Sinai Hospital in New York, specializing in the detection by
X-ray of lung dysfunction. Among his first patients were
seventeen men from the UNARCO plant who had been referred by
a local attorney.

All of these men were still working, and

appeared to be in good health, but fifteen showed signs of
pulmonary defects from the inhalation of asbestos fibers.
By 1961, four of them had died.[278]
By 1961, nearly half of all insulation workers were
dying from occupational cancer and asbestosis, even though
their average exposure was comparable to the exposure level
recommended by the ACGIH in 1946.[279]

9.2

Selikoff, 1964

Selikoff sought support for a study of the Paterson plant
from UNARCO, and from the US Public Health Service, but was
denied.

In 1962, he established a working relationship with

two locals of the International Association of Heat and Frost
Insulators and Asbestos Workers (IAHFIAW).
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9.2.1 The IAHFIAW
The International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators
and Asbestos Workers (IAHFIAW) represents insulation workers
in the construction trade, and also employed in refineries,
industrial plants, shipyards, and powerhouse construction and
repair.

The IAHFIAW was charted by the American Federation

of Labor in 1910 to represent independent locals throughout
the country, and the Salamanders Association of New York.
The Salamanders was the first union of insulation
workers in the United States. It started in New York City
in 1884 as the Salamander Association of Boiler and Pipe
Felters.

Local 12 in New York City is directly descended

from the Salamanders, and Local 32 is an affiliate located in
Newark, New Jersey.[280]

Detailed records kept by the union

dated from 1914.

9.2.2

The 1964 Studies

With the cooperation of the locals, and his associates at
the Mount Sinai Hospital, Selikoff, along with Dr. Jacob
Churg, Chief Pathologist at Barnert Memorial Hospital, in
Paterson, New Jersey, and Dr. E. Cuyler Hammond, VicePresident for Epidemiology and Statistics of the American
Cancer Society, began the first comprehensive studies of the
effects of asbestos exposure among insulation workers, using
data independent of the asbestos industry.[281]
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Preliminary research confirmed that the asbestos
content of the products used by the insulation workers had
remained fairly consistent over the years.

Magnesia block,

the most commonly used product, contained approximately
fifteen per cent asbestos.

Cement products contained from

fifteen to twenty percent asbestos.

The appearance and

increased use of amosite in insulation for shipbuilding,
beginning in 1934, was also noted.
Several stages of disease manifestation were investi
gated using the extensive database compiled in cooperation
with the IAHFIAW and its members.

Insulation workers not

included in the study were those working in other trades or
other unions, spray-insulation workers, nonunion workers,
and some maintenance workers.
In 1963, the IAHFIAW rolls contained 14,803 members.
Of this number, 1,258 were counted in the New York-New Jersey
locals.

In addition, 264 men had died from January 1, 1943

to December 31, 1962.

The cohort consisted of the latter two

groups, a total of 1522 cases.

The studies began on January

1, 1963.

9.2.2.1 The Twenty Year Latency Period

Previous reports

mentioned the appearance of neoplasia associated with asbestosis that seemed only to occur after twenty years from onset
of exposure.

This question was addressed by a separate study

on the mortality of asbestos workers with twenty or more
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years of exposure.

The cohort was a sub-group of 632 workers

who were members of either of the locals as of Dec 31, 1942.
339 of these men had been exposed to asbestos dust prior to
1924, and had twenty years of exposure as of 1943.

The

others were counted in the study as they reached the twenty
year exposure mark, which was before 1962.

Those who died

before the twenty year exposure mark were not counted.

A

total of 8,737.5 man-years of exposure histories of twenty
years or longer were compiled.[282]
Using five year time periods, the death rate among the
asbestos workers was compared to the average age-specific
death rate of the US white male population.

In the first

period, the rate among asbestos workers was substantially
lower, but was slightly higher in the second period.

In the

third period, from 1953 to 1957, 85 deaths occurred compared
to 56.6 expected.

From 1958 to 1962, 88 deaths occurred

compared to 54.4 expected.[283]

Excluding seven men who

died before the twenty-year-exposure mark, 255 of the 632
asbestos workers died before Jan. 1, 1963.

This was twenty-

six percent in excess of the 201.5 deaths that would have
been expected.[284]
Death from cancer of the lung or pleura was far higher
than expected in each of the five year periods.

Forty-five

of the 632 workers died from cancer of these sites, when only
6.6 such deaths were expected.

The three deaths listed as

neoplasms of the pleura were all mesotheliomas.

This one
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percent incidence was considered extremely high for such a
rare tumor.

The other 42 deaths were from bronchogenic

carcinomas.

Cancers of the stomach, colon, and rectum were

three times more frequent than expected.

Cancer from all

other sites was consistent with the expected rates.[285]
The question of environmental exposure was briefly
discussed, with particular concern for other tradespeople
on job sites where asbestos was used.

Because the "floating

fibers do not respect job classifications,"

these workers

were subject to passive, or second hand, rather than direct
exposure.

The mortality study on asbestos exposure and

neoplasia was published in the Journal of the American
Medical Association in April, 1964.

9.2.2.2 Asbestosis

The study of asbestosis among insula

tion workers included all 1522 members on the roster of the
New York-New Jersey locals from January 1, 1943 through
December 31, 1962.

264 members had died.

Of 1258 living

members, 1086 were still working in the trade, 63 had
retired, and 34 were not working due to illness.

The

remaining 75 had left the union and were no longer employed
as insulation workers.

Union records, which were compiled

on a weekly basis, detailed the work history of each member.
These were used to fill in information on workers who were
not examined, and supplement the occupational histories
obtained from those who were.

Death certificates were used

to obtain and analyze hospital and autopsy records for the
264 members who had died.[286]
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From the examinations and records, such details as:
onset and lapses of employment, protection measures used,
materials handled, occupational settings, and smoking habits
were established.

Reasons for inactivity or leaving the

trade were ascertained.

All physical examinations included

X-rays, measures of vital lung capacity, and fluid samples.
Many of the examinations were even more detailed.
Radiological change was the sole criteria used to
establish evidence of pulmonary asbestosis in those who
were examined.
participated.

Examination was voluntary and 1117 members
This included 984 of the 1806 active working

members, 50 retired members, 28 who were ill, and 55 who had
left for other employment.[287]

Evidence of pulmonary

asbestosis was present in half of this group.

The extent of

fibrosis varied directly with the duration of exposure.[288]
Time from onset of exposure to time of examination of
the 1117 workers was divided into ten year periods.

Only 36

(10 percent) of the 346 workers with less than ten years
showed some sign of radiological abnormality.

For workers

with exposures from ten to nineteen years, 167 of 379 (44
percent) showed some abnormality, nine of which were greater
than minimal.

Pleural fibrosis was present in 35, and 5

showed evidence of calcification.[289]
The majority of the 392 workers with more than twenty
years showed evidence of pulmonary asbestosis.

This group

included the majority of older members who had retired, or
were ill.

Of this group, 56 of the 77 (72 percent) with
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twenty to twenty-nine years had abnormal films.

This

increased to almost ninety percent for 194 workers with
thirty to thirty-nine years, and to ninety-five percent
for those with over forty years.

The extent and severity

of asbestosis increased with the time from onset of
exposure.[290]

9.2.3 Study Results
Dyspnea, or shortness of breath, is the physical complaint
most often associated with asbestosis.

The study found that

dyspnea on exertion rarely correlated with X-ray evidence of
fibrosis.[291]

Only twenty-five percent of ninety-nine cases

with twenty or more years of exposure, in which moderate or
severe dyspnea was present, had X-rays showing moderate or
extensive parenchymal fibrosis.

"Thus significant disability

may be present with relatively little to be seen on X-ray
and, conversely, X-ray changes may be extensive with little
functional difficulty."[292]
Particular attention was paid to the known increased
risk of lung cancer among asbestos workers.

Seven cases

(0.7%) were found among 984 of the 1086 members who were
still active in the trade.

Among the 172 who were no longer

active, 133 were examined and four cases (3%) of lung cancer
were found.

These cancers occurred in the 392 members with

more than twenty years of exposure.

None was found in those

with less than twenty years exposure prior to examination.
In 307 consecutive deaths examined in the cohort, lung cancer
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was found to be seven times greater than expected, and cancer
of the gastrointestinal tract was three times as common.

Ten

cases of mesothelioma of the pleura or peritoneum were found.
The difficulty of comparison with earlier studies was
cited, noting the conditions under which some of these took
place, the skewed populations involved, and the lack of
prolonged exposures.

Of particular interest is mention of a

report by Fleischer et a l . in 1945.

It is cited as "the only

large scale survey of asbestos insulation workers undertaken
...in the US."

The men were examined while at work, and only

51 of the 1074 examined had more than ten years of work
experience.

Only three cases of asbestosis were found, and

the study concluded that 'asbestos pipe covering of naval
vessels is a relatively safe operation.'
The study by Selikoff et a l . concluded that pulmonary
asbestosis, and the complications of lung cancer and meso
thelioma associated with it, were significant hazards among
insulation workers exposed to asbestos, particularly for
those with more than twenty years from onset of exposure.
Results of the study were presented at the New York Academy
of Science's International Conference on the Biological
Effects of Asbestos, held at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in
October 1964 in New York City.[293]
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9.3

The State of Awareness

9.3.1 The Medical Literature
From 1930 to 1960, industry executives had conspired to
suppress damaging information about the health effects of
asbestos exposure, by either editing the results to appear
more favorable, or not allowing publication, of at least nine
statistical health studies performed on humans or animals.
Independent studies in the 1930s and 1940s linked asbestos
exposure to pulmonary disease, lung cancer, and mesothelioma
tumors.[294]

These were mainly occupational diseases, but

the possibility of environmental or community exposures had
been suggested.

By the 1950s and 1960s, public health

officials and scientists were paying more attention to the
ill health effects attributed to asbestos exposure.
By 1960, sixty-three papers on the problems of asbestos
exposure had been published in the United States, England,
and Canada.

The papers sponsored by industry downplayed

asbestosis and dismissed any connection between lung cancer
and asbestos exposure.

The other fifty-two papers, published

independently of the industry, concluded the opposite - that
asbestos exposure was a dangerous source of asbestosis and
lung cancer.[295]

After 1960, the industry sponsored the

publication of three times as many studies as it had in the
preceding thirty years, and spent more than thirty times as
much on research as any government agency.[296]

By the end

of 1964, more than seven hundred medical articles worldwide
detailed the hazards of asbestos exposure.[297]
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9.3.2

New York Academy of Science Conference, 1964

"The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Insulation Workers in
the United States" appeared in the Annals of the New York
Academy of Science on December 31, 1965, which published
the proceedings of the 1964 conference.

The study was used

by attorney Ward Stevenson, whose precedent setting strategy
of suing asbestos manufacturers under product liability law
successfully breached the industry's "state-of-the-art
defense".[298]

The decision rendered by the court in the

case of Borel vs. Fibreboard Paper Products "triggered the
greatest avalanche of toxic-tort litigation in the history
of American jurisprudence."[299]
The extensive scope, objectivity, and thoroughness
of the database and methodology of the 1964 study presented
conclusive evidence of definite hazards resulting from
asbestos exposure.[300]

At the time, less than half of

the state governments had enacted regulations pertaining to
asbestos exposure.

Most of these only addressed asbestosis,

and all of them were based on less than reliable data.[301]
Unions led the drive to channel funding to Mount Sinai for
further research and education efforts.

By the end of 1964,

unions were pressing for federal government intervention.
The 1964 New York Academy of Science conference, and
the publication of its proceeding had opened the passage to
public debate on the use of asbestos, asbestos exposure and
its ramifications.

The reality of decades of asbestos

exposure was well known, but the twenty year latency period,
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and long term hazards of exposure had not been so apparent.
The 1964 studies confirmed the possibility that millions of
workers exposed during the war years were currently at risk.
It was also apparent that the five mppcf exposure limit value
adopted by the ACGIH did not provide an adequate level of
protection.

The TLV for asbestos and how it was set were

major topics of discussion at the 1964 conference.

9.4 The ACGIH
9.4.1

Formation

TLVs were the brainchild of the American Conference of
Governmental Industrial Hygienists.

Despite its name, the

ACGIH is a voluntary organization with no formal ties to
the federal government.

It was an outgrowth of training

seminars funded by the 1936 Social Security Act.

For

the first time, states received money for public health
activities, including education and training.

The focus

was on industrial hygiene, and the Public Health Service
worked with the Conference of State and Provincial Health
Authorities of North America to establish active industrial
hygiene units in state and local health departments.[302]
The American Industrial Hygiene Association was the
dominant group representing industrial hygienists.

Most

of its membership worked in private industries which held
large contracts from the federal government.

The AIHA had

industry support and was viewed as "industry-friendly,"
whereas, the ACGIH saw itself as

"worker-friendly".

The
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groundwork for its formation was laid after the second series
of training seminars in the summer of 1937.

By 1938, the

Public Health Service had organized industrial hygiene units
in twenty-eight states. The ACGIH held its first convention
apart from the AIHA in June, 1938, and continued to do so
until 1943.[303]
The reason for forming the ACGIH was that a non
governmental organization would have more flexibility in
responding to issues when the Public Health Service could
not.

The model for the ACGIH was the Conference of State

Sanitary Engineers.

This private group met annually with

the Public Health Service's Division of Sanitary Engineering
to discuss policy and training matters.[304]

The purpose of

the ACGIH was to:
promote industrial hygiene in all its aspects
and phases; to coordinate industrial hygiene
activities...by official federal, State, local
and territorial industrial hygiene agencies? to
encourage the interchange of experience among
industrial hygiene personnel in such official
organizations; to collect and make accessible
to all governmental industrial hygienists such
information and data as may be of assistance to
them in the proper fulfillment of their
duties.[305]
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9.4.2 The 1946 Guideline
The ACGIH adopted a strategy to maximize the impact of the
new group's national standing and impact.

To that end,

standing committees were formed to recommend guidelines for
levels of hazardous agents in the workplace.[306]

These

guidelines were called Maximum Allowable Concentrations
(MACs).
The purpose of the MAC list was to define acceptable
limits for exposures to ambient concentrations of substances
used in the workplace, as a guide for industrial hygienists.
A MAC value was based on an average concentration over an
eight hour day, called a time-weighted average (TWA).
MAC value was not a maximum concentration.

The

During an eight

hour period, the value could be exceeded, as long as lower
values occurred to balance the exposure to an average con
centration that did not exceed the M A C . [307]

The MAC list

included some materials that were known or suspected human
carcinogens.

This information was not specified, and did

not appear to be the basis for including such materials on
the list.[308]
The ACGIH established a formal Committee on Threshold
Limit Values (TLVs) in 1941.

Its members included William

G. Fredrick, Bureau of Industrial Hygiene for Detroit, as
chair; Leonard Greenburg, co-inventor of the Greenburg-Smith
impinger; and Philip Drinker of Harvard.[309]

The TLV

Committee began publishing an annual report in 1946, the same
year in which asbestos was approved as an addition to their
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MAC list.

The guideline adopted for asbestos was based

on the tentative recommendation of the 1938 Public Health
Service study conducted by Dreessen, et a l .

It was not

based on engineering solutions or modified work practices,
but on a numerical limit.

The limit applied only to asbes

tosis, based on a total average dust count of five mppcf,
over an eight hour period.

The 1938 study had already

documented that workers exposed at the five mppcf level
were developing asbestosis.

The limitations of the study

were thus incorporated, when the ACGIH adopted five mppcf
as the allowable exposure limit for asbestos in 1946.

9.4.2.1 The 1947 Hemeon Report

New Jersey adopted the

ACGIH guideline as a workplace standard in 1946, and also
considered restricting its industrial hygiene code to apply
only to long fibers.

Gardner, in his industry funded

research at Saranac Labs, had already produced asbestosis
in guinea pigs breathing ball milled asbestos.

The total

concentration of asbestos dust was 138 mppcf, but only 0.8
mppcf of the fibers were longer than ten microns.

Shorter

asbestos fibers had produced lung damage in rabbits in a
study by King in England, which also found interstitial
fibrosis produced by asbestos fibers as short as 2.5 microns.
Despite the insistence of Johns-Manvilie's counsel Vandiver
Brown, Gardner refused to endorse the New Jersey proposal
by testifying that short fibers were harmless.[310]
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The strongest criticism of the five mppcf guideline
came in a 1947 report by the Industrial Hygiene Foundation
of America (IHF).

The IHF evolved from the Air Hygiene

Foundation (A H F ), a research laboratory begun in 1935 by
the Mellon Institute.

The AHF had been formed, at the

request of industry, in response to the silicosis problem
prompted by the Gauley Bridge Tunnel disaster.[311 ]
The year it was formed, Brown wrote to the industry
trade magazine Asbestos, praising the new foundation for
"approaching various problems relating to air hygiene from
an unbiased viewpoint".

He also noted that it was "never

theless the creature of industry and is the one institution
upon which employers can rely completely for a sympathetic
appreciation of their viewpoint."

Brown urged the co-oper

ation and "unqualified support of all members of industries
faced with a dust disease hazard."[312]

Asbestos companies

supporting the AHF formed a group named the Asbestos Textile
Institute (ATI). Their purpose was to exchange information
on, and promote the use of successful methods of dust control,
among themselves.

In 1941, the Air Hygiene Foundation became

the Industrial Hygiene Foundation.
In 1947, the ATI requested an evaluation by the IHF to
define the nature and magnitude of the asbestosis problem.

A

preliminary investigation was conducted that spring by Dr. W.
C. L. Hemeon, and Dr. Richard Walmer, medical director and
chief engineer, respectively, for the foundation.

They took

dust surveys, and evaluated medical studies in ten asbestos
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textile plants owned by ATI member companies.

Only five of

the ten plants had programs for taking chest X-rays.

In two

of those plants, the Raybestos-Manhattan factory in Manheim,
Pennsylvania, and the Johns-Manville plant in Manville, New
Jersey, about twenty percent of the workers had developed
asbestosis.

The average total dust level for the Raybestos-

Manhattan plant was only two mppcf.[313]
Hemeon concluded that "the information available does
not permit complete assurance that five million [ppcf] is
thoroughly safe nor has information been developed permit
ting a better estimate of safe dustiness."

He urged the ATI

to find a method for "accurately measuring any remaining
hazards in the dust zone below five million [ppcf] for the
elimination of future asbestosis depends on the degree of
control effected now."

He also recommended that further

studies be done at ATI companies in North Carolina, where
annual X-rays of textile workers were required by state law,
especially "in one or two plants with a long history of high
order of dust control...".[314]
The 1947 report was never published, and none of the
further studies that Hemeon suggested were done.[315] The
1947 report was uncovered by plaintiff attorneys thirty
years later, and subsequently publicized during the trial
of Bob Alan Speake vs. Johns-Manville Corp. et a l .r316]
As a tribute to the ACGIH's initial strategy to gain
national impact and influence for its work, the five mppcf
guideline stood firm as the only available industry standard
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for asbestos, despite continued criticism of its inadequa
cies.

Hemeon felt that the five mppcf limit was too high.

Brown questioned whether it should exist at all.

At the

Sixth Saranac Symposium on Dust Diseases, organized by
Gardner's successor Vorwald, Brown presented a speech on
"Management's Viewpoint" in which he addressed the ACGIH
guideline that New Jersey had recently adopted.

Brown used

Hemeon's report to support his own argument that "no one can
state with certainty what is the maximum allowable limit for
asbestos dust."

He stated with assurance that "no study

has been made specifically directed toward ascertaining this
figure and I question there exists sufficient data correla
ting the disease to the degree of exposure to warrant any
determination that will even approximate accuracy."[317]

9.4.2.2 Modifications Proposed

Vorwald, a member of the

TLV Committee in 1952, tried to incorporate some aspects of
Gardner's earlier Saranac study into the standard.

Vorwald

proposed a companion limit of one mppcf for fibers longer
than ten microns in length. The proposal was not adopted by
the ACGIH, but it was considered by Johns-Manville.
In 1954, Johns-Manvilie's safety executive directed a
change in the company's internal reporting of MAC values.
The five mppcf standard would still be used for total
airborne dust, but fibers longer than ten microns would be
reported in fibers, rather than particles, per cubic foot.
The change was an attempt to measure long asbestos fibers
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more accurately because they were thought to be the most
hazardous airborne contaminants.

Johns-Manville decided on

the change despite the difficulty of reconciling and then
applying to humans, the contradictory conclusions from two
studies that involved different animals (guinea pigs and
rabbits).
Another attempt to modify the ACGIH standard was made by
toxicologist Herbert Stokinger of the Public Health Service.
In 1955, after Doll's study confirming the link between cancer
and asbestos exposure, Stokinger spoke at a "Symposium of
Threshold Limits" held jointly by the ACGIH and the American
Industrial Hygiene Association.

Even though he was skeptical

about the carcinogenicity of asbestos, Stokinger proposed a
safety factor of from one hundred to five hundred for
industrial carcinogens.

Stokinger was a member of the TLV

Committee for the next twenty years, but his proposal was
never implemented.[318]

The addition of asbestos to the

MAC list in 1946 had been followed by arsenic in 1947 and
chromates in 1950.

Nickel carbonyl was added in 1955, at

the time of Stokinger's presentation at the symposium.[319]
The substances were finally identified as carcinogens in the
ACGIH's "Documentation of the TLV Values" for 1966, but no
limits were recommended for them.[320]
Dr. Paul Gross became a member of the TLV Committee in
1965, primarily to address the setting of limit values for
mineral dusts including asbestos.
with the Mellon Institute.

Gross was a pathologist

He started there in 1954 and over
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a six year period, had examined various lung samples sent
from Johns-Manville.

Cancer was present with asbestosis in

most of these lung samples, leading Gross to the belief that
asbestos was carcinogenic.

He was the principal handler of

the asbestos standard for the TLV Committee until 1983.[321]
In 1968, the ACGIH issued a "Notice of Intent" inviting
comment from "industry-connected individuals principally, but
others also," on proposed changes to the 1967 TLV list.[322]
The proposal for asbestos included special consideration for
crocidolite:
A limit of 5 MPPCF, based on impinger
samples counted by light-field technics
(sic), is satisfactory to control exposures
to most forms of asbestos.

Crocidolite,

however, has been shown to produce, in
addition to the asbestotic inflammation,
also mesothelioma.

Since no safe limit can

be established for this form of asbestos,
it is recommended that workers exposed to
crocidolite be equipped with air-supplied
helmets.[323]
Official recognition of crocidolite as a cancer causing
agent,even at low levels of
problem for the industry.

exposure, would create a

Most of the

crocidolite imported

to the United States was used to manufacture large-diameter,
asbestos-reinforced cement pipe for drinking water supply
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systems.

A blend of chrysotile and fifteen percent by

weight of crocidolite produced the best product.

Selikoff

and other public health officials raised doubts about the
wisdom of this practice, and questioned whether crocidolite
was actually more hazardous than chrysotile or amosite
asbestos.

Stokinger recommended banning further use of

asbestos-cement pipe for water supply systems.[324]

9.4.3 Setting the Guidelines
The TLV Committee faced inherent difficulties.

The ACGIH

was formed "expressly to keep out corporate influence," but
was virtually dependent on industry to supply data the TLV
Committee needed.[325]

Speaking as chair of the committee

in 1969, Stokinger summarized his view of this dilemma:
The TLVs are industry's values... industry
has the sole responsibility to develop data
on its own products; government is not in a
position to develop the facilities to handle
the problem in total, nor should it, when
reliable toxicological consultants are now
available."[326]
Stokinger went on to acknowledge the inability to
obtain "appropriate industrial hygiene data as the greatest
problem facing the TLV Committee" in setting standards.[327]
The industry was not forthcoming, and the government was not
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able to exert influence, forcing the TLV Committee to rely
on other sources.
The ACGIH opted not to open membership to those in
private industry when it split with the American Industrial
Hygiene Association in 1938.

As a result, the TLV Committee

was an insular body of toxicologists and industrial hygien
ists, most from government health agencies. "Outsiders" such
as Vorwald and Gross had indirect connections with industry,
but their professions were similar to those represented on
the TLV Committee.

The persistent lack of physicians on the

committee increased the ire of the more established indus
trial doctors, especially as the ACGIH guidelines became
more widely recognized.[328]

9.4.3.1 Emphasis on Prevention

The TLV Committee

concentrated on prevention by seeking some minimum level
of exposure which would not lead to sickness.

The data on

which to base a lower limit were not available to them, so
other criteria were used.

These criteria are amply described

by McCulloch's comment about the coal dust standard for New
South Wales: "The standard was determined through a trade
off between technical efficiency, acceptable cost to the
producer and the existing dust levels found in the industry."
McCulloch's comment referred to discussions of preventive
measures and setting standards, which took place at the Third
International Conference of Experts on Pneumoconiosis, in
Sydney, Australia in 1950.

The conference unanimously
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adopted a proposal favoring prevention because "...no
reliance should be placed on an appliance which depended
on the individuals using it correctly, unless it was quite
impossible in the circumstances to use any other."

Preven

tion, a higher level of protection, took precedence over
safety equipment in setting standards.[329]

Although the

ACGIH achieved its goal of gaining national impact, its
standards were not enforceable unless adopted by state law.
Even when enforceable, the five mppcf standard for asbestos
was not an adequate level of protection to prevent asbesto
sis, the only asbestos-produced disease it addressed.

The

standards could be no more stringent than what the technology
at the time was capable of measuring.

9.4.3.2 Changes in the TLV

The ACGIH had approved the

addition of asbestos to the first MAC list published in 1946.
In 1963, the ACGIH changed the name for its list, from
maximum allowable concentrations (MACs) to threshold limit
values (TLVs).[330]

The need for a more stringent standard

was somewhat acknowledged by the "Notice of Intended Changes"
for 1968.

Although the proposal for special handling of

crocidolite was dropped, the TLV for asbestos was lowered to
twelve fibers per cubic centimeter of air (12 f/cc), or two
mppcf for all particles.

One particle per cubic centimeter

(ppcc) equals 35.3 times one mppcf.

A conversion factor, of

one mppcf equal to six fibers per cubic centimeter, was used
to facilitate a more accurate system of measurement which,
like the old system, could only count microscopic dusts.[331]

In 1970, the ACGIH established a new subcommittee on
carcinogenic substances.

Over the next six years, represen

tatives from major corporations in private industry became
so prevalent that they made up half of the committee members.
In some cases, primary responsibility for reviewing new
products was done by representatives from the companies which
made those same products.

In 1974, the TLV for asbestos was

listed at 5 f/cc, two years after OSHA had adopted a standard
at that level through the formal rulemaking process.[332]
In 1980, the ACGIH revisited its earlier proposal for
special consideration for crocidolite, and lowered the TLV
for crocidolite to 0.2 f/cc.
to 0.5 f/cc.

The TLV for amosite was lowered

The TLV for chrysotile and other forms of

asbestos was lowered to 2 f/cc.

By 1980, the 2 f/cc level

of exposure had been in effect for four years in the United
States, and for eleven years in England.[333]

CHAPTER 10

FEDERAL REGULATION OF ASBESTOS

10.1 Introduction
In 1969, a federal standard of twelve fibers per cubic
centimeter (12 f/cc) of air was adopted under provisions
of the Walsh-Healy Public Contracts Act, which applied
to government contract jobs costing $10,000 or more.[334]
After several years of consideration, a watershed of federal
legislation concerning environmental issues was pending in
the Congress.

10.2 The OSHAct of 1970
"Through the exercise of its power to regulate commerce
among the several States and with foreign nations," the
91st Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970.

The OSHAct of 1970 was signed into law by

President Nixon, on December 29, 1970. It became effective
on April 28, 1971.

10.2.1 Provisions of the OSHAct
The purpose of the Act was to "assure safe and healthful
working conditions for working men and women by authorizing
enforcement of the standards developed under the Act; by
assisting and encouraging the States in their efforts to
assure safe and healthful working conditions; by providing
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for research, information, education, and training in the
field of occupational safety and health; and for other
purposes."[335]

10.2.1.1 Administration

The Department of Health,

Education and Welfare (HEW), and the Department of Labor
(DOL) were the agencies designated to carry out the
provisions of the OSHAct.

The term "Secretary" in the

OSHAct, refers to the Secretary of Labor.

The Occupational

Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) was the enforcement
agency created in the Department of Labor.

OSHA was the

first centralized, federal depository for information on
workplace conditions in the United States.
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare was
established in 1953 to combine the government's various
health related activities under the administration of one
federal agency.

10.2.1.2 NIOSH

Section twenty-two of the OSHAct created

the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW), which later became the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS). NIOSH is administered by the Centers for
Disease Control.

Its functions include research, training,

employee education, and related activities.

NIOSH is

responsible for developing and recommending standards.
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10.2.1.3 Setting Standards

The primary responsibility for

setting occupational safety or health standards is assigned
to the Secretary of Labor.

Section six of the OSHAct estab

lished the procedure for setting a "national consensus stan
dard."

In the event of "conflict among any such standards,

the Secretary shall promulgate the standard which assures the
greatest protection of the safety or health of the affected
employees."[336]

Standards for toxic or harmful physical

agents were to assure, "to the extent feasible, on the best
available evidence, that no employee will suffer material
impairment of health or functional capacity even if such
employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by
such standard for the period of his working life."[337]
Promulgation of an OSHA standard would supersede those
safety or health standards which predated the OSHAct.

10.2.2 The Rulemaking Process
The first test of OSHA's rulemaking procedure for setting
standards in the public forum was set in motion within one
year of the act's passage.

10.2.2.1 The First Consensus Standard

The first consensus

standard adopted under the OSHAct limited asbestos exposure
to 12 f/cc of air, averaged over an eight hour day.
adopted by OSHA on May 29, 1971.

It was

In October, 1971, NIOSH

investigators surveyed the Owens-Corning plant in Tyler,
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Texas, at the request of its owners.

More than seventy-

five percent of the fifty-four air samples taken, failed
to meet the existing standard of 12 f/cc, but this was not
mentioned in the inspection report.

Instead, an "extremely

serious occupational-health situation" was said to exist.
Extensive improvements to the ventilation and dust control
systems were to be completed by March 31, 1972, and a $210
fine was imposed for other "non-serious" violations.[338]
The situation at the Tyler plant prompted action from the
AFL-CIO.

On November 4, 1971, the Industrial Union Division

of the AFL-CIO petitioned Secretary of Labor James D. Hodgson
to declare an emergency temporary standard (ETS)
for asbestos exposure of 2 f/cc.

10.2.2.2 The First Comprehensive Standard

On December 7,

1971, Secretary Hodgson issued an ETS of 5 f/cc, and a peak
exposure of 10 f/cc as a "scientific compromise".[339]

The

Secretary called for hearings on a permanent standard to
begin in March, 1972, and assigned a five person advisory
committee representing government, labor, industry and
science.

OSHA retained the Arthur D. Little consulting

firm to conduct a survey of the health effects, at various
levels of exposure (0.2, 2, 12, and 30 f/cc), over a working
lifetime.

Labor unions, research scientists, and the

advisory committee recommended a standard of 2 f/cc.
Industry supported the ETS of 5 f/cc that was in effect.
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The consensus standard of 12 f/cc was no longer considered
feasible by any group.

NIOSH prepared a Criteria Document

recommending a standard of 2 f/cc, to be effective in two
years, along with requirements for recordkeeping, monitor
ing, medical surveillance of workers, and labeling.

The

report was submitted to the Secretary on February 1,
1972.[340]
OSHA promulgated its first comprehensive health stan
dard for asbestos on June 7, 1972.

The emergency standard

was retained until July 1, 1976, when a reduction to 2 f/cc
became effective.

A decision was made on May 24, 1983 to

apply any new standard adopted for general industry to
construction, as well.

10.2.2.3

The 1984 Hearings

An ETS of 0.5 f/cc, published

on November 4, 1983, was invalidated in March, 1994, by the
US Circuit Court of Appeals.

On April 10, 1984, OSHA began

the formal rulemaking process again, by announcing two
possible exposure levels for asbestos (0.5 and 0.2 f/cc),
and permitting the use of respirators.[341]
At OSHA's public hearing on June 21, 1984, a NIOSH
representative testified that there was "no safe airborne
fiber concentration for any of the asbestos minerals.

NIOSH

stated that not even the lowest fiber exposure limit could
assure all workers of absolute protection from exposurerelated cancer," and reaffirmed the agency's earlier conclu
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sion, that "there is no scientific basis for differentiating
health risks between types of asbestos fibers for regulatory
purposes."[342]

10.2.2.4 Risk Analysis

OSHA considers as significant those

occupational exposures which cause more than one death per
one thousand, over a working lifetime.

Through its risk

assessment analysis, OSHA determined that a reduction of the
PEL from 2 f/cc to 0.2 f/cc would reduce the lifetime risk
of death from asbestos-related cancer from 64 to 7 deaths
per 1000 workers.

Excess cancer risk for a twenty year

period of exposure was estimated at 4.5 per 1000 workers.
For asbestosis, the incidence over a working lifetime was
estimated at 5 per 1000, with an incidence for twenty years
of exposure of 2 per 1,000 workers.[343]

10.2.3 A Ten-fold Reduction Over Ten Years
On June 17, 1986, OSHA issued two revised standards, one for
occupational exposures in general industry, and the other for
construction.

The construction standard included specific

requirements for asbestos abatement and demolition work.

The

time-weighted average permissible exposure limit (TWA-PEL)
for asbestos was the same for both standards.

It was reduced

from 2 f/cc to 0.2 f/cc, and an action level of 0.1 f/cc was
established.
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Both standards included occupational exposure to the
non-asbestos varieties of tremolite, anthrophyllite and
actinolite asbestos.
in June, 1992.
21, 1986.

This provision was subsequently deleted

The 1986 standards became effective on July

In the ten year period from 1976 to 1986, OSHA

had reduced the PEL for asbestos tenfold, from 2 f/cc to 0.2
f/cc.[344]

10.2.4 OSHA Regulations
Congress created OSHA under its power to regulate commerce,
and the OSHAct of 1970 focused on occupational settings,
mostly in private industry.

The regulations are codified in

the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) for the construction,
and maritime industries, as well as for general industry.
In general, OSHA regulations cover employees and employers
in occupational settings, through federal jurisdiction, or
through OSHA-approved state programs.[345]

OSHA has never

had the resources to inspect all of the nation's workplaces,
which means that compliance is largely voluntary.

Despite

OSHA's extensive recordkeeping and reporting requirements,
lack of data on the causes of injury are still one of the
agency's greatest problems.

10.3 Mounting Litigation
The landslide of claims in the 1970s and the 1980s from
asbestos-related exposures helps to explain why the federal
government was forced to intervene.

As a matter of
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commerce, it was becoming difficult to obtain financing and
insurance for buildings which contained asbestos.[346]

The

numbers of product liability claims, and the amounts being
awarded, were piling up.

10.3.1 Increasing Damages
The average settlement cost had tripled in the ten year
period from 1970 to 1979, then doubled in the next four
years. In mid-1982, the courts began awarding punitive
damages as well.

By the end of 1982, manufacturers and

their insurance companies had paid approximately six hundred
million dollars in compensation, to settle some four thousand
product liability cases.[347]

A study completed in March,

1984, surveyed compensation paid for asbestos-related disease
claims in trials that began between January 1, 1980 and
August 26, 1982.

The average total compensation, for the

fifty-three percent of the plaintiffs who won their cases,
was $388,000.[348]

10.3.2

Johns-Manville

By 1982, claims against Johns-Manville were coming in at
a rate of six thousand per year.
were still pending.

Seventeen thousand cases

Compensation payments with no end in

sight prompted the company to change its name, and file a
petition in Federal Bankruptcy Court.

10.3.2.1

Bankruptcy

On August 26, 1982, the Manville

Corporation filed for reorganization under Chapter 11,
seeking protection from the continuing onslaught of personal
injury lawsuits.

The next day, Manville Chairman and CEO

John A. McKinney's full page ad appeared in the Washington
Post, the New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal.
McKinney chastised Congress for failing to pass a statutory
compensation program, and held the government responsible for
conditions at naval shipyards during World War II.

Selikoff,

who was then Director of the Environmental Sciences Labora
tory at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine in New York City,
called the filing "simply the latest episode in a fifty year
history of corporate malfeasance and inhumanity to man
unparalleled in the annuls of the private enterprise system."
At the time of filing, the company had over two billion
dollars in assets, and was ranked 181st on the Fortune 500
list of domestic industrial concerns.

Bankruptcy was seen

as the only viable solution for keeping the company alive to
face the onslaught of product and strict liability lawsuits.
[349] Manville voluntarily declared bankruptcy to force
government intervention on the industry's behalf[350] so
that, as CEO McKinney stated, "the thousands of citizens
and voters caught up in this problem will be spared the
expensive, inefficient, and haphazard litigation system
we have been saddled with."[351]
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10.3.2.2 Manville Sues the Government

The suit filed by

Manville in May 1983 was the first of its kind against the
federal government.

The company sought reimbursement of

compensation it had already paid to former shipyard workers.
Half of the claims were from shipyard workers. Most of them
had never even worked for the company, but had used its
products.[352]

Manville argued that Navy specifications and

government actions during World War II made the federal
government liable for damages.

The suit was Manville's way

of forcing the government to do something about the prospect
of never ending claims.

10.3.3 Organizing to Settle Claims
On June 19, 1985, the Wellington Agreement was signed in
the United States by thirty-four asbestos producers and
sixteen insurers.[353]

Manville did not participate, as it

had already established a trust for settling claims during
its reorganization.

The agreement established the Asbestos

Claims Facility to settle bodily injury claims, and to
provide a joint defense against claims brought by asbestos
victims.

Sixty-five thousand lawsuits were settled under

the Asbestos Claims Facility, but it could not handle the
number of cases being brought, or the increasing number of
cases from new and different sources of exposure.
Facility was dissolved in 1988.

The Claims

It was succeeded by the

Center for Claims Resolution, formed by some of the producers
and insurers who had signed the original agreement.[354]
Disputes continue regarding settlement of claims.
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10.4 EPA
Overall workplace conditions have probably improved because
of OSHA, but the agency responsible for bringing the subject
of asbestos fully into the public arena was the Environmen
tal Protection Agency (EPA) through its administration of
the asbestos-in-schools programs.

10.4.1

Provisions for Regulating Asbestos

OSHA regulates matters of health and safety in occupational
settings.

EPA enforces public health and environmental

safety laws.[355]

The EPA Worker Protection Rule of 1987

extended OSHA's asbestos regulations for the construction
industry to cover workers in the public sector who are
engaged in asbestos abatement activities.
In 1979, the agency established the Technical Assis
tance Program (TAP) to provide guidance and technical
assistance for the identification and control of ACM in
buildings.[356]

EPA regulates asbestos under several

provisions, and each of its ten regional offices has a
Regional Asbestos Coordinator.
Emissions to ambient air are regulated under the
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
(NESHAP), which EPA administers under authority of the Clean
Air Act of 1971.[357]

NESHAP revisions in 1973 specified

work practices and procedures to be followed in order to
prevent "visible emissions" of dust. Removal of asbestos
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prior to renovation and demolition projects, and prior
notification to EPA of same, are requirements of NESHAP.
Under NESHAP, asbestos was designated as a hazardous
air pollutant in 1971.

The use of asbestos in spray-on

insulation or fireproofing applications was banned in 1973,
followed by a ban on its use for decorative purposes.

The

disposal of asbestos waste in landfills is regulated under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976,
which pertains to solid, but not hazardous, wastes.

10.4.2 The Asbestos-in-Schools Programs
EPA regulates the asbestos-in-schools programs to monitor
asbestos abatement in public and private, elementary and
secondary school buildings.

The most prominent of these

programs is regulated under the Asbestos Hazard Emergency
Response Act (AHERA) of 1986.
AHERA was originally created as Subchapter II under
the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). TSCA was enacted in
1976 to fill the gaps left in other federal laws regulating
toxic substances.[358]

Under TSCA, EPA issued the Friable

Asbestos-Containing Materials in Schools Identification and
Notification Rule (Asbestos-In-Schools rule), effective in
June, 1982.

10.4.2.1 Identification and Notification Rule

The Identi

fication and Notification rule required private schools and
school districts to inspect for friable asbestos by June 28,
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1983, and notify parents and employees, whether or not it
was present. [359]

Abatement was not required, and there

were no guidelines for the inspections, or for establishing
when abatement would be an appropriate response.
No funding was allocated to carry out the inspection
and notification program.

Schools that had complied with

the Asbestos-In-Schools rule could apply for funding under
the Asbestos School Hazard Abatement Act of 1984, which
provided loans and grants to correct serious exposure
situations in financially needy schools.[360]
An EPA survey of 2600 schools, completed in January,
1984, showed that ninety-three percent of them had been
inspected, but only thirty-four percent were in full com
pliance with the rule.

One year later, EPA had issued 147

civil complaints nationwide, for failure to comply.

Fines

levied on the school districts totaled more than one million
dollars.[361]

10.4.2.2 AHERA of 1986

To correct deficiencies in the

rule, Congress directed the EPA to regulate response actions
to friable ACM found in the schools.

Friable asbestos is

defined as any material, containing more than one percent
asbestos by weight, that can be easily crumbled by hand
pressure. Representative Jim Florio, of Gloucester Township,
New Jersey, sponsored the federal legislation which became
known as the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act (AHERA)
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of 1986.[362]

The act was signed into law by President

Reagan on October 22, 1986.
AHERA required local education agencies (LEAs) to
establish management plans with inspection, monitoring and
notification procedures for the control of asbestos in the
schools.

Approximately 107,000 schools in the nation were

affected by AHERA,[363] and abatement work was anticipated
for 45,000 of them.[364]
Control options included repair, encapsulation,
enclosure, and removal.

Removal of non-friable asbestos-

containing materials was rarely required by AHERA. A poorly
done removal job could increase, rather than eliminate, the
risk of exposure.

Abatement work in the schools, including

inspections and the design of management plans, was to be
done only by EPA accredited personnel.

A readily available

work force of such personnel was not yet established.
The implementation of AHERA required a vast education
and training effort.

The EPA published numerous guidebooks

on controlling asbestos-containing materials in buildings,
and in January, 1985, established the first supervisory
level training centers at the University of Kansas, Tufts
University, and Georgia Institute of Technology.[365]
Maryland, New Jersey, and Alaska were the first states to
establish training and certification programs for asbestos
abatement personnel.
The original deadline for completing the inspections
and submitting the asbestos management plans was October
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12, 1988.

Most school districts experienced difficulties,

and many of the plans that were submitted were technically
inadequate.

In New Jersey, less than twenty percent of the

school districts had filed by the deadline.

President Reagan

signed a bill in mid-July allowing the LEAs to request delays
until May 9, 1989, but the original July 9, 1989 deadline
for implementation of the plans remained unchanged.

By the

end of August, EPA had approved training and certification
programs for asbestos abatement in only eight states (New
Jersey, Alaska, Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachu
setts, and Michigan).[366]

A general lack of understanding

of the regulations, and the temperament of the times,
resulted in a plethora of removal projects, undertaken during
the summer of 1989.

10.4.3 The 1988 Study
One provision of AHERA required EPA to determine whether
public and commercial buildings should be subject to the
asbestos-in-schools regulations.

In February 1988, the EPA

Study of Asbestos-Containing Materials in Public Buildings:
A Report to Congress was issued.
results of

The study detailed the

extensive inspections conducted in a statisti

cally representative sampling of 231 buildings located at
ten sites around the country.

The sample represented 3.5

million buildings in the United States, divided into three
classes - federal government, private non-residential or
commercial, and residential apartments.[367]

The study found
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that almost sixty percent of the buildings contained ACM.
The worst levels of airborne asbestos fibers in a sample
of forty-three federal buildings were no higher than those
found in ambient outdoor a ir.[368]

The study found that

asbestos was commonly found in large, residential apartment
buildings and most commonly used in heating systems to
insulate boilers and piping.
From the sample, EPA estimated that 73 3,000 federal
and commercial buildings contained friable asbestos-con
taining material (ACM), and 317,000 of those buildings
contained some areas with significantly damaged ACM that
was likely to become airborne.[369]

It was estimated that

190,000 buildings contained 1.2 billion square feet of
sprayed-on or troweled-on materials, with an average asbes
tos content of fourteen percent.[370]

Estimates for removal

of ACM in these buildings ranged from $100 to $150 billion.
EPA estimated that 22.5 million office workers, and 369,200
custodial workers worked in the buildings, and predicted
3,300 deaths from asbestos-related disease by the year
2118, among the population using these buildings.[371]

An

extension of EPA regulations to encompass these additional
buildings was estimated to cost $53 billion over a thirty
year period.

Instead of widening the scope of its oversight,

EPA recommended a $6.2 million increase in its annual budget
over the next three years: to increase the number of trained
asbestos-control personnel, to develop safe abatement
methods, and to supplement educational, technical assistance
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and enforcement programs.

No new regulations were proposed

because of limited resources available in terms of funding
and trained personnel.

The schools were given top priority,

"both because of the minerals' greater prevalence in schools
and because asbestos exposure poses a greater cancer risk to
children than adults."[372]

10.4.4 Asbestos Ban and Phase Out Rule
The EPA had already banned several uses of asbestos in the
1970s and began investigating other asbestos containing
products after French researchers reported that asbestosimpregnated floor tiles could release fibers through normal
wear.[373] On June 20, 1986, the agency published a proposal
to ban all uses of asbestos over the next ten years.

The EPA

estimated that the proposal would prevent 1900 deaths per
year from asbestos-related cancers.

On July 12, 1989, the

EPA promulgated the Asbestos Ban and Phaseout Rule under
TSCA.

The Asbestos Ban and Phaseout Rule was designed to

phase out the importation, manufacture and processing of 94%
of all remaining asbestos-containing products in the United
States, in three stages, over a seven year period.
The schedule for the Ban and Phase Out rule began in
1990, when the manufacture, importation, or processing of
asbestos in roof and floor felt, vinyl-asbestos tile, asbes
tos clothing and asbestos-cement products was prohibited.
Commercial distribution was prohibited in 1992.

After 1994,

the same applied to gaskets and some friction products,
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followed in 1996 by paper products, roofing and other coat
ing products, additional friction products, and asbestoscement pipes and shingles.

Under the rule, all commercial

distribution of these products in the United States would
be prohibited after 1997.

Exemptions to the ban could be

granted on a case-by-case basis.

The rule did not affect

existing asbestos-containing materials in buildings.[374]
The Asbestos Information Association of North America
(AIA/NA) filed a petition in the US Court of Appeals in
Richmond, Virginia.[375]

The AIA was an industry supported

lobbying group and public relations agency that was formed
in 1970.

The group challenged the authority under which

the Asbestos Ban and Phase Out rule was established, but
specified that the legal action did not pertain to friable
asbestos products being abated from schools and other
structures.

The Asbestos Cement Pipe Producers Association

joined the suit.
A decision by the US Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
in October, 1991, vacated enforcement of the Asbestos Ban
and Phase Out Rule.

The health effects of exposure to

asbestos were not the basis for the suit, and they were not
considered in the court's decision.

The EPA has interpreted

the court's decision to apply only to products that were
still found in commerce after the rule was enacted, and in
1993, published a list of product categories still subject
to the rule.

It is not clear which products will remain in

commerce, but the business of asbestos has been sharply

curtailed in the United States.[376]

Ten years after the

OSHAct became effective, the apparent annual consumption of
asbestos had decreased by half.[377]

CHAPTER 11

DISCUSSION
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, and PUBLIC POLICY

11.1 Introduction
Asbestos was the miracle fiber that became the curse of
the twentieth century. An understanding of its role in
the development of the United States helps to explain how
the hazards of exposure were perceived, interpreted and
addressed.
Asbestos was remarkably marketable because of its
versatility.

Between 1900 and 1980, 36 million metric

tons were used in over 3,000 products.

Millions of build

ings benefited from its unique fireproofing and insulating
properties.[378]
In the 1950s, marketing non-regulated asbestos-contain
ing products to the schools was a profitable venture for
industry.

Thirty years later, regulations for the asbestos-

in-schools programs created a new market for asbestos abate
ment, forcing technology and the practitioners needed to
service that market to catch up.

11.2 Regulation of Hazardous Materials
Laws promulgated in the 1980s to protect workers exposed to
hazardous materials included, for the first time, specific
mandates that required more precise assessment, monitoring
and recordkeeping procedures.
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11.2.1 Origin of Federal Laws
The origin of these laws involved OSHA's experience in
responding to oil spills in the chemical industry.[379]
OSHA's worker protection laws applied to the chemical
industry, but laws for hazardous wastes and accidental
releases were monitored by the EPA.

OSHA had no jurisdic

tion over workers responding to spills inside the plants,
and the EPA had no mandate to regulate worker safety.
The first regulations to address hazardous materials
and emergency response training were issued in 1980 under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) to cover
workers in treatment, storage, and disposal facilities.
This was followed by the Hazardous Communications Act of
1984 (29 CFR 1910.1200), which applies to employees in
companies using or manufacturing hazardous materials.

In

1986, OSHA was directed to regulate workers at hazardous
sites or responding to emergencies at those sites.

These

regulations were promulgated in AHERA, which included
standards for training asbestos abatement workers handling
AHERA contracts.[380]

11.2.2

Creating A New Industry

Federal regulations created the asbestos abatement industry
to address the health concerns of asbestos in the schools.
The market for asbestos abatement grew from about $600
million in 1986[381] to over $1.5 billion by the following
year, in contractor services alone.[382]

New and improved
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technologies were developed to improve efficiency, and to
meet the flurry of increasingly stringent regulations.
By 1989, asbestos abatement contractors and equipment
suppliers were also engaged in hazardous materials manage
ment and emergency response remediation.

Eliminating

economic losses faced by owners whose buildings contained
asbestos provided another market for the growing abatement
industry.[383]

11.3

Public Policy

Like the TLV, the PEL was not meant to imply a safe level
of exposure, but one that could be assessed using technology
that was widely available.

Limitations in both technology

and available data were reflected in the standards.

Advances

in both of these areas provided some basis for setting
limits, but many other factors were considered.

Unlike the

TLV, the PEL is codified in regulations and procedures that
are enforceable under federal law.

Court cases brought by

both industry and labor challenging, the validity of OSHA's
standards and how they were developed, are ongoing, as of
1994.

11.3.1 Changing Conditions
As a matter of public policy, establishing an exposure limit
involves elements of risk and burdens of uncertainty that
must be evaluated in the decisionmaking process.

Changing
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conditions produce different situations that influence how
those risks and burdens are allocated.

OSHA's first regula

tions addressed unsafe conditions in manufacturing plants,
mines and steel mills.[384]

Changes in the economy, and

advances in technology have produced new industries, with
occupations and processes with different conditions. Regula
tions addressing health and safety issues will always lag
behind changes in the economy because hazardous conditions
are not always readily discernible.

11.3.2 Defining the Problem
A problem has to be recognized before it can be defined or
addressed.

Klaidman comments on the high level of uncer

tainty typical of health-risk issues, which makes them
especially manipulable.[385]
Peters notes that government regulations may be respon
sible for some common misconceptions about the hazards of
asbestos.

Asbestos is regulated as a mineral dust.

The

required warnings and labels caution against exposure to
asbestos dust. In his 1930 report, Merewether emphasized
control of dust levels.

As Peters points out, most people

believe dust is something that can be seen, but the most
harmful asbestos fibers are too small to be seen by the naked
eye, and they can stay airborne for long periods of time.
situation in which dust can be seen is one of gross
contamination.[386]

A
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11.3.3 Addressing the Problem
How a problem is addressed reflects the perspectives and
values of the decision makers.

Industry executives knew

that exposure to asbestos dust was a health hazard, but they
were not compelled to recognize it as such, or institute
preventive measures.

Their primary concern was the possi

bility of escalating compensation costs from the adverse
health effects from exposure to asbestos dust.[387]

The

industry's problem was originally defined in terms of lost
production time and cost containment.

Efforts to determine

the nature and extent of the problem were undertaken from
that perspective.

The problem was addressed by suppressing

information, influencing unfavorable legislation, and dis
claiming positions contrary to their interests.

Before the

hazards of asbestos exposure became a matter of public
debate, there were no effective rebuttals to the industry's
position.
Industry was able to carry on business as usual as
long as it did, because it retained control over conditions
in the workplace.

The OSHAct of 1970 finally established

federal regulation of workplace conditions, six years after
pressure to produce such legislation was initiated in 1964.

11.4 Summary
The 1964 studies established evidence of the hazards from
occupational exposure to asbestos, which helped initiate the
movement toward environmental legislation.

Remediation of
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asbestos in the schools was addressed as a national priority
because of fears that the situation placed an entire genera
tion in jeopardy of developing debilitating asbestos-related
diseases.

Environmental exposures exploded on the scene in

New York City in the summer and fall of 1989, when ruptures
of asbestos-cement steam and water pipes seemed to occur on
a weekly basis.[388]
One of the first of these ruptures occurred in Gramercy
Park.

The fine mist spewed from the steam pipe released two

hundred pounds of asbestos, in a geyser that reached the
rooftops of a row of affected apartment buildings.

In that

case, Con Edison was fined late in 1994, for failure to give
proper notification and follow other required procedures.
The utility was able to settle OSHA's proposed sixty thou
sand dollar fine for seven thousand dollars.[389]
The Occupational Safety and Health Act was passed under
the authority of Congress to regulate commerce. Issues of
health and safety, even when recognized as hazards, are
weighed against economic interests.

Science, research, and

technology can provide information, but the results can only
be explained through interpretation.

The industry fought

against stricter regulation of asbestos to the bitter end,
citing lack of scientific proof as an argument for delay.
Various aspects of exposure to asbestos will continue to
prompt debates that could apply as well to: cigarette smoke,
materials substituted for asbestos, hazardous waste disposal
sites, and electromagnetic fields (EMFs).[390]
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Perception of risk and what is considered to be safe,
are subject to opinion in any number of situations when
health, safety, and the cost of peoples' lives are weighed
against economic interests, by entities with diverse agendas
and the power to impact policy decisions.

As Peters notes,

government mandated requirements are minimum guidelines
"representing a real-life political compromise between
influential interest groups" which, if used in a vacuum,
"can induce unsafe behavior, promote harmful misconceptions,
and create detrimental attitudes."[391]
Standards for health and safety will continue to be
based on incomplete data until better information is avail
able.

That may involve the amount of time it takes for the

consequences of a hazard to outweigh the failure to recognize
and address it.
There is some scientific consensus regarding the
causation and progression of asbestos-related diseases.
Unanswered questions about these processes are a primary
source of the longstanding controversies regarding exposure
to asbestos.

Uncertainties include which fiber character

istics induce disease mechanisms; the synergy of smoking and
asbestos exposure that increases the risk of lung cancer;
extrapolating the results of animal studies to humans;
transferring occupational experience to non-occupational
settings; using past exposure and disease experience (heavy
in textiles) to predict present circumstances (light in
schools); a threshold level below which disease will not

occur; and the role of differences in human susceptibility
Research and technology may eventually provide better
information about some of these processes.

CHAPTER 12

CONTROVERSIES

Some of the current knowns, unknowns, and continuing con
troversies regarding the regulatory aspects of asbestos,
are outlined briefly in this final chapter, including OSHA's
1994 rule for occupational exposure to asbestos, the latest
since the 1986 standard.

12.1 Regulatory Definitions Limited by Technology
For regulatory and analytical purposes, asbestos is defined
as a fiber in terms of length and aspect ratio.
ratio is a fiber's length compared to its width.

The aspect
OSHA

defines a fiber as greater than 5 microns in length, with
an aspect ratio of three to one or greater.

EPA defines a

fiber as greater than or equal to 0.5 microns in diameter,
with an aspect ratio of five to one, with substantially
parallel sides.
Exposure to airborne asbestos is determined by analy
zing fiber counts of samples taken to be representative of
conditions at the site.

Collecting the samples, preparing

them, and counting the fibers, are all subject to human and
other errors.

The instrumentation and procedures used are

explained in Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber, pages 102-142,
and are detailed in OSHA's regulations.
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NIOSH Method #7400 prescribes the method for analyzing
fiber counts using phase contrast microscopy (PCM) at a
magnification of four hundred times (400X).
sets of rules:

There are two

The A rules apply to fibers with aspect

ratios of three to one or greater; the B rules apply to
aspect ratios of five to one or greater, where the diameter
is less than three microns.
miniscule.

The units of measurement are

There are one million microns in one meter.

One

meter equals 39.37 inches, or 3.28 feet, or 100 centimeters.
One fiber per cubic centimeter (1 f/cc) of air is equivalent
to one million fibers in each cubic meter of air which, by
definition, includes both asbestos and nonasbestos fibers.
PCM is not capable of detecting fibers with diameters
of less than 0.25 microns, and less than 0.5 microns in
length.

It cannot distinguish between asbestos and other

fibers.[392]

The skill and accuracy of the microscopist

counting the fibers is critical, but it is difficult to
count what cannot be seen.

Ultimately, the limits of

readily available technology determined the lower value
for an exposure limit.
The regulatory definition of a fiber reflects tech
nological limitations in the detection, measurement, and
counting of asbestos fibers.

A 1985 EPA guidebook entitled,

"Measuring Airborne Asbestos Following Abatement Action,"
stated that transmission electron microscopy (TEM) was "the
best method for measuring airborne asbestos."

TEM has a

magnification of 10,00OX, and is capable of distinguishing
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asbestos fibers from other fibers.

As of December 14, 1989,

AHERA required the use of TEM analysis for determining the
final clearance levels in asbestos abatement projects.

12.2

Fiber Characteristics and Disease Effects

Asbestosis, lung cancer, mesothelioma, and non-malignant
asbestos-related diseases are detailed in Sourcebook on
Asbestos Diseases by Peters, and Work-Related Lung Disorders
by Cotes[393].

One of the long standing controversies

concerns the causal, versus the collaborative or incidental,
effect of exposure to asbestos fibers.

The degree to which

various types of asbestos promote specific diseases is still
being debated, but all commercial forms of asbestos have now
been shown to produce these diseases.

12.2.1 Long vs Short Fibers
Regulatory emphasis on longer fibers, and the difficulty
of detecting and counting shorter fibers, led some to
conclude that only longer fibers were potentially harmful,
and shorter fibers relatively harmless.[394]

The longer,

thinner fibers are thought to be more carcinogenic,
especially for mesothelioma, whereas, shorter fibers
migrate deeper into body tissue.[395]

The most harmful

fibers are only one tenth the size of an object that can
be seen by the naked eye. [396]

Studies indicate that the

fibers most likely to cause cancer are too thin to be
observed by a light microscope.
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12.2.2 Asbestos Fibers in Body Tissue
Inhalation and ingestion are the primary routes by which
asbestos fibers enter the body.

Orally, asbestos does not

appear to present a significant health hazard.

Inhalation

is the route which leads to ill health effects.
Asbestos fibers can be widely disseminated in the human
body.

Their transmission through body tissue has not been

fully explained,[397] and the amount of fibers required to
cause adverse reactions in living organisms has not yet been
determined.

The large surface area and specific surface

reaction of the fibers are suspected to have some effect
on cells.[398]
A latency period of twenty to forty years is typical
before physical ailments become apparent.

The length of

the latency period varies with the type of disease.

The

likelihood of developing disease follows a dose/response
relationship,[399] but the mechanism that initiates the
malignant transformation remains unknown.

12.3 Latency and Liability
Latency was a key issue in the class action lawsuits.

The

question was whether insurers were liable for claims from
the time of first exposure, or from the time that disease
became apparent.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia in 1981 answered the question of insurer liabil
ity in Keene vs. INA.

In that case, the court ruled that

"all insurance policies in effect from the day of exposure
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until the time the illness manifests itself are responsible
for the entire amount of the loss...".
Fibreboard had been insured by the Chubb Corporation's
Pacific Indemnity Company under a twelve month general
liability policy that began in 1956.

That was followed by

a three year policy, issued by a subsidiary of CNA Financial
Corporation, which began in 1957, but was cancelled after
twenty-two months.

The terms of the policies were argued

during litigation of a personal injury class action lawsuit
against Fibreboard that began in 1979 in California.
1990,

In

the California court ruled that the two insurers

involved in the case faced unlimited liability.

A three

billion dollar settlement was proposed in 1993.

At the time,

Chubb's general counsel stated that there were 148,000 past
or pending claims, and 186,000 new claims were anticipated
against Fibreboard over the next twenty or thirty years.
Chubb's share of the settlement proposal was $358 million,
bringing their total reserves for injury claims arising
from the one year policy to $1.25 billion.[400]

12.4 Changes in Classifications
Dust levels were the highest during a period when few
measurements of dust levels were taken.

More precise

measurement techniques were adopted, but comparisons with
earlier data, gathered using impingers, were compromised.
Decades later, when disease became apparent, there was no
reliable basis for assessing past exposures.

Categories
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for classifying causes of death were also changed over
the years[401] as the various pulmonary diseases were
more precisely differentiated and defined.
In 1972, the Bureau of Mines began revising the format
it used for collecting data on domestic asbestos consumption.
Adjustments were made to reflect one hundred percent of
apparent consumption for eleven major uses of asbestos.
The revisions negated the possibility of comparisons with
earlier years.

The difficulty of establishing a true or

complete picture of past situations based on historical d a t a ,
is aggravated when changes negate the basis for comparison.

12.5 Chrysotile
There is still considerable controversy over the ill health
effects of chrysotile, in part because exposure to chrysotile
does not produce mesotheliomas at the same rate as the
amphiboles.[402]

Most of the Canadian chrysotile that was

used in the United States is naturally contaminated with
approximately one percent tremolite, an amphibole, which was
blamed for producing mesotheliomas found among Canadian
miners. Tremolite is found in talc, and in children's play
sand.

It is controversial in its own right.[403]

12.5.1 Mesothelioma
Mesothelioma tumors, first linked to asbestos exposure in
1943, were very rare. In 1960, Wagner reported thirty-three
deaths from mesothelioma over a four year period, all from
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the North Western Cape Province of South Africa, where crocidolite was mined.[404]

For this reason, mesothelioma was

associated with crocidolite asbestos for a long time. Meso
thelioma progresses rapidly, and is usually fatal within two
years of diagnosis.

It does not appear to be dose related,

and smoking does not appear to increase the risk.[405]

12.5.2 The "amphibole hypothesis"
The argument that chrysotile is less carcinogenic than
other forms of asbestos is outlined in an article on the
"amphibole theory" by Mossman et a l ., in the January, 19,
1990 issue of Science.[406]

In rebuttal, Nicholson, notes

that chrysotile can partially dissolve in body fluids, and
does not tend to remain in the lungs.

This makes an esti

mation of dose difficult to ascertain.

Amphiboles fibers

do accumulate in body tissue, and are visible upon autopsy.
Nicholson also notes that lung cancer is three times more
prevalent than mesothelioma among groups of workers exposed
to asbestos.[407]

12.6 Lung Cancer
Cancer is a collection of diseases that affect various sites
of the body in different ways.

The progression of asbestos-

related cancer is indistinguishable from cancer caused by
some other agent.[408]

Cancer is the second leading cause

of death in the United States, after heart disease, and lung
cancer is the number one cause of cancer related deaths.
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It is estimated that as many as sixteen thousand lung cancer
deaths per year may be due to occupational exposure.[409]
Whether or not asbestosis progresses to bronchial carcinoma,
or lung cancer, is another controversial topic.[410]

12.6.1 Asbestosis
Asbestosis is a diffuse pulmonary fibrosis of the lungs,
initiated by the inhalation of asbestos fibers.[411]

The

aerodynamic behavior and deposition of asbestos fibers as
they travel through the respiratory tract are described in
Bernarde's Our Precarious Habitat, and in The Normal Lung:
The Basis for Diagnosis and Treatment of Pulmonary Disease
by John F. Murray.

The body's natural defense mechanism

attempts to destroy the foreign fibers by surrounding them
with scar tissue.

The build-up of scar tissue causes a

thickening or fibrosis of the alveoli walls, and of the
pleural tissue of the lung (pleural) cavity.

The gas

exchange function of the lungs is reduced as more air
sacs are affected, causing a reduction in functional lung
capacity.

Straining to breathe produces an enlarged heart,

typical of asbestosis sufferers.

When this process is

initiated by asbestos fibers, it is called asbestosis.[412]
Eventually, the sufferer suffocates.
Fifty percent of asbestosis sufferers may develop
lung cancer, the predominant form of respiratory cancer.
Moderate exposure to asbestos increases the risk of
developing lung cancer by a factor of five to ten.[413]
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12.6.2 Cigarette Smoke and Smoking
For those who smoke, and are exposed to asbestos, the risk
factor for developing lung cancer increases by more than
ninety.

The risk appears to be dose related, and suggests

some synergistic relationship between asbestos fibers and
tobacco smoke.

Asbestos is considered to be the second most

important cause of lung cancer after tobacco smoke.[414]
Bernarde notes the numbing effect of cigarette smoking on
the cilia, which reduces the output of mucus and permits
more asbestos fibers to slip deeper into the respiratory
tract to the alveoli.[415]
Klaidman, in his book on media coverage and public
health issues, notes that lung cancer was rare in the first
third of the twentieth century, before smoking became
popular.

Between 1922 and 1952, cigarette sales rose by 639

percent while the population was growing by only 54 percent.
As smoking became more popular, yet another use was found for
asbestos - in the filter tips of cigarettes.

The rate of

cancer among women increased almost four-fold between 1930
and 1967, the same period in which the proportion of adult
women smokers rose, from ten percent to an estimated thirtyfive percent.
Smoking was linked to lung cancer in 1936 by Dr. Alton
Ochsner who, in the 1950s, predicted that lung cancer would
account for 18 percent of all deaths from cancer in 1970.
fact, lung cancer accounted for 19.7 percent of deaths from
cancer in 1970.[416]

The cancer rate in 1994 was eighteen

In
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percent higher than it was in 1971.

At that rate, one third

of the population can expect to develop some type of cancer
during the course of a lifetime.[417]

12.7

Unregulated Chemicals

Benjamin Goldman, in The Truth About Where You L i v e , details
the geographic disparities in mortality rates among counties
in the United States, and notes that they are declining for
all causes of death except cancer, especially lung cancer.
Goldman also discusses the large number of unregulated
substances in every day use for which there are no d a t a .

The

National Toxicology Program lists 117 chemicals as potential
human carcinogens.

The International Agency for Research in

Cancer (IARC) lists 30 chemicals, mixtures, or occupational
exposures as carcinogenic to humans, 61 as probable human
carcinogens, and 64 as carcinogenic to animals.[418]

"Less

than 2 percent of the 70,000 chemicals in commerce have been
fully tested for human health effects, and there are no
health data whatsoever for over 70 percent.11[419 ]

Goldman

attributes the dearth of data to the high cost of performing
thorough human tests and industry's reluctance to conduct
them.

He also notes evidence that "animal tests themselves

cause the cancer, because massive doses of almost anything
seem to make cells divide, increasing the risk of mutations
associated with cancer."[420]
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12.8

Experimental Animal Studies

Klaidman also addresses the question of bias in the
interpretation of experimental animal studies for risk
assessment purposes, citing EPA's conservative guidelines
requiring that animal experiments select the most sensitive
strain of the species.

He gives a specific example of using

rats in testing formaldehyde:

"...

although rats get nasal cancers from

formaldehyde and appear to be the species
that is most sensitive to it, rats are
unusual because they can breathe only
through their noses. In contrast, other
animals, notably humans, can breathe through
the mouth and this would reduce significantly
the estimate of cancer risk from formaldehyde
in humans."[421]
A person engaged in heavy labor is more likely to
breathe through the mouth, inhaling more of whatever is
in the air.

In an eight hour day, a worker breathes in at

least five cubic meters of air.

Heavy labor can increase

the volume of inhaled air by a factor of five.[422]

The

example emphasizes how the effects of a decision that is
based on an interpretation can be multiplied throughout the
experimental, analytical, and policy-making stages of risk
assessment and risk management.
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12.9

The One Fiber Theory

The question of low level exposures encompasses debates
surrounding environmental exposures, the "one fiber theory,"
and the reasonableness of enacting legislation such as AHERA.
At issue is the reliability of extrapolating past occupa
tional exposures to predict expectations of future disease
produced under present day conditions, and the variability
of individual human susceptibility to disease.
The one fiber theory postulates that one fiber can
initiate the progression of disease.

Opponents, such as

Mossman, declare that "if one fiber of asbestos could kill,
we'd all be dead, as the general population all contain
asbestos fibers in their lungs."

In supporting this

position, Bernarde cites a study conducted in the 1970s,
of the population of Paterson, New Jersey.

The study was

of interest because the former UNARCO asbestos textile mill
was located in a residential area.

The study concluded that

contact with asbestos did not appear to have an adverse
effect on the residents of Paterson.[423]

12.10 Substitutes
Glass wool, rock wool, steel wool, iron wire, synthetic
rubber, organic plastics, cellulose, and treated paper are
some of the materials that have been tested as possible
substitutes for asbestos, but none of them can duplicate
the variety and combination of advantageous properties
found in asbestos.[424]
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During World War II, a fabric made from glass and
asbestos yarns was developed to extend the limited supply
of asbestos fibers.

The United States Rubber Company

manufactured a similar fabric named "Asbeston," which was
said to be well-adapted for theatre curtains as well as
fireproof draperies in ships, schools, hospitals, libraries,
and hotels. Glass fibers have proven to be unsuitable as a
replacement for asbestos in asbestos-cement and in friction
products.[425]
In 1990, the EPA added man-made minerals, including
glass fibers, rock wool, and slag wool fibers, to the list
of hazardous air pollutants.[426]

On July 1, 1994, the

Department of Health and Human Services classified fiber
glass insulation as a suspected cancer-causing agent, and
listed it, along with radon, as one of seven additions to
the Annual Report on Carcinogens.

Fiberglass insulation,

common in most homes, was said to be "perfectly safe when
handled properly."[427]
asbestos.

The same could be said about

Currently, there is no defined or universally

accepted threshold level below which exposure to airborne
asbestos fibers can be considered safe.

12.11 OSHA Final Rule, 1994
12.11.1

Challenges to the 1986 OSHA Standard

Various provisions in OSHA's 1986 standard were challenged
by the Building and Trades Department of the AFL-CIO, and
the Asbestos Information Association (AIA).

The Court of
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Appeals upheld most of the provisions, but found that the
ban on all spraying of asbestos containing products was
unsubstantiated.

The court ruled that the use of asbestos

in encapsulating sprays would have to be allowed.

In that

process, asbestos is simultaneously sprayed and coated with
resin, binding the fibers onto a surface.

OSHA was ordered

to take action on the ban, and other issues, by December 14,
1988.
A second set of issues included smoking controls, the
effective use of respirators, and the use of bilingual
warnings and labels.
January 28, 1990.

OSHA responded to these issues on

With the court's consent, an extension

of time was granted to coordinate a proposal for a third
set of three issues, with EPA and other regulatory agencies.
These revisions were published in a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking on July 20.

The time scheduled for receiving

comments on these issues was extended, and an informal
hearing was held from January 23 to February 8, 1991.

The

post-hearing briefing period was extended to July 24, 1991.
On June 8, 1992, the definition of asbestos in the 1986
standard was amended to delete the non-asbestos forms of
tremolite, actin, and anthrophyllite.

In November, the

comment period was re-opened, to allow additional public
commentary on options to protect workers from inadvertent
exposure to asbestos in buildings.

Although not part of the

court's remand order, the issue had been raised by OSHA and
others.

In 1988, the Service Employees International Union
(SEIU) petitioned, and subsequently sued EPA, seeking regu
lation of asbestos usage in public and commercial buildings.
As a result, EPA convened a series of joint meetings between
May 1989 and May 1990.

Representation at these meetings

included OSHA, unions, states, asbestos manufacturers, con
sultants and contractors, public interest groups, and other
interested parties from the realty, lending, and insurance
industries.

"The major area of disagreement in the group

dealt with the characterization of risk to general building
occupants and office workers."[428]

The need for specific

federal inspection requirements was also disputed, but the
group agreed that building service workers should be made
aware of the presence of asbestos.

As a result of these

discussions, OSHA and EPA collaborated to enhance the com
patibility of their respective regulations.

The comment

period closed on January 4, 1993.

12.11.2

OSHA 1994 Final

On August 10, 1994, OSHA

Rule
published its final rule

for

exposure to asbestos, which became effective on October 11.
The evolution of the current PEL for asbestos, and details
of the standards are included in the Codes of Federal Regu
lation (CFR ).

Occupational exposure to asbestos in general

industry is codified in 29 CFR 1910.1001, in the construc
tion industry in 29 CFR 1926.1101 (previously 1926.58), and
in the shipyard industry in 29 CFR 1915.1001.

The standards
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include four classes of construction activity.

Class I,

for removal of known or presumed ACM, is the most hazardous,
high risk activity.

Class II involves removal activities

that are not high risk.

Class III involves repair and

maintenance work where ACM or presumed ACM is disturbed.
Class IV includes maintenance and custodial activities where
employees may contact ACM.

Clean up of ACM waste and debris

is also included in Class IV.

As the hazard of an activity

increases, the prescribed controls become more stringent.
Mandatory methods of control for brake and clutch repair are
included in the standard for general industry.

This group of

workers remains the most highly exposed to episodic releases,
although the exposures are sporadic.
The TWA-PEL was reduced to 0.1 f/cc for all industries,
because "this limit is feasible for most industry sectors to
reach most of the t i m e ."

A lower PEL "would be particularly

unsuitable as compliance criteria because it is difficult to
reliably measure."

Such measurements, when taken, would not

insure that employers had complied with the standard.

In

contrast, it would be easier to determine whether or not
specified work practices were being followed.
OSHA's 1984 risk assessment had shown that significant
risk would be reduced, but not eliminated, at the 0.1 f/cc
level of exposure.

At that level, the risk of cancer would

be reduced to 3.4 per 1,000 workers, with a twenty year
exposure risk of 2.3 per 1,000 workers.

OSHA acknowledged

that significant health risk remained at the 0.1 f/cc level,
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and mandated "operation-specific work practices" in the 1994
standard, as the "most cost-effective means of assuring that
significant risk is eliminated to the extent feasible."[429]

12.12

Conclusion

The use of asbestos has been banned in several countries,
but it is still a marketable commodity in segments of the
global economy.

The possibility of financial ruin from

disability claims, the potential of future lawsuits, the
massive education and training campaign conducted to launch
AHERA, the educated consumer's disfavor, and the specter of
regulatory enforcement, were factors which led to a drastic
reduction in domestic production, and use of asbestos-con
taining products in the United States.
The public rulemaking process, formalized by the OSHAct,
cut its teeth on asbestos.

The regulatory policy adopted for

friable asbestos, to reduce the exposure level to the lowest
feasible limit, was realized in the 1994 OSHA standard.

The

limits of detection of the most widely and readily available
technology now matches the regulatory definition of an
asbestos fiber at the 0.1 f/cc PEL, a level recommended
by NIOSH in 1976.[430]
OSHA standards will continue to come under attack by
various industries and interests which continue to downplay
the adverse health effects of their products.

However

imperfect the regulatory mechanism may be, the reality of
enforceable federal regulations with comprehensive standards
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and practices to protect workers, and prevent injury and
death as a consequence of performing one's duties in the
workplace, has changed the laissez-faire relationship that
previously existed between government and industry.
Having executed the policy adopted for exposure to
asbestos, regulatory agencies have turned their attention
to other pressing matters.

The prodigious amount of asbes

tos that was used in the United States has provided reason,
at various times, for both profit and panic.

The amount of

ACM still in place, and still in commerce, will continue to
provide sources of potential exposure.
Thirty years after the 1964 studies by Selikoff et al.,
and twenty-five years after the OSHAct, a much wider aware
ness of the hazards and how to prevent or protect against
them exists.

Regarding the scientific literature, Peters

notes the importance of distinguishing between causation
of cancer and causation of asbestosis, because much, if not
most, of the attention, experimental studies, and general
conclusions have been based on the latter, as were the
first TLV and the latest PEL limits levels for exposure to
asbestos.

Information and literature on every aspect of

asbestos is more abundant than ever.

These are tools to be

utilized, because the bottom line is still caveat emptor.

APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY

ACM

Asbestos-Containing Material.
EPA
defines ACM as any material containing
more than one percent asbestos by weight.

ACGIH

American Conference of Governmental
Industrial Hygienists recommends TLVs.

AFL-CIO

American Federation of Labor and Congress
of Industrial Organizations labor union.

AHF

Air Hygiene Foundation. Begun by the
Mellon Institute in 1935, and renamed the
Industrial Hygiene Foundation (IHF) in 1947,

AIA

Asbestos Information Association.

AIHA

American Industrial Hygiene Association.

AMA

American Medical Association.

Abatement

Procedures to control fiber release from
ACM, which may include repair, encapsula
tion, enclosure, or removal.

Air Sampling

Samples taken under ambient conditions,
then analyzed to determine the concen
tration of airborne contaminants, as a
measure of the level of exposure.

Asbestos

The common and commercial name for
a group of fibrous minerals.

CAG

Carcinogins Assessment Group of the EPA.

CPSC

Consumer Product Safety Commission.

CERCLA

Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act.

DOL

U. S. Department of Labor

EPA

U. S. Environmental Protection Acency.

Encapsulation

Using a paint or sealant product to
adhere asbestos fibers to a surface.

Enclosure

Using barriers to surround, enclose,
or seal off ACM.
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f/cc

Fibers per cubic centimeter of air.

FDA

Food and Drug Administration.

Friable

Material which can be crumbled,
pulverized, or reduced to powder
by hand pressure.

IAHFIAW

International Association of Heat and
Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers.

IARC

International Agency for Research in
Cancer classifies chemicals according
to their cancer-causing potential.

IHF

Industrial Hygiene Foundation of
America, evolved from the AHF.

ILO

International Labor Organization.

impinger

A dust trapping device that was used to
obtain samples, which were analyzed by
microscope at a magnification of 100X.

Industrial
Hygienist

A professional qualified by education,
training, and experience to anticipate,
recognize, evaluate and develop controls
for occupational health hazards.

Latency

The time period between exposure
and manifestation of disease.

mppcf

Million parts per cubic foot.

MSHA

Mine and Safety Health Administration.

NESHAP

National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants.

NIOSH

National Institute for Occupational
Health and Safety.

NTP

National Toxicology Program tests
chemicals and reviews evidence for cancer.

O & M

Operations and Maintenance plans and
programs, initiated under AHERA, to
control and prevent exposure to friable
asbestos in buildings.

OSHA

The Occupational Safety and Health
Administration within the Department
of Labor administers the OSHAct.
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PEL

Permissible Exposure Limit. Levels of
occupational exposure set by OSHA.

PCM

Phase contrast microscopy.
The most
readily available, lowest cost method
for analyzing air samples. NIOSH Method
#7400 describes the procedure.

PLM

Polarized Light Microscopy, used to
analyze bulk, and surface or wipe samples.

RCRA

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.

TAP

Technical Assistance Program, started in
1979 by EPA, established a Regional Asbestos
Coordinator in each of agencies ten regional
offices.

TEM

Transmission electron microscopy. Required
by AHERA for analyzing air samples for final
clearance in abatement projects.
Magnifica
tions range from lOOOx to over 250,000X. Can
distinguish asbestos fibers from others.
NIOSH Method #7402 prescribes the procedure.

TLV

Threshold Limit Values.
Levels of exposure
recommended by the ACGIH.

TLV-C

TLV-Ceiling.
The concentration which
should not be exceeded.

TWA

Time-weighted average.
Refers to the
average air concentration of contaminants
during a particular sampling period.

UNARCO

The Union Asbestos & Rubber Company.

APPENDIX B
Numerical limit levels adopted for
exposure to airborne asbestos,
1946-1994
OSHA
PEL

5 mppcf

1946
1963

ACGIH changed MACs to TLVs
12 f/cc, or
2 mppcf *

1968
1970

OSHAct signed Dec. 29

1971

OSHAct eff. Apr. 29

1972

First consensus,

May 29

ETS issued, Dec.

7

First comprehensive, June 7

12 f/cc
5 f/cc
5 f/cc
5 f/cc

1974
1976

ACGIH
TLV

Effective July 1

2 f/cc

1978
0.2 f/cc
crocidolite
0.5
amosite
2.0
others

1980

0.2 f/cc

1986
1994

Issued August 10
Eff. Oct. 11, 1994

0.1 f/cc

* 12 f/cc for asbestos or 2 mppcf for all fibers.
The conversion factor used was 6 f/cc = 1 mppcf.

APPENDIX C
MEASURING AIRBORNE ASBESTOS CONCENTRATIONS
C.l

Common Units for Measuring Fiber Concentrations
mppcf = millions of particles per cubic foot
f/cc = fibers per cubic centimeter
ppcc = particles per cubic centimeter
= 35.3 x mppcf

Length
1 meter (m) =
=
=
=

39.37 inches, or 3.28 ft
100 centimeters (cm)
1,000,000 microns (um)
10,000,000,000 Angstroms (A)

Volume
1 cubic meter (m3) =
=
1 liter (1) =
=

35.3 cf
1,000,000 cubic centimers (cc)
1,000 milliliters (ml)
61.02 cubic inches

Weight
1 pound = 454 grams (g)
1 gram = 1,000,000,000 nanograms (ng)
Source: EPA. "Guidance for Controlling Asbestos-Containing
Materials in Buildings." (Purple Book)(Washington, D.C.:
GPO, June 1986): B-l.
C.2

Regulatory Definitions of Asbestos Fiber
Aspect Ratio
(Length to Width)

Length
OSHA
Industry
Standards
EPA
AHERA

Greater than
or equal to
5 microns

3:1
or greater

Greater than
or equal to
5 microns

5:1
or greater

New Jersey
Greater than
NJAC 5:23-8
5 microns
(Subchapter 8)
NIOSH #7400
A and B Rules
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3:1
or greater

A Rules.

5:1
or greater

B Rules.
Diameter
less than
3 microns.
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Figure D.l Asbestos fiber lengths in
millimeters with grade designations.
Source: Bureau of Mines. Asbestos. (Department of
Commerce (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1979): 4.

APPENDIX D

PROPERTIES OF ASBESTOS MINERALS[a]

Chemistry[b]
Chrysotile

Mg3Si205(0H)4

Amosite

(Fe2+, Mg)7Si8022(0H)2

Crocidolite

Na2(Fe2+, Mg)3Fe3+2Si8022(0H)2

Anthophyllite

(Mg, Fe2+)7Si8022(0H)2

Tremolite

Ca2Mg5Si8022(OH) 2

Act ino 1 ite

Ca2(Fe2+M g )5S i8022(O H )2

Mineralogy[c]

Crystal
Structure

Crystal
System[c ]

Chrysotile

Sheet
silicate

Fibrous
and asbestiform

Monoclinic
and orthohombic

Amosite

Double chain

Prismatic,
lamellar to
fibrous

Monoclinic

Crocidolite

Double chain

Fibrous

Monoclinic

Anthophyllite

Double chain

Prismatic,
lamellar to
f ibrous

Orthohombic

Tremolite/
Actinolite

Double chain

Long and thin
columnar to
fibrous

Monoclinic
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Morphology[b]

Cleavage[c]

Specific
Gravity

Filtration

Chrysotile

Wavy, curly
fibers

Perfect

2.4-2.6

Slow

Amosite

Straight,
rigid fibers

Good

3.1-3.25

Fast

Crocidolite

Straight,
rigid fibers

Good

3.2-3.3

Fast

Anthophyllite

Straight,
single fibers

Perfect

Tremolite/
Actinolite

Straight,
Good
single, or
composite fibers

Fusion
Point,
°F

Specific
Heat,
Btu/lb/°F

2.85-3.1
2.9-3.2/
3.0-3.2

Electric
Charge

Medium
Medium

Resistance
to Destruc
tion from
Heat

Chrysotile

2770

0.266

Positive

Good.
Brittle at
high temp.

Amosite

2550

0.193

Negative

Good.
Brittle at
high temp.

Crocidolite

2180

0.201

Negative

Poor,fuses

Anthophyllite

2675

0.210

Negative

Very good

Tremolite/
Actinolite

2400/
2540

0.212/
0.217

Negative

Fair to
good/ —
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Color

Luster

Texture

Chrysotile

Green, gray
amber to white

Silky

Soft to harsh

Amosite

Gray, yellow
to dark brown

Vitreous

Coarse but
pliable

Crocidolite

Blue

Silky to
dull

Soft to harsh

Anthophyllite

Yellowish,
brown, gray
ish white

Vitreous
to pearly

Harsh

Tremolite/
Actinolite

Gray-white,
greenish,
yellowish,
bluish

Silky

Harsh

Flexibility

Spinnability

Tensile
Strength,
psi

Chrysotile

High

Very Good

Amosite

Good

Fair

16.000 to
90.000

Crocidolite

Good

Fair

876,000 max.

Anthophy11ite

Poor

Poor

4,000 and
less

Tremolite/
Actinolite

Poor

Poor

1.000 to
8,000/
1.000 and
less

824,000 max.

[a]Source unless noted: Handbook of Asbestos Textiles.
2nd ed., (Philadelphia, Pa.: Asbestos Textile Institute,
1961) 8-9.
[b]Melvin A. Benarde, e d ., Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber.
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990) 14.
fclAsbestos in the Great Lakes Basin with emphasis on Lake
Superior: A Report to The International Joint Commission
from The Great Lakes Research Advisory Board
(Feb. 1975) 9.

APPENDIX E
A8BE8T0S COMPARED with OTHER SUBSTANCES
Table E.l Airborne Concentrations of Dust, mppcf
Substance

Approximate concentration
(millions of particles per cf of air)

Pollen
Dust, rural air
Dust, city air
Dust, industrial district
D ust, dust storm

0.05
0.2
0.5
1.0
2,000

0.2
2.0
5.0
- 20.0
- 3,000

Source: Gross, William F. Applications Manual for Paint and
Protective Coatings. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970): 64
Table E.2 Diameter of Various Fibers
Fiber Diameter,
inches
Human hair
Ramie
Wool
Cotton
Rayon
Nylon
Rock wool
Glass
chrysotile

0.00158
0.000985
0.008 to 0.0011
0.0004
0.0003
0.0003
0.000142 to 0.000284
0.00026
0.000000706 to 0.00000118

Fibrils in one
linear inch
630
1015
910 to 1250
2500
3300
3300
3520 to 7040
3840
850,000 to 1,400,000

Table E.3 Average Tensile Strength of Various Materials
Tensile Strength,
lbs. per sq. in.
Ingot iron
Wrought iron
Carbon steel
"Nichrome" steel
Piano steel wire
Cotton fiber
Rock wool
Glass fiber
Chrysotile
Crocidolite
Amosite
Tremolite

45.000
48.000
155.000
243.000
300.000
73.000 to 89,000
60.000
100.000 to 200,000
80.000 to 200,000
100.000 to 300,000
16.000 to 90,000
1,000 to 8,000
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Table E.4 Surface Area of Various Fibers
Surface Area by N2 Adsorption,
square centimeters per gram
Nylon
Acetate rayon
Cotton
Silk
Wool
Viscose rayon
Chrysotile

3100
3800
7200
7600
9600
9800
130,000 to 220,000

Source for Tables E.2,E.3, E.4: Rosato, D. V. Asbestos: Its
Industrial Applications (New York: Reinhold Publishing,
1959) 42-43, 50.

The density of chrysotile is 2600 g/m3. The density of the
amphiboles is 3000 g/m3.
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Figure E.l Density and temperature of non-asbestos
insulation materials
Source: Burgess, William A. Recognition of Health Hazards
in Industry: A Review of Materials and Processes. New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1981): 158.
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A SBESTO S EXPORTS AND IMPORTS BY COUNTRIES
EXPORTS

Canada

Rhodesia

Union of
South Africa
IM P O R T S

United S tates

United Kingdom

Central and
W estern Europe

n o t a v a ila b le
n o t a v a ila b le
200

300

S h o r t T o n s ( th o u s a n d s )

Figure F.l Asbestos exports and imports by
country in 1938, 1941, and 1945.
Source: Bureau of Mines. 1950 Materials Survey
on Asbestos. (Washington, D. C . : GPO, 1952): IX-1

APPENDIX F

U.S. ASBESTOS CONSUMPTION

Table F.l Allocation of Strategic Grades of Asbestos
by End Use, in 1944
Canadian Spinning Fibers (Chrysotile)

Percent

Woven brake linings and clutch facings
Mechanical packings and gaskets
Navy cable filler
Navy lagging cloth
Maintenance and repair of other
than electrical
Asbestos safety clothing
Aircraft
Asbestos yarn in flexible metal tubing
Miscellaneous textile uses

30
19
18
13
4
4
3
1
8
100

Rhodesian C. & G. Nos. 1 and 2 (Crocidolite)
Navy cable insulation
Electrical equipment new and maintenance
Laminated plastics

African Amosite
Navy felt insulation (lightweight blankets)
Molded amosite insulation
85% magnesia and other
high temp, insulation
Marine insulating board
Sprayed insulation

Source: U.S. Bureau of Mines, 1950 Materials Survey
on Asbestos, National Security Resources Board
(Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1952) XII-9.
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65
25
10
100

39
25
22
11
3
100
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Table F.2

Annual Imports to the U.S., 1935-1950
Short Tons
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942

166,585
243,602
307,188
179,490
242,561
246,613
419,196
419,242

1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950

440,255
383,049
374,354
456,688
594,839
647,881
509,366
705,253

Table F.3 Asbestos Production, 1943-1950
Metric Tons
1943
1944
1945
1946

U.S.

World

5,456
6,048
11,091
12,769

633,800
602,000
632,000
724,000

U.S.
1947
1948
1949
1950

World

21,804
33,649
39,360
38,495

872,000
995,000
895,000
1,206,000

Source: U .S . Bureau of Mines, 1950 Materials Survey on
Asbestos (Washington, D. C . : GPO, 1952) IX-6.
Table F.4 U.S. Asbestos Consumption, 1971-1981
Metric Tons
Domestic
Production
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981

119,000
12,000
137,000
103,000
91,000
104,000
92,256
93,097
93,354
80,079
75,618

Imports
620,000
670,000
721,000
706,000
523,000
596,000
550,693
570,000
513,084
327,296
337,618

Apparent
Consumption
699,000
748,000
804,000
779,000
572,000
659,000
609,157
618,706
560,600
358,700
348,800

Source: Melvin A. Benarde, ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous
Fiber, (Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990) 31. Benarde
notes that figures may not total due to rounding and
deposits/withdrawals from stock piles.
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Table F.5 Asbestos reprocessing plants in New Jersey in 1968
Company

Location

Friction Materials
Johns-Manville Corp.
Raybestos-Manhattan
Reddaway Manufacturing
H. K. Porter Co., Inc.

Manville
Newark
Passaic
Trenton

Asbestos Cement Products
Johns-Manville Corp.
National Gypsum Co.
Philip Carey Manufacturing Co.
GAF Corp.
U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc,

Manville
Millington
Perth Amboy
S o . Bound Brook
South River

Floor Tile
Congoleum-Nairn, Inc.
Johns-Manville Corp.
American Builtrote Rubber Co.,, Inc.

Kearny
Manville
Trenton

Other A=Textiles, B=Paper, C=Miscellaneous
Berkley Hgts
Howard Industries
Bloomfield
Asbestos Corp.
Cranford
Kavon Filter Products Co.
E. Rutherford
Janos Asbestos Co.
Gloucester City
GAF Corp.
Hawthorne
Columbia Filter Co.
Hoboken
Cellulo Co.
Hoboken
Imperial Products Co.
Irvington
Ladden Asbestos Corp. of New Jersey
Jersey City
Smyth Rubber & Packing Co.
Linden
Smith & Kanzler Corp.
Manville
Johns-Manville Corp.
Maplewood
Flaherty-Kennedy Filter Fabrics
Asbestos Products Manufacturing Corp. Newark
Newark
Asbestospray Corp.
New Brunswick
Johns-Manville Corp.
North Bergen
Electrical Insulation Sales Co.
Paterson
Brassbestos Manufacturing Corp.
Paterson
La Favorite Rubber Manufacturing Co.
Phillipsburg
J. T. Baker Chemical Co.
Rochelle Park
Minerals & Insulation C o . , Inc.
Trenton
Baldwin-Ehret, Inc.

A
C
ABC
B
C
C
AB
C
BC
BC
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C

Source: Rajhans, Gyan S . , and Gordon M. Bragg. Engineering
Aspects of Asbestos Dust Control. (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Ann
Arbor Science Publishers, Inc., 1978): 176-182.

APPENDIX G

REGULATION OF ASBESTOS

G.l

Principal Federal Agencies

G.1.1 OSHA
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration in
the Department of Labor is responsible for administering
the OSHAct.

The agency regulates matters of health and

safety in occupational settings, and sets standards and
permissible exposure limits for worker exposure.

G.l.2 EPA
The Environmental Protection Agency enforces public
health and environmental safety laws. EPA regulates
the handling, hauling, and disposal of toxic substances
in air, water, and land, under a number of provisions,
including the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), RCRA,
and CERCLA.
Under the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Control Act,
EPA regulates the asbestos-in-schools programs, to control
and eliminate exposure to friable asbestos in the nation's
elementary and secondary school buildings.

G.l.3 CPSC
The Consumer Product Safety Commission regulates asbestos
in consumer products, under the Consumer Product Safety Act,
and the Federal Hazardous Substance Act.
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G.l.4

MSHA

The Mine and Safety Health Administration regulates
mining and milling of asbestos, and approves respirators.

G.l.5 FDA
The Food and Drug Administration is responsible for
preventing asbestos contamination in food, drugs, and
cosmetics, which might occur during the manufacturing
process.

Sources: Environmental Protection Agency, Asbestos Fact
Book (Washington, D. C . : GPO, Feb., 1985) 3.
Asbestos Exposed: The Inside Story (Philadelphia, Pa.:
Asbestos Victims Special Trust Fund, 1992) 20.

G.2
G.2.1

Regulations Governing Asbestos

OSHA
Construction Industry Standard for Asbestos
29 CFR 1926.1101 (Previously 29 CFR 1926.58).
General Industry Standard for Asbestos
29 CFR 1910.1001
Maritime Industry Standard for Asbestos
29 CFR 1915.1001
Respiratory Protection Standard
29 CFR 1910.134

G.2.2

EPA
Worker Protection Rule
40 CFR 763 Subpart G
Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act (AHERA)
40 CFR 763 Subpart E
National Emission Standard for
Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP)
40 CFR 61 Subpart M
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G.2

Regulations Governing Asbestos (continued)

NESHAP

The National Emission Standard for Hazardous

Air Pollutants prohibits visible emissions to the outside
air.

NESHAP applies to demolition and renovation projects

that disturb more than 260 In.ft. or 160 sq.ft. of ACM over
a one year period.

RCRA

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

regulates the handling, manifesting, and disposal of solid
waste in landfills.

Some states classify ACM waste as

hazardous waste under RCRA.

CERCLA

The Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act Recovery Act, or "Superfund"
Laws, classifies friable asbestos as a hazardous substance.
Source: EPA, "Managing Asbestos in Place: A Building Owner's
Guide to Operations and Maintenance Programs for AsbestosContaining Materials (Washington, D. C . : GPO, July 1990):
26-30.

APPENDIX H

SELECTED EPA PUBLICATIONS for ACM

1979

March. Orange Book.
"Asbestos-Containing Materials in School
Buildings: A Guidance Document."
Part 1 outlines steps schools can take
to conduct an asbestos control program.
Part 2 addresses school personnel,
contractors and others, with emphasis
on inspection and control work.

1983

March. Blue Book
"Guidance for Controlling Friable AsbestosContaining Materials in Buildings"

1985

June. Purple Book
"Guidance for Controlling Asbestos-Containing
Materials in Buildings"

1985

October. Pink Book.
"Asbestos in Buildings: Simplified Sampling
Scheme for Friable Surfacing Materials."

1985

Silver Book
"Measuring airborne asbestos following
an abatement action."

1986

June. "Guidance for Preventing Asbestos
Disease Among Auto Mechanics."

1990

July.
"Managing Asbestos in Place: A Building Owner's
Guide to Operations and Maintenance Programs for
Asbestos-Containing Materials."
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APPENDIX I

B.2 CONSUMER
P R O D U C T LI STBRI G

A ppliance h e a t shielding (millboard)
T oasters
R otisserie broilers
Fireproof wallboard

T his list is a se lectio n of co n su m er prod

M etal-clad fire doors and partitions

u c ts s u s p e c te d of containing a s b e s to s by
th e C o n su m e r P roduct S afety C om m ission.
Not all b ra n d s o r m o d els of th e s e p roducts

Tent garm ents
S tove pipe rings

n ecessa rily contain a s b e sto s .

CLOTH AND WOVEN
PRODUCTS

ASBESTOS PAPER
PRODUCTS

A ppliance wiring
B arbecue fire sta rte rs
Broilers
Curling irons
Electric blankets
H air dryers
H eating pads
R anges

A coustical ceiling tile
Lamp so c k e ts
B urner m ats for g a s sto v e s
Roofing felt (outer layer)
P ipe a n d boiler covering
Vinyl s h e e t flooring backing

Slow cookers
T oasters
Irons

R adiator top insulation
A ppliance h eating shielding (paper)
Slow co o k ers
Hair d ry ers

D eep fat fryers
Electric fry pans

P a p e r s h e e ts for h e a t insulation

A wnings

M illboard
TV an d o th e r electro n ic sw itch p lates

C andlesticks
C atalytic h e a te r m antles

E lectric sw itch boxes
M etal reinforced g a s k e ts (for air-

C igarette lighter w icks
Cord
S e a ls for high tem p eratu re g a sk e ts
Valve steam packings
Insulation for g la ss handling to o ls
Reinforcing for braided wall ste m h o se
T heater curtains
Felt

cooked engines)
E lectrical w ash ers
Linings for ovens, kilns, sa fe s, safety
boxes, incinerators
M illboard sh e e t
W all protection behind heatgen eratin g products
Floor p rotection u n d er w ood and

R einforcem ents in plastics
G ask ets

coal sto v e s

R einforcem ents in a s b e s to s ta p e s
S econdary insulation in high-

S oldering an d w elding blocks
iron r e s ts

tem perature wire and cable
A sphalt im pregnated

R E S O U R C E

M A T E R I A L S
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A S B E S T O S CEMENT
PRODUCTS

S eco n d ary insulation in hightem p eratu re wire and cable
A sphalt im pregnated roofing felts
P iano an d organ felts

W ater, se w e r an d se p tic drain field pipe
A irduct pipe

Flexible air c o n d u cto rs for heating,
co oking and ventilation equipm ent

S h e e t p ro d u cts
Roofing clapboard
Siding
S h in g les

H eating p a d s (elem ent insulation)
Ironing board p a d s and covers

Interior w alls
Boiler an d furnace baffles

Lam p an d lantern m antles
Pipe and boiler covering

Bulk sh eetin g
W elding sh ield s
Baking s h e e ts

P o t h o ld ers an d oven m itts
Flam e re sis ta n t garm ents
G loves
H ats

B lackboards
L aboratory table to p s
Linings for vaults, sa fe s, hum idifiers
an d filing cab in ets

H elm ets
H oods
M ittens

V A R I O U S MATRIX
PRODUCTS

O v erg aiters
S le e v e s
S u its

A dhesives (glues an d epoxies)

U m brellas
A prons
Arm protection
F lam e-resistant blankets

Air d u c t ce m e n t for a sb e sto s -c e m e n t
air d u ct
Buffing and polishing com pounds
C aulks an d putties

B oots
C aps

Floor tile cem en t & m astic

S m o k ers' bibs

Auto body filler

S to v es-C oal an d wood burning

Flashing cem en t

T ape for pipe insulation

F urnace cem en t

Braid an d rope for packing

G lazing com pound for ceram ics

M otion picture sc re e n s

Pipe & boiler coverings

T ent g rom m ents

Roof & drivew ay co atin g s
S ta in s & v arn ish es
A utom otive undercoating
R efrigerant cem en ts
A utom otive muffler repair com pounds

R E S O U R C E

M A T E R I A L S
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PRODUCTS SUBJECT
TO INADVERTENT
ASBESTOS
CONTAMINATION

T extured paint
C e m e n t, drywall & p laste r patching
co m p o u n d s
Artificial g a s fireplace em berizing m aterial

Driveway gravel

P h o n o g rap h records

Fertilizer & lawn care p roducts

CONSUMER PRODUCTS
POSSIBLY CONTAINING
ASBESTOS

Potting m aterials (vermiculite)
P iaysand
T alcs for noncosm etic or food u se
applications

APPLIANCES
Air conditioners
D ish w ash ers
H and-held mixers

MISCELLANEOUS PRODUCTS
A coustical & therm al insulation m aterial,
sp ray ed

P o rta b le electric h e a te rs
P opcorn poppers

A m m unition shell w adding

R efrigerators

A utom otive mufflers

V acuum clean ers
W affle m akers

B arb ecu e firebed m aterials in g as
b a rb e c u e grills

MISCELLANEOUS PRODUCTS
C a rp e t padding
F ireplaces

B oat hull repair kits
Flow er pots

In stan t papier m ache
Light fixtures on railroad
p a s s e n g e r cars

Friction m aterials
C lutch p lates
B rake linings

W elding m asks
File cab in ets

P o tte r's kilns
R einforcem ent in m olded p lastic & ru b b er
A utom otive radiator se alan t
P o ttery clay
P o w d er (asb esto s)
Bulk Fiber
Vinyl a s b e s to s floor tiles
A brasive w heels
Aerial d istre s s flares
M olded p lastics & phenolic lam inates
P ain ts

R E S O U R C E

M A T E R I A L S
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Source: "Asbestos Exposed: The Inside Story."
(Philadelphia, Pa.: Asbestos Victims Special
Trust Fund, 1992): 37-39.

APPENDIX J

Lifetime Risk Values for Selected Situations

Selected ris k s itu a tio n s, m a in ly U .S. d a la :,,!"
Extra high risk
Sm o k in g (all causes o f death)
S m o k in g (cancer only)
H igh risk
M otor vehicle. U.S.. 1975 (deaths)
Elevated risk
Frequent airline passenger (dcalhsi
C irrh u sis o f liver, m oderale drinker (deaths*
M olot accidents, pedestrians. U.S.. 1975 td c a th si
Sk iin g . 40 hours per year (deaths)

L ife tim e risk
p e r 100,0(10

21.900
8 .KO0

1.600

730

290
2 U0

220

M oderate risk
L i g h t d r i n k e r , o n e b ee r p e r d ay ( c a n c e r )

150

D r o w n i n g deaths, all re c r e a ti o n a l c a u s e s

140

A i r p o ll u ti o n . U. S.. h e n z o t a l p y r c n e ( c a n c e r )

1 1(1

N a t u r a l b a c k g r o u n d ra d i a ti o n , s ea le v el ( c a n c e r )

1 10

F r e q u e n t airline p a s s e n g e r , c o s m i c r a y s ( c a n c e r )

1 10

Loss risk
H om e accidents. U.S., 1975 (deaths)
C y clin g (deaths)
Person sharing room w ith sm oker (cancer 1
D iagnostic x-rjys. U.S. (cancer)
(R isk level where few w ould com m it their ow n resources to reduce
risk: R oyal Society. London. I9K3). (270)

KK
75
75
75
70

Vers Low risk
Person living in brick building, additional natural radiation tcancer)
V accination for small pox. per occasion 1death)
O ne transcontinental air flight per year (deathI
S acch arin , average U.S. consum ption (cancel 1
C onsu m in g Miami or New O rleans drinking w ater (cancer)

35
22
22
15
7

(R isk level where very few w ould consider a ction necessary, unless
clear causal links with consum er products. R oyal S ociety. London.
19K3I. (270)
E xtrem ely low "rarc-cvent" risk
One transcontinental air flight per s c a t, natural radiation (canceri
Lightning (deathsi
H urricane (deaths)
C h arco al broiled steak, one per week (cancer)
E N V IR O N M E N T A L A SB ESTO S R IS K .' 19K5. (c a n ce ri
("aro u n d one per lUO.dOO or lower": (his R eport)

7

4
3
3
3
I

Source: Benarde, Melvin A . , Ed. Asbestos:
The Hazardous Fiber. (Boca Raton, Florida:
CRC Press, 1990): 69.
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APPENDIX K
PHOTOGRAPHS
Microscopic Identification of
Chrysotile and Amosite Fibers

Chrysotile
Dispersion Staining
Refractive Index Liquid-1.550
Total Magnification-l48X
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ironm ental

Chrysotile
Crossed Polars with
First Order Red Plate
Total Magnification-155X
Photo by Thomas J. Hopen
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m °crone environmental services, inc.

Chrysotile Asbestos
AHERA Cluster with Selected Area Electron
Diffraction Pattern
(Camera Constant = 64.76 mmA)
Photo by Steve Burris

Amosite
Crossed Polars
Total Magnification-155X
Photo by Thomas J. Hopen

m crone envtfonmental services, inc
Amosite
Central Stop
Dispersion Staining
Refractive Index Liquid-1.680
Total Magnification-155X
Photo by Thomas J. Hopen

Color Photographs Courtesy of McCrone Environmental Services,
Inc.,
850 Pasquinelli Drive, Westmont, 111. 60559.

APPENDIX L
AN ASBESTOS CHRONOLOGY

1760

The Industrial Revolution begins in England.

1776

The signing of the Declaration of Independence
establishes the United States of America.

1791

The New England textile industry begins with a
cotton spinning plant in Pawtucket, Rhode Island.

1858

Henry Ward Johns moves to Brooklyn, and starts
a small roofing materials business.

1861

The Civil War begins.

1866

Asbestos fiber mixed with sodium silicate
was first used as an insulation material.

1869

May 10. The first transcontinental railroad
is established.

1870s

Mining of chrysotile begins in the Italian Alps.
Asbestos coverings for insulating boilers,
and asbestos-cement products were introduced.

1871

The first asbestos textile factory opens in England.

1876

Mining of chrysotile begins in Canada.

1883

The Salamander Association of Boiler and Pipe
Fitters, the first union of absestos workers,
was formed in New York City, N.Y.

1885

Eighty-five percent magnesia insulation using
asbestos fiber as a binder was introduced.

1890

The H. W. Johns Manufacturing Company obtains
its own mine in Canada.

1891

Mining of the first deposits of Cape blue
crocidolite, discovered by a German geologist
named Lichtenstein, near Prieska, South Africa.

1891

The H. W. Johns Manufacturing Company becomes
the largest asbestos manufacturer and dealer
in the world.

1896

The first asbestos textile mill opens
in the United States.
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1898

Johns dies from scarring of the lungs.
The Annual Report of Her Majesty7s Women
Inspectors cites asbestos textile work,
and describes the ill effects of the dust.
Corrugated asbestos paper for air-cell
coverings is introduced.

1900

Murray's post-mortem description of the
lungs of a thirty-three year old asbestos
textile worker documents the first case of
death from asbestosis.

1901

Manville buys out the H. W. Johns Manufacturing
Company to form the new Johns-Manville Company.

1906

The first study of mortality among asbestos
workers appears in an article in the Bulletin
de 1'Inspection du Travail et de 1 'Hygiene
Industrielle.

1907

Amosite discovered in the Transvaal, South
Africa.
Large scale extraction begins in 1908.
Murray reports the first asbestos-related death
in England.
Brake shoes made with asbestos introduced.
The Hours of Service Act regulates working
conditions nationally for the first time.

1912

Johns-Manville begins a complex of asbestos
factories, establishing the town that bears
half its name - Manville, N. J.

1913

The Department of Labor is formed to "foster,
promote and develop" the lot of wage workers.

1914

The Public Health Service's Division
of Occupational Health is formed.

1917

The United States enters World War I .
The first published report of asbestos-related
disease in the United States, by Pancoast.

1918

The U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes
a special study conducted by Frederick Hoffman,
chief actuary for the Prudential Insurance
Company of America.
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1918

Formal founding of Harvard University's School
of Public Health.
The Drinker brothers develop
one of the first comprehensive programs in
industrial hygiene.

1919

Wisconsin enacts worker's compensation
legislation covering asbestosis.

1921

Lighter weight amosite is used in insulation
instead of chrysotile to reduce the weight of
naval vessels, as called for in the Washington
Treaty of Limitations in Tonnage.

1924

July 24. The first clear case of death due to
asbestos exposure is described by W. E. Cooke
in the British Medical Journal.

1927

W. E. Cooke coins the name asbestosis to
describe scarring of the lungs caused by
inhalation of asbestos fibers.
The first disability claim for asbestosis is upheld
by the Massachusetts Industrial Accident Board.
Gardner becomes Director of the Saranac
Laboratories.

1928

Seiler's reports a case of "pure" asbestosis from
South Africa, which prompts a study of hundreds of
asbestos textile workers in England, conducted by
Merewether, Chief Inspector of Factories.

1929

The Raybestos Company, and the Manhattan Rubber
Company consolidate to become Raybestos-Manhattan,
the country's largest manufacturer of friction
products.

1929

Lanza begins a study for the Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company. Completed in 1931, the study
is published four years later, by the Public
Health Service.

1930

April. Construction begins on the Gauley Bridge
tunnel.
Minnesota Medicine reports the first case of
asbestosis found at autopsy in the United States.
Merewether and Price's report on asbestos and
occupational health is published in England.
Legislation on workplace conditions is enacted
the following year, when asbestosis becomes a
compensable disease.
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1930

Industrial medicine has emerged as a distinct
specialty, but industrial hygiene is not yet
recognized as a specialized discipline.

1931 32

Limpet, the first spray applied asbestos
containing product, is developed in England.

1933

Major asbestos producers settle compensation
claims filed by contract insulation workers.
Pancoast testifies as an expert witness for
the defense concerning Gauley Bridge in the
case of Raymond Johnson v. Rinehart and Dennis
and E. J. Perkins, which came to trial in March.

1934

Amosite felt is developed.

1935

January 4. Lanza's study is published
by the Public Health Service.
The Mellon Institute starts the Air Hygiene
Foundation, at industry's request, in response
to the "silicosis problem." The name was changed
to the Industrial Hygiene Foundation (IHF) in 1941.
The spray-on application of asbestos for decorative
finishes is introduced in the United States.

1936

Summer.
Courses in industrial hygiene, sponsored
by the Public Health Service, lead to formation of
the American Conference of Governmental Hygienists.

1938

Lanza's textbook, Silicosis and Asbestosis,
is published.

1938

The Public Health Service has organized industrial
hygiene units in twenty-eight states.
The ACGIH splits from the American
Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA).
A study by Dreessen is published as a Public
Health Service bulletin.
It becomes the basis
for the exposure level recommended by the ACGIH.

1938

German physicians are calling lung cancer
an occupational disease of asbestos workers.

1941

The United States enters World War II.
The AGCIH's Committee on Threshold Limits
is formally established.
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1941

UNARCO begins operation of its plant in Paterson,
New Jersey, to supply insulation for naval vessels.

1942

January 20. Government restrictions are enacted
to insure an adequate supply of strategic types and
grades of asbestos for the war effort.

1943 45

Eight states enact worker's compensation
legislation to cover asbestosis.

1944

Gardner begins the study of Kaylo for
the Owens-Illinois Glass Company.

1945

August. All restrictive orders imposed on
asbestos during World War II are lifted by
the end of the month.

1946

The TLV Committee approves the addition
of asbestos to the MAC list, and begins
publishing an annual report.
Drinker's study of naval shipyards is published.

1947

Hemeon's study of ten asbestos textile
plants is completed, but never published.

1949

Merewether's study on asbestos and lung
cancer is published in England.

1950

February.
The Third International Conference
of Experts on Pneumoconiosis is held in Sydney,
Australia.
From 1940-1950, the demand for asbestos
increased by two hundred percent.

1951

The Lancet publishes Gloyne's study
on lung cancer and asbestosis.

1952

September. The Seventh Saranac Symposium
is held but, unlike the preceding six, its
proceedings are never published.

1953

Selikoff establishes a medical clinic in
Paterson, New Jersey.

1954

UNARCO closes its Paterson plant and begins
a similar operation in Tyler, Texas.

1955

Richard Doll's study in England shows high
rates of lung cancer among asbestos workers.
September. The study on Kaylo is published.
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1958

The Chase Manhattan Bank building in New York
City is the first modern skyscraper to use
spray-on fireproofing containing asbestos.

1960

Wagner's report of thirty-three cases
of mesothelioma in South Africa.

1962

UNARCO sells its Tyler, Texas plant to Pittsburgh
Corning, and leaves the asbestos business.

1963

ACGIH maximum allowable concentrations (MACs)
are renamed threshold limit values (TLVs)

1964

Selikoff's seminal study of insulation workers.
The New York Academy of Science's International
Conference on the "Biological Effects of Asbestos"
is held at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York City.

1967

Asbestos production increased to four million
tons per year, from fifty tons in 1877.

1968

ACGIH issues a Notice of Intended Change which
includes special consideration for crocidolite.
The proposal is dropped, but is reconsidered at
a later date.

1969

Under provisions of the Walsh-Healy Public Contracts
Act, a federal standard of 12 f/cc is enacted.

1970

The Asbestos Information Association is formed.
President Nixon signs the Occupational
Safety and Health Act on December 29.
Seventy percent of the world's asbestos supply
is used in construction products.

1971

March.
EPA lists asbestos as a
toxic air pollutant under NESHAP.

1971

April 28.
The OSHAct becomes effective, and items
on the TLV list become enforceable under federal
law. The TLV for asbestos, remains at 5 mppcf.
May 29. The first consensus standard adopted
under the OSHAct sets an exposure level of 12 f/cc.
October.

NIOSH inspects the Tyler, Texas plant.

The AFL-CIO petitions OSHA to reduce the exposure
level to 2 f/cc.
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1971

December 7. OSHA issues an emergency temporary
standard (E T S) of 5 f/cc, and a peak exposure of
10 f/cc.

1972

February 3. Pittsburgh Corning closes the
Tyler, Texas plant.
February 15. The New York City Council bans
all spraying of asbestos.
June 7. OSHA's first comprehensive health standard
for asbestos sets the permissible exposure limit
(PEL) at 5 f/cc, with a ceiling limit of 10 f/cc.

1973

April.
NESHAP is revised to include the "no visible
emissions" standard.
The use of spray-on asbestos
material for thermal, insulating, or fireproofing
purposes is banned.
Asbestos consumption in the United States reaches
a high point, exceeding 800,000 tons.

1974

ACGIH lists the TLV for asbestos at 5 f/cc.

1975

October 9. A proposal by OSHA to reduce the
PEL to 0.5 f/cc is withdrawn because of the
Supreme Court's decision on benzene.
Collection and disposal of ACM are included
under the NESHAP "no visible emissions" standard.
Three thousand known commercial uses have
been developed for asbestos.

1976

July 1. The 2 f/cc PEL becomes effective,
as called for in the 1972 standard.

1977

Feb. The CPSC is petitioned to ban consumer products
containing tremolite talc.
Dry patching compounds
are banned.
The ban requested on other products,
including play sand, is denied in 1981.

1978

The EPA bans the use of spray-on asbestos for
decorative purposes.
The "no visible emissions"
standard is extended to require removal of ACM prior
to demolition.
April 26. Health, Education, and Welfare Secretary
Joseph A. Califano, Jr. orders the Surgeon General
to send an advisory letter describing the health
risks of exposure to the nation's 400,000
physicians, and urges those who are or were exposed
to asbestos to stop smoking cigarettes.
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1978

June.
The New York Academy of Science's second
major conference, the "Health Hazards of Asbestos
Exposure," is held at the New York Hilton.
Total employment at six mine and mill operations
in the United States is four hundred.
Total world production of all grades and varieties
of asbestos is estimated at 5.6 million metric tons.

1979

March.
The Technical Assistance Program is
established, which includes a Regional Asbestos
Coordinator for each of the EPA's ten regions.
EPA issues the two-part "Orange Book," a guidance
document for handling ACM in the schools.
CPSC negotiates with manufacturers to voluntarily
remove asbestos materials from hair dryers.

1980

September.
EPA issues a proposed rule on the
identification and notification of friable ACM
in schools.
From 1900 to 1980, thirty-six million metric tons
of asbestos were used, and some thirty million tons
was put in place.

1982

June.
EPA's final Identification and Notification
Rule affects public and private, elementary and
secondary schools nationwide.
UNARCO (name changed to UNR) files for bankruptcy.

1982

August 26.
The Manville Corporation files for
reorganization under Chapter 11, after changing
the company's name and moving its headquarters
to Denver, Colorado.
Johns-Manville became a
subsidiary against which more than eleven thousand
lawsuits were filed between 1980 and 1982.
Asbestos consumption drops to 300,000 tons.

1983

Feb.

EPA reports to Congress on ACM in buildings.

Manville sues the government for reimbursement of
health claims paid to former shipyard workers, whose
claims comprise half of those against the company.

1983

June 28. The deadline for schools to meet EPA's
Friable Asbestos-Containing Materials in Schools:
Identification and Notification Rule.
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1983

November 4. OSHA publishes an ETS of 0.5 f/cc,
which is challenged by the industry and subsequently
overturned in Federal District Court, in March,
1984.

1984

April 10. OSHA publishes a proposed rule covering
all industries governed by the OSHAct (maritime,
construction, and general industry).
August 11.
President Reagan signs the Asbestos
School Hazard Abatement Act (ASHAA), a loan and
grant program to help schools eliminate asbestos
hazards.
November 4. OSHA issues an ETS of 0.5 f/cc and
permits the use of respirators.
A court decision,
answering a challenge by the AIA, reverts the PEL
to 2 f/cc.
December.
The Asbestos Action Program is
established in the EPA's Office of Pesticides
and Toxic Substances.

1985

January.
EPA establishes the first supervisory
level training centers for training and
certification of asbestos workers.
June.
EPA issues the "Purple Book," a guidance
document for ACM in buildings.
Approximately two thousand tons of asbestos per
year is mined and processed in the United States.

1986

January.
A proposed Ban and Phase Down Rule
is issued by EPA.
June 20. OSHA publishes new regulations for general
industry and for the construction industry.
The PEL
is reduced to 0.2 f/cc and an action level of 0.1
f/cc is established.
The effective date is July 21.

1986

October 22.
President Reagan signs Public Law
99-519, the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act,
which includes standards for training asbestos
abatement workers.
The Johns-Manville complex in Manville, N. J. is
closed.
At peak production, almost five thousand
workers were employed to manufacture fire-proof
products made with asbestos.

1988

February.
EPA reports to Congress on ACM in
public buildings.
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1988

October 12. This original deadline for schools
to complete inspections and submit management
plans for AHERA is extended until May 9, 1989.
Manville emerges from bankruptcy.

1989

July 9.

Deadline for implementation of AHERA.

July 12. EPA's Asbestos Ban and Phaseout Rule
would ban ACM products by 1997.
The rule is
challenged by the AIA, and overturned by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in October, 1991.
Dec. 14. AHERA requires TEM analysis to establish
final clearance levels for all abatement projects.
1990

Sept. 10. Fire destroys Building A at the
empty Johns-Manville plant in Manville, N. J.

1991

March 6. EPA issues "An Advisory on Asbestos
in Buildings."

1994

February 2. The AFL-CIO challenges the
0.2 f/cc PEL, which is upheld by the court.
August 10. OSHA issues a final rule for
occupational exposure to asbestos, setting
the PEL at 0.1 f/cc.
The effective date is
October 11, 1994.

Figure L.l Trend of Asbestos Use, 1890 to 1980,
in metric to n s .
Source: Benarde, Melvin A., Ed. Asbestos: The
Hazardous Fiber. (Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press,
1990): 10.
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